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Chapter 1  
General introduction 
 
This Chapter introduces the material basis of society, with a focus on metals related to 
low-carbon energy technologies. It also introduces the research questions that will be 
answered in this dissertation.    
 
 
1.1 The importance of the material basis of society  
 
In a time where the service economy is booming and the experience economy and/or 
dream society are seen as the next stage of economic development (Jensen 1999; Pine 
and Gilmore 1999), it is easy to lose track of the physical basis of our prosperity: 
materials. The value of the raw materials we use is, in monetary terms, very small 
compared with global GDP1. However, raw materials provide over 97% of our energy 
in the form of fossil fuels, uranium and combustible renewables  (International 
Energy Agency 2010). In order to produce the remaining 3% with hydropower, wind 
and sunlight we need concrete, steel and many other elements to produce the devices 
needed to capture significant amounts of energy from these diffuse sources. The bulk 
of our food is produced with the aid of a mix of mainly fossil fuels, phosphate rock, 
atmospheric nitrogen, steel and concrete. Even the internet can only exist within 
servers made with the aid of at least two-thirds of the elements in the periodic table 
and which need to be continuously fed by energy that is currently derived mainly from 
fossil fuels. The supply of materials and energy are inextricably linked:  the copious 
supply of cheap energy in the form of easily recoverable oil and coal has facilitated the 
production of cheap materials while at the same the copious supply of cheap materials 
has facilitated the production of cheap energy. This linkage is the core theme of this 
dissertation.       
 
Throughout history the scarcity of raw materials has been an important issue, with 
access to resources a key pre-requisite for the development of complex societies. In 
ancient times, materials were pivotal for the production of tools that could be used to 
increase the efficacy of hunting and gathering and the efficiency of agriculture. 
Precious metals were an essential ingredient facilitating the transition from a gift and 
barter economy to a monetary economy, which in turn facilitated the development of 
early civilizations. Alongside the development of tactics and strategy, materials were 
(and still are) of crucial importance in warfare. An advantage in either weaponry or 
armour will quickly pay off on the battlefield. In the modern era, too, sufficient 
supplies to the military has always been a key concern  In periods of relative material 
scarcity it is often the military that is the first to develop an interest in the security of 
                                               
1 In 2009 the total value of traded fuels, mining products and agricultural products was about $ 3.4 
trillion, while the value of traded manufactured products was about $ 8.3 trillion (WTO 2010). In that 




supply of materials that are important for their gear and equipment (The President's 
materials policy commission 1952; Haglund 1986) .  
 
Although a secure and sufficient supply of materials has been a consistent concern 
over the ages, the availability and thus the production of materials has increased 
exponentially since the start of the industrial revolution. Economic and technological 
development have simultaneously increased both demand for and supply of materials. 
Today we live in an era in which we use more materials than ever before, while at the 
same time the availability of these materials is greater than ever before. There has also 
been a significant increase in both the number of elements to be found in everyday 
products and the number of complex products we use on an everyday basis. 
Moreover, these products can only be manufactured through complex production 
processes with the aid of virtually every element in the periodic table. Since the 
industrial revolution there have been times in which material supply could barely keep 
up with demand, resulting in high commodity prices. Time after time, such periods 
were followed by periods in which supply exceeded demand and prices were low.  
 
The supply, demand and price of materials is  by definition a topic that is studied 
within the discipline of economics. In the early 20th century, Gray and Hotelling and 
others laid the foundations of so-called Resource Economics. From the 1960s to the 
1980s a fierce debate took place between such economists as Solow and Simon and 
environmentalists and ecological economists like Ehrlich and Georgescu-Roegen. The 
former, the resource optimists, argued that resources were more plentiful at that time 
than ever before and that technological progress would ensure that this trend would 
continue into the foreseeable future. The latter, the resource pessimists, argued that 
the use of finite resources and, more so, exponential growth of resource extraction is 
by definition unsustainable and that we therefore needed to decrease the rate of 
extraction so as not to diminish or limit the opportunities of future generations.  
 
One could argue that the resource optimists have been proved right, at least up to the 
previous century. In earlier eras there had been shortages of key metals. There are 
solid indications that the development of the production of 'good iron' was triggered 
by a major disruption in the supply of tin around 1200 BC (Raymond 1984). Once it 
became clear that iron and steel were superior in many applications. the technology to 
produce these materials spread swiftly from Asia Minor to Europe, India and China, 
thereby replacing bronze as the main metal in use (Gilmour 2009). Metal scarcity was 
also one of the factors that darkened the dark ages that lasted from the fall of the 
Roman Empire to the end of the first millennium. After Roman technology, 
infrastructure and organization were lost, metal mining in Europe almost ceased to 
exist except for local and readily accessible sources of iron for weapons and tools. The 
mines in the Rio Tinto area of Spain and the copper mines of Cyprus were forgotten. 
This led to a shortage of precious metals as a basis for currency and external trade, 
severely hampering economic and societal development in the dark ages (Raymond 




The period of high commodity prices in the late 1970s was followed by a period of 
low prices and ample availability that lasted until 2002. However, the 2002-2008 
metals boom, a period of steeply rising metal prices, combined with the birth of 
virtual monopolies for the production of certain scarce metals like the rare earths, 
indium and others put materials scarcity firmly back on the political agenda. Over the 
past decade, numerous reports has been published or initiated by governmental 
organizations on the criticality of resources and the possible effects of future scarcity 
for national and global economic development, including  (American Physical Society 
& Materials Research Society 2011) ,(National Research Council 2008), (U.S. 
Department of Energy 2010), (Ad-hoc Working Group on defining critical raw 
materials 2010), (Angerer et al. 2009), (Oakdene Hollins 2008), (National Institute for 
Materials Science 2008), (Statistics Netherlands 2010). 
 
These reports often start out by defining a framework for determining the criticality of 
specific raw materials. Key factors are then their economic importance, their 
substitutability, the diversity of supply, the size of known resources and reserves and 
the potential for recycling. Although these analyses are useful for identifying supply 
risks, they focus mainly on the short term and seldom take future demand for new 
technologies into account. A noteworthy exception is the German study by Angerer 
(Angerer et al. 2009), which focuses specifically on this issue. Furthermore, in these 
reports there is scarcely any analysis of past episodes of material scarcity or of current 
trends in supply and demand that will determine the long-term future availability of 
materials. This dissertation is concerned precisely with such an analysis of long-term 
trends in the supply and demand of metals, with a specific focus on the metal 
requirements of the transition to a low-carbon energy system.  
 
1.2 The debate on scarcity in recent history  
 
The 2nd World War led to massive worldwide destruction of infrastructure and other 
capital goods, while the development of new weapon systems and defence 
technologies at the same time led to rapid technological progress. After the war this 
led to an increased demand for mineral resources for rebuilding the lost infrastructure 
and for manufacturing all manner of newly developed consumer goods. In addition, 
though, the supply of mineral resources was hampered by the dwindling reserves in 
developed countries, the weakening or severing of colonial ties and the disruption of 
normal trade patterns engendered by the start of the Cold War (The President's 
materials policy commission 1952; Geiser 2001). In the US The President's Materials 
Policy Commission (known as the Paley Commission, after its chairman) was established 
in 1951, during the Korean War. The commission was charged "to make an objective 
inquiry into all major aspects of the problem of assuring an adequate supply of production materials 
for our long-range needs and to make recommendations which will assist me in formulating a 
comprehensive policy on such materials" (Truman 1951). The commission’s report discussed 
the basic principles of the depletion debate, including the formulation of possible 
policies and research agendas. It was this report that laid the foundation of US policy 
on scarcity and resource depletion. Strategic stockpiles of a large number of materials 
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that were deemed critical to the US economy and military were established. The non-
profit corporation Resources for the Future (RfF) was established in 1952 with Paley 
as its Chairman. In 1963 one of the most important works in this field, Scarcity and 
Growth by Barnett and Morse, was published under the flag of RfF.  
 
In the 1970s the oil crisis and the peak in commodity prices combined with growing 
environmental awareness led a whole series of publications on the implications of 
resource scarcity. In 1972 the Club of Rome published their famous "Limits to 
Growth" report (Meadows et al. 1972) and in 1976 an entire issue of Science was 
dedicated to the scarcity of biotic and abiotic resources. Since then, a fierce debate has 
raged between resource optimists (mainly resource economists) and resource 
pessimists (mainly ecological economists, scientists and environmentalists). It is 
important to note that some of the arguments used by both sides are clearly valid. 
Resource optimists point out that the amount of virtually all elements in Earth's crust 
and oceans is more than future generations can conceivably consume. However, as 
resource pessimists point out, exponential growth in resource use, as we are 
experiencing today, is by definition unsustainable. Resource optimists will gladly 
explain that technological progress will increase the efficiency of mining, refining and 
recycling and that this has led to more copious supplies than ever before. Then again, 
however, resource pessimists will point out that ore grades are diminishing  in quality 
and that new deposits are often smaller and harder to access.  
 
1.3 Metal requirements of the energy transition 
 
Materials and especially metals are not only crucial for the production of electronic 
gadgets; they are also indispensable for many future energy technologies. Hydrogen 
fuel cells and electrolysis depend on platinum as a catalyst, Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration (CCS) requires stainless and other special steels for pipelines and 
capture installations, thin-film photovoltaic (PV) solar cells require exotic materials 
like indium and gallium, electric vehicles use lithium or lanthanum in their batteries, 
new-generation direct-drive wind turbines use neodymium- and dysprosium-
containing permanent magnets, and this list goes on.  
 
Climate science tells us that we require a transition from our current fossil fuel-based 
energy system to a low-carbon energy system within the next few decades. This raises 
the question whether the supply of metals can keep up with demand if these low-
carbon technologies are scaled up to substantial levels. This is one of the key 
questions addressed in this dissertation. Pioneering work in this field has been done at 
Chalmers University in Götenborg, Sweden (Andersson and Råde 2001; Råde 2001; 
Abelson and Hammond 1976; Andersson 2001). Andersson and Råde have made 
detailed analyses of the material requirements of two specific technologies: PV solar 
cells and batteries for electric vehicles. Their analysis was based on forecasts of the 
introduction of these technologies and they concluded that the supply of certain 
metals might be an important constraint for specific technologies if no additional 
measures were taken to secure future supply.  
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1.4 Relation of metal scarcity to other issues 
 
The topic of mineral scarcity cannot be interpreted as an isolated issue. In this 
dissertation some of the linkages between metal scarcity and other scarcities and 
environmental issues are described. Although the study of the linkages among these 
various scarcities is still in its infancy, Graedel and van der Voet have dedicated a 
whole volume to probing this topic (Graedel and van der Voet 2010). In the first 
place, energy is required for the extraction of minerals and we will need more energy 
per kg material in the future than we did in the past. Energy is needed mainly in form 
of diesel in mining and in the form of coke (partly as reducing agent) and electricity to 
free the metals from their ores. With respect to copper and nickel, Norgate reports an 
exponential increase in the energy demand of both mining and refining with 
decreasing ore grade (Norgate 2010). At the same time, we will also need huge 
amounts of minerals to tackle the problem of climate change. As will be shown in 
Chapter 3 and 4, most low-carbon energy technologies are more metal-intensive than 
their current fossil fuel-based counterparts. Furthermore, the mix of materials within 
these low-carbon energy technologies is often more complex, too. This follows 
naturally from the fact that it is a move from highly concentrated energy sources 
(fossil fuels) to diffuse energy sources (wind, sunlight, etc.). Another crucial resource 
that is needed in mining operations is water. It is used in the mining itself but above 
all in the refining processes (Humphreys 2010; Mudd 2010). Mudd identifies 
increasing water use and competition for water as a key issue for the future of mining 
in Australia.   
 
The extraction and refining of ores also contributes significantly to other 
environmental problems. Landscape destruction and the disposal of mining 
overburden, including leakages of toxics and accidents with waste water reservoirs and 
tailing ponds, are perhaps the most obvious impacts2.  The energy used in mining and 
processing contributes significantly to the emission of greenhouse gases. In Australia 
mining accounts for 10% of total direct GHG emissions (Australian Government 
2010). These environmental impacts will increase as ore grades decline. As discussed 
earlier, it is even argued that environmental costs will be the main constraint on 
material supply in the future (Mudd 2010). And last, but certainly not least, there are 
the social and geopolitical issues associated with the extraction of resources. Workers’ 
safety and health are important issues in the mining and refining of metals, especially 
in developing countries. Furthermore, there are significant ethical issues related to the 
massive flow of resources from the developing world to the developed countries and 
emerging economies.     
 
 
                                               
2 The most recent example was the tailings dam failure at Kolontar, Hungary in October 2010, involving 




1.5 Methods and tools for analysing the complex interactions between material 
flows 
 
The use of materials lies at the heart of almost all the environmental problems with 
which we are confronted today. Climate change, pollution and depletion are all 
directly linked to the way we use natural resources. Early work on Industrial 
Metabolism (Ayres 1989) has paved the way for a more systemic analysis of the 
material flows in society. In the 1980s and 1990s consistent frameworks for analysis 
(tools) were developed to analyze material flows within the emerging field of 
Industrial Ecology. Economy-wide material and substance flow analysis (MFA and 
SFA) are now used systematically in many countries to analyze the flows of all or 
selected materials. Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is a widely accepted tool for analysing 
the material flows and related environmental impacts associated with a unit product or 
service. Environmentally extended Input Output Analysis (E-IOA) is now being 
developed for economy-wide analysis of production and consumption, including 
environmental impacts. Although the field of Industrial Ecology is still young as a 
scientific discipline, these tools are now widely used as policy-supporting instruments 
within private companies, NGOs and national and international governmental 
institutions.  
 
LCA can be used as a tool to analyse the metal requirements of different energy 
technologies. It has the major advantage of being a comprehensive approach in which 
the entire life cycle is taken into account. This means that not only the materials in the 
wind turbines or CO2 capture facilities are taken into account, but also all those used d 
in the production of components, extraction of raw materials,  
maintenance and processing of waste. The LCA approach therefore yields a more 
complete picture of the full range of materials required for producing electricity. 
However, LCA also has several important limitations. First of all, the level of detail in 
LCA databases is limited. This is a problem when there is a need to quantify the 
volumes of scarce elements which are used in relatively small amounts. Thus, LCA 
databases are not very suitable for answering questions relating to the amount of rare 
earth elements used in computers, for example. Even if one specified the amounts of 
rare earth elements used in the production of hard disks themselves, the LCA would 
add very little information on the use of these scarce elements in the background 
processes (e.g. the production of the materials and electricity needed to produce the 
hard disk), simply because the level of detail on the background processes in the LCA 
database is too low. The LCA approach would therefore have little added value when 
endeavouring to answer such a question. LCA is therefore not particularly suitable for 
calculating the total amount of minor metals used to produce a product or service.  
 
Another important limitation is the fact that the use of a static database for 
background data implies that it can only be employed to analyse the impacts of minor 
changes, i.e. those that do not change the current production system in any significant 
way. A case in point would be the analysis of the effects of an overall change in our 
energy system. LCA is perfectly suitable for comparing 1 kWh produced with a coal-
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fired power plant with 1 kWh produced with a PV solar cell. However, if the question 
is to quantify the implications of a national-scale transition from coal-fired power 
plants to PV solar cells, traditional LCA cannot provide an answer. In a traditional 
LCA only the foreground processes are specified by the user, in this case typically the 
production and use of the PV solar cell. All the other production processes are taken 
from a static LCA database that contains processes like the production of steel and 
concrete, transport and electricity production – which  in the database is based on the 
energy mix currently used. The aluminium used in the PV module is therefore 
produced using the electricity deriving from the current mix. In order to identify the 
implications of a national energy transition, then, the background database needs to be 
modified. However, the energy mix will not be the only thing to change if a national 
energy transition takes place. The entire grid would change, buffer capacity would 
need to be installed, the industry would change its focus, land use might change from 
agriculture to PV solar farms, which in turn would lead to larger food imports, and so 
on.  
 
Integrated Assessment (IA) tools and Material and Substance Flow Analysis 
(MFA/SFA) are much more suitable tools for the analysis of system-wide transitions. 
However, both have limitations of their own. Material Flow Accounting is often 
focused on generating single indicators in which material use is aggregated based 
solely on mass and proceeds from a very high level of aggregation (one nation, or just 
a few sectors), while Substance Flow Analysis  focuses on a single (group of) 
substance(s). Integrated Assessment tools also proceed from a very high level of 
aggregation of processes and sectors and lack the life cycle perspective. Although 
several attempts have been made to include these dynamics in the framework of 
traditional LCA, it is clear that an alternative analysis framework is required that 
permits analysis of system-wide transitions and includes a life-cycle perspective. To fill 
this gap,  Life Cycle Sustainability Analysis (LCSA) has recently been introduced 
(Guinée and Heijungs 2011).  
 
 
1.6 Aim, scope and contents 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the problem of metal scarcity, specifically in 
the context of the introduction of new energy technologies, and to assess the potential 
for using analytical tools from the realm of Industrial Ecology and Integrated 
Assessment to include the complexity of material flows through society in 




This leads to the following research questions: 
1. How did the use of metals co-evolve with human progress and what was the 
role of metals scarcity in that process? 
2. What was the nature of scarcity in previous eras and what was its nature 
perceived to be at the time? And how does the current scarcity situation and 
scarcity debate differ from those in the past? 
3. What are the metal requirements of the transition to a low-carbon energy 
system and will these requirements constrain the scale-up of individual 
technologies or constrain the pace of the energy transition as a whole? 
4. Will these metal requirements, combined with other types of demand, lead to 
significant scarcity in the short- and medium-term future ? 
5. What are the possibilities and limitations of Industrial Ecology and other 
analytical tools when it comes to including the real complexity of material 
flows in societies in sustainability analyses?   
 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation the analysis of the material requirements of low-
carbon energy technologies is taken a step further in two ways. First of all a back-
casting approach is used to analyze the metal requirements for the scenario of a future 
hydrogen economy (2050) based entirely on renewable energy sources. Secondly, the 
whole energy system is taken into account, from energy capture by wind turbines and 
PV solar cells and hydrogen production through transmission via power lines and 
hydrogen pipelines to end-use in fuel cells and electric motors. The main rationale 
behind this part of the study is that we need a massive and rapid transition to a low-
carbon energy system in order to avoid catastrophic climate change. It is therefore 
useful to take a complete transition to a renewables-based energy system as a starting 
point for identifying possible material constraints that might hinder such a transition.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the metal requirements of electrical power generation, and here 
the analysis is taken one step further by including the life-cycle perspective. Life Cycle 
Assessment is used to calculate the metal requirements over the entire life cycle of 
power generation, including the mining and transport of fossil fuels and the materials 
required to produce wind turbines, solar cells and the infrastructure for capturing and 
sequestering carbon dioxide. The metal requirements of three electricity mixes, based 
on three future scenarios for electricity production, are compared. The first is a mix 
based on a scenario in which Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) is applied to all 
fossil fuel-based energy systems. The second is based on a complete transition to non-
fossil energy sources (PV-solar, wind, biomass, hydro and nuclear). The final 
electricity mix is taken from the IEA Blue map scenario and consists of a mix of fossil 
fuels with and without CCS and non-fossil energy sources. The metal requirements of 
all mixes were then compared with current mining output in order to identify possible 
supply bottlenecks on a global scale.            
 
In Chapter 5 current and future trends in the supply and demand of metals are 
analysed, in an attempt to answer the question whether or not materials scarcity might 
constrain the development of society. Metals are of special interest, first of all because 
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approximately three-quarters of all naturally occurring elements are in fact metals. 
Secondly, their specific properties makes them suitable for making complicated, 
strong and yet ductile structures through a process of melting and moulding.  
 
In Chapter 6 the limited scope of both Industrial ecology and Integrated Assessment 
tools, and thus the need for a new analysis framework, is illustrated with the example 
of a hypothetical ban on PVC. It is shown that the complex interactions within a small 
subsector of the economy, the chlorine industry, can have unexpected macro-scale 
implications.   
 
In Chapter 7 the overarching conclusions of this dissertation are presented, followed 
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Chapter 2  
A short history of the importance of metals for humanity and 
the debate on their scarcity 
 
Metals that occur in their metallic form in nature have probably been used for as the 
long as humans roam the world. It was probably some time in the 6th millennium BC 
that humans managed to develop the technology required to release metals from their 
ores. Since then, metals have had a profound impact on human society, most 
prominently through improvements in agriculture, the development of new 
technologies and in warfare. Today metals are an integral part of society and in many 
applications it is hard to imagine non-metallic substitutes.  
 
For as long as metals have been used, scarcity has been an important issue. Precious 
metals are precious because they are scarce. In our time, gold, silver and the platinum-
group metals are considered precious simply because ore deposits of these metals are 
relatively scarce. Their scarcity, together with their relative inertness, makes these 
metals eminently suitable for making jewelry. This, in turn, makes it a useful object for 
investment. In the time of the Egyptian pharaohs, however, iron was much scarcer 
simply because the technology to free iron from its ore was not yet available, despite 
iron-ore resources being very common. The same is true of aluminium, which was not 
freed from its ore until the late 19th century.             
 
Shortages of metals have led to several periods of scarcity. The causes of these 
shortages have varied throughout history. Security of supply routes is one of the key 
issues that has caused shortages ever since metals were first introduced, right up until 
current times, with export quota for rare-earth elements currently a topic of discussion 
within the WTO. Today, the combination of the scale of the use of metals, the 
interdependency throughout global supply chains and the concentration of mining and 
refining in a limited number of countries mean the supply of metals is quite 
vulnerable. Another aspect of supply insecurity relates to the linkages between various 
different resources. In particular, the availability of energy and a suitable reducing 
agent have acted as limiting factors in the past. Until 1740 metal smelting was entirely 
dependent on wood as a source of energy and charcoal, which led to massive 
deforestation. In our era we face a deterioration of ore grades, which is increasing the 
demand for energy, water and land per kilogram of metal produced. At the same time, 
these resources are themselves under pressure from other types of use and through 
the environmental impacts associated with their use.    
 
Finally, shortages of supply may be caused by the fact that supply simply cannot keep 
up with growing demand. Demand shocks have been the major cause of the supply 
shortages encountered over the last century. Until now these shortages were solved 
though additional investments and innovations in mining and exploration but, looking 
into the future, declining ore grades together with the linkages with other resources 




This chapter provides a brief summary of the historical development of the 
importance of metals for humanity and the scarcity associated with that use1. 
 
 
2.1 The importance and scarcity of metals pre-1740  
 
For every living being the availability of sufficient resources is important to sustain its 
existence and that of its offspring. In nature this relates mainly to the availability of 
resources that fulfil basic needs, i.e. air, water, food and shelter.  
 
Before the introduction of agriculture, around 8000 B.C., humans were dependent on 
the availability of game that could be hunted and food that could be gathered from 
nearby ecosystems. Key materials included animal products like bones and skins, and 
wood and other plant materials that could be used for providing shelter and 
fabricating simple tools. The main mineral resources used during what is now called 
the Stone Age were silicon-based: mud, clay, stones (e.g. flint) and rocks. The only 
metals that were used were those that could be found in their metallic or alloyed form: 
gold, silver, copper and meteoric iron/nickel alloys (Craig et al. 2011; Raymond 1984). 
Because of the scarcity of these metallic metals, their use was generally limited to 
ornaments. Use of these metals to be found in nature in their metallic form was 
widespread and occurred everywhere people and metals co-existed.   
 
Climatic changes, population growth and the mass extinction of megafauna at the end 
of last ice age triggered a transition to an agricultural society, which in turn paved the 
way for the development of more complex societies (Ruddiman 2005; Tainter 1988)2. 
During the period between 10,000 and 5,000 years ago, early agricultural societies were 
still Stone Age communities lacking the technology for metal smelting. From a 
mineral resource perspective, little had changed compared with the hunting and 
gathering era. Clay, stone and rock were still the main mineral resources in use. 
Around 9000 B.C. the techniques for making pottery from clay were developed, 
providing superior means of storing and transporting food and water. They also led to 
improvements in building methods, because of the development of bricks and glass. 
The techniques for freeing copper and other metals from their ores were probably 
discovered accidentally in fireplaces and pottery ovens made partially from ore-
containing rocks. The heat together with charcoal as a reducing agent provided the 
right conditions to free the metal from its ore. Metal had three big advantages over 
stone: it was not as brittle, it could be readily formed into the desired shape and it 
                                               
1 A more comprehensive overview of the impact of metals on humankind can be found in a volume by 
Raymond (Raymond 1984). A more complete overview of the literature on resource scarcity is provided 
in an essay by Krautkraemer (Krautkraemer 2003), the works of Barnett and Morse, the revisit of the 
1963 Barnett & Morse analysis by Simpson, Toman and Ayres (Simpson et al. 2005) and the works of 
Robinson, Geiser, Tilton and Radetzki (Robinson 1989; Geiser 2001; Tilton 2003; Radetzki 2008).  
 
2 Whether this transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture was by choice or a necessity caused by 
a growing population, and whether or not this was a good thing for humanity is debatable, as Jared 
Diamond does in his essay "The worst mistake in the history of the human race" (Diamond 1987).     
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could be recycled after a tool, ornament or weapon was broken (Raymond 1984; Craig 
et al. 2011). Early metallurgy was developed more or less independently at different 
times in different locations. The earliest metal smelting probably dates back to the 6th 
millennium BC in Mesopotamia. As in biological evolution, there is a growing body of 
evidence that the development of metallurgy not only proceeded through incremental 
improvements but also through a series of periods of rapid change and innovation. 
One example is given by what Chernykh calls an explosive development in the 
northern Balkans and the Carpathian basin during the Copper Age of the 5th 
millennium BC. He also describes how pastoral nomads formed an important link for 
the spread of metallurgical processes between what are now called Europe and the 
Middle East and China. However, he also notes that although some of the early 
technologies were imported from the West, the development of metallurgy in China 
proceeded in a fairly independent manner, spawning metallurgy that in many ways was 
much more advanced than in the West (Chernykh 2009).  
 
In South America, both Peru and Colombia were rich in placer deposits3 of pure 
metals, mainly copper and gold. Beaten gold objects have been found that date back 
to around 2000 BC. Around the year 0 the technologies to smelt and cast metals were 
developed in Peru. In Colombia a material called 'tumbaga', an alloy of about 30% 
gold and 70% copper was very common. This alloy had the advantage that its melting 
point was lower (800 ºC) than that of the individual metals (1064 ºC and 1084 ºC 
respectively) which made casting much easier. The Colombians were probably the first 
to use platinum, mixed with gold, which also occurred as small grains in placer 
deposits. In Australia there is no evidence of the use of pure metals until the arrival of 
the Europeans (Raymond 1984).     
 
By 3000 BC other metals like silver, tin, lead and zinc were regularly extracted from 
their ores and bronze and bronze-like alloys were being produced in Eurasia. Metals 
became important mineral resources for society (Craig et al. 2011; Raymond 1984). 
Lead only became important when the Greeks and Romans started using it for piping 
and storing water. By combining copper with tin to form bronze a far less ductile 
metal was produced that gave societies the opportunity to produce more sophisticated 
craftwork, tools, weapons and armour. The start of the Bronze Age coincided with the 
development of the first major cities in Mesopotamia. Because of the dispersion of 
sources of copper and tin, the Bronze Age also marked the first time in human history 
that civilizations were dependent on foreign resources and long-range transport of 
minerals (Craig et al. 2011).  
 
After bronze, some time around 1300-1000 B.C., iron (in the form of wrought iron) 
became the material of choice for tools, weapons and armour because it is much 
stronger and tougher than bronze (Craig et al. 2011; Raymond 1984). Although iron is 
far more abundant than copper, it is harder to extract from its ores. The fires that 
were used to melt bronze and copper were not hot enough to melt iron (1537 °C), but 
the soft iron that was produced was pounded and forged into the desired shape. There 
                                               
3 Deposits of metals that are released from rocks through erosion and have accumulated in river beds.  
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is evidence that this technique was already known from the start of the Bronze Age, 
but that iron was avoided because of the inferior quality of the iron that was produced 
in the rudimentary production processes of the time. It was only after (local) shortages 
of copper and tin occurred that iron was used as an inferior substitute and that 
technologies to produce the superior-quality iron were gradually developed (Raymond 
1984). This may have been the first time in human history that societies were 
confronted with the scarcity of metal resources that were truly important to their 
functioning. In this case the problem was solved by substitution of one metal by 
another, which led to a technological breakthrough and to the development of 
superior materials (wrought iron).  
 
The Eurasian practice of iron extraction from ores probably had a common origin in 
Asia Minor in the early 2nd millennium BC. In pre-modern times, iron production 
from ores was confined to Eurasia; on other continents only meteoric iron was used, 
as a rarity. The basic invention of iron smelting was further developed along three 
different lines in Europe, the Middle East and central southern Asia and China 
(Gilmour 2009). In the 8th century BC the scale of the industry can be illustrated by a 
find of 163 tons of the metal in the form of mainly fish shaped bars in the palace of a 
neo-Assyrian ruler. Iron was probably introduced in China in the 9th to 8th century BC, 
probably through cultural interaction with western Asia. In China, which had a very 
rich tradition of bronze casting, the production of cast iron followed soon after the 
introduction of the metal. Cast iron objects have been found at a site in the province 
of Shangxi that date back to the 8th century BC (Han and Duan 2009; Guo 2009). In 
China, blast furnace technology was in use in the 1st century BC, almost 1500 years 
before it was introduced in Europe around 1340 (Wagner 1999). In a blast furnace, 
ore and charcoal are introduced at the top together with the flux, a mineral material 
that serves as a reducing agent and impurity absorbent, while air is blown in from the 
bottom. The main advantages of a blast furnace are that the temperature easily reaches 
the melting point of iron and that it can be used in a continuous process: ore, charcoal 
and flux can be added at the top while molten iron can be poured into casts from the 
bottom. This innovation made it possible to substantially increase the production of 
(cast) iron objects .    
 
Steel, an alloy of iron and carbon (0.2-2%), which is much stronger and tougher than 
wrought iron and cast iron, was known long before its large-scale introduction in 
Europe in the 18th century. There are still many gaps in our knowledge about the 
development and dissemination of the technologies for producing steel. Steel swords 
dating back to the late 2nd millennium BC have been found in western Iran (Gilmour 
2009). In India high-carbon steel artifacts have been found that were made between 
800 and 400 BC (Srinivasan et al. 2009).  
 
The first steel was probably made during bloomery iron production4. In this process 
part of the end-product, the bloom, with a high carbon content (1.2-1.7%), is separated  
                                               
4 A bloomery is a simple chimney-like oven with an air inlet at the bottom (blown or draught) in which a 
mix of charcoal and iron ore is ignited. In its simplest form the bloomery creates conditions such that the 
History of metals and scarcity 
 23 
and subjected to a process of controlled decarburization consisting of repeated 
heating, forging and folding. This process is stopped when the carbon content has 
been reduced to 0.7-0.8%. There is some evidence that this process, which today is 
still used to make traditional Japanese Samurai swords, was used by the Romans to 
produce steel. Later, steel was produced by heating a mixture of pure or wrought iron 
together with a (biotic) source of carbon in a crucible (carburization) (Gilmour 2009). 
This process allowed for a more homogeneous distribution of the carbon, resulting in 
higher-quality steel. The crucible process was first developed in India around 600 BC 
and it was used to produce 'wootz', a type of steel that was highly valued throughout 
the world from 600 BC until the middle ages. In the Middle East, Indian wootz was 
used to make so-called 'Damascus steel' swords and daggers, which were far superior 
to other steels produced at that time owing to elemental impurities in the ores 
(including rare earths) and the accidental formation of carbon nanotubes in the 
production process (Tripathi and Upadhyay 2009; Raymond 1984; Reibold et al. 
2006).  
 
In Europe the large-scale application of cast iron started with the introduction of the 
blast furnace around AD 1340. This led to the ample availability of cheap iron objects, 
an important factor in the later industrial revolution. The main disadvantage of cast 
iron is that it has a high carbon content (2-4%), making it brittle. The development of 
the technology for larger-scale crucible steel production in the mid-18th century and 
the Bessemer process in 1858, both in England, marked two major breakthroughs for 
the truly widespread use of metals in society. Steel is now one of the most commonly 
used and most versatile materials. Iron mining now accounts for over 90% of all 
primary metal production (U.S. Geological Survey 2010). By changing its composition 
and by adding different kinds of alloys, the properties of steel can be tailor-made for 
many applications. 
 
Although the large-scale use of metals was of key importance for military successes 
and for manufacturing tools and craftwork, until the industrial revolution the material 
basis of societies was still very much bio-based. Building and construction were based 
a on combination of wood and silicon-based materials like rocks and clay. Wood was 
the main source of energy and biomass was the main source of fibres. Even the 
economies of the ancient civilizations like the Greeks and Romans in Europe, the 
Shang and Zhou dynasties in China and the Maya civilization in the Americas were 
dominated by agricultural production (Tainter 1988). However, metals did play an 
important role in both in the military and agricultural realm, providing tools that 
allowed a significant increase in yields (Han and Duan 2009). Military success was 
important in economic terms only as long as the marginal returns of territorial 
expansion were favourable. When opponents were encountered that were of 
equivalent strength or of very low wealth, war become a bad investment (Tainter 
1988; Han and Duan 2009).  
                                                                                                                       
iron oxide is reduced to iron, but with the temperature not high enough to actually melt the iron. The 
product is a mix of iron and slag, from which pure, carbon-free iron is then produced through a process 
of repeated hammering (Raymond 1984).      
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2.2 Metals and wood: interlinked until 1740 
 
The fact that wood/charcoal was the only fuel that could be used for the smelting of 
metals created a strong link between abiotic and biotic resources. Perlin describes how 
Cyprus, which at the time had huge copper ore reserves, was deforested twice because 
of the need for fuel for copper smelting: during the Late Bronze Age between 1500-
1200 BC and during the Roman annexation, starting in 50 BC. He also argues that 
Roman wealth was to a major extent financed through silver production in Spain, 
which led to the deforestation of over 18,000 km2 of woodlands. He blames part of 
the economic problems of the Roman empire after 200 A.D. on declining silver 
production as result of fuelwood scarcity in Spain, even though ample quantities of 
ore still remained (Perlin 2005).  
 
Perlin describes how the close link between iron smelting and wood remained intact 
until 1750, leading to massive deforestation in England from the 16th to 18th century. 
The scarcity of wood became a serious constraint on economic growth, even after 
coal had become an important energy source. Halfway through the 16th century the 
navy started complaining about the shortage of timber for shipbuilding. In the late 
16th century coal starts to replace wood for heating, despite the 'foul fumes' it 
produced. Perlin quotes Josiah Tucker, an economist of the time, who attributes this 
scarcity to "the superior numbers of people and to the rapid progress which the inhabitants of the 
island have lately made in all arts and sciences, trades and manufacturers." The impurities in coal 
made it impossible to make iron of sufficient quality from unprocessed coal. Only 
after the process to derive coke from coal was optimized in the 1740s could coal 
substitute for charcoal. This allowed for the tripling of iron production in England in 
the period from 1750 to the end of the 18th century (Perlin 2005). Again, the 
substitution of one resource by another was forced by scarcity, but again it led to a 
significant technological breakthrough that allowed for increased growth. Wood 
remained an important resource during the industrial revolution, though, since it was 
extensively used in coal mining, where timber props were used to hold up the mine 
shafts (Perlin 2005).  
 
 
2.3 The industrial revolution, conservationism and resource economics  
     (1740-1930) 
 
Just prior to the industrial revolution, the scarcity of wood paved the way for the use 
of (inferior) coal as a household fuel. In coal mining, pumps were needed to pump off 
water, which led to the development of the steam engine: perhaps the key ingredient 
of the industrial revolution. This revolution triggered a period of rapid economic 
expansion in the Western world that was literally fuelled by the availability of a 
relatively cheap and apparently inexhaustible source of (fossil) energy. This economic 
growth coincided with a huge increase in the consumption of base metals such as iron, 
copper, zinc, tin and lead. These metals were needed for building new infrastructure, 
railways, bridges and modern cities as well as steam engines, trains, ships and cars. At 
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the same time, these new inventions and infrastructure provided a means of bulk 
transport and the heavy equipment and industry required for large-scale mining and 
refining (Burke 1978; Lundgren 1996).  
 
Until the 18th century only nine metals were known to man: antimony, tin, lead, 
mercury, silver, copper, gold, iron and arsenic. From the time of the discovery of iron 
smelting, some 3000 years ago, it took until the late 19th century to find a way to free 
the only metal which is more abundant in Earth’s crust: aluminum. The main reason 
for this late development was that aluminum oxide cannot be reduced to form 
aluminum metal by using carbon (charcoal or coke) as a reducing agent  (the common 
process used to free other metals like iron and copper from their ores), simply because 
the chemical bond between aluminum and oxygen is stronger than that between 
carbon and oxygen. The industrial revolution and the introduction of cheap electricity 
paved the way for the electrolysis process that was used in the first commercial 
aluminum smelters, which became operational in the final decade of the 19th century 
(Raymond 1984).  
 
About a century after the start of the industrial revolution the issue of fast-depleting 
(national/continental) resources, biotic, mineral as well as environmental, was 
recognized by governments and scientists. This resulted in a strong movement of 
conservationists, led amongst others by Theodore Roosevelt. In the US this resulted 
in the regulation of the use of natural resources and the creation of national parks. In 
1908 Roosevelt called a special Governor's Conference on Conservation at the White 
House which focused on the depletion of natural resources within the US (Geiser 
2001).   
 
During the same period economists like Gray (1914) and Hotelling (1931) developed 
the first theoretical economic frameworks of so-called exhaustion theory (Gordon and 
Tilton 2008; Robinson 1989). One of the results of their efforts was the idea that a 
mine owner will always maximize the returns of the deposit by distributing the 
extraction over time (Hotelling 1931). The cake should thus be eaten at just the right 
rate to maximize the returns. For example, if the price of a resource is expected to rise 
in the future, the mine owner will halt extraction and wait for these higher prices. The 
reduced rate of extraction would drive up prices to a level equal to the anticipated 
future price. If this simplest version of Hotelling's exhaustion theory indeed holds,  
current resource prices would be a good indicator for future scarcity. However, 
Hotelling assumed completely rational actors with access to perfect information about 




A good example is the discovery of a giant gas field in the north of the Netherlands in 
1959. This discovery was made at a time that the mainstream opinion was that science 
in general and nuclear power in particular would make energy virtually free. The 
Dutch government therefore decided that the natural gas in the Groningen field 
should be capitalized as soon as possible, i.e. before it became worthless. It started a 
huge infrastructural project to introduce natural gas as a fuel for domestic heating and 
cooking, for industrial and horticultural use and for power production. A dense 
distribution network of pipelines was constructed and long-distance pipelines were 
built to export the gas to other European countries. Of course, energy never became a 
free resource and current natural gas prices are much higher than those in of the 
1960s, when this strategy of quick capitalization was implemented.  
 
Since the publication of Hotelling's theory it has been refined frequently within the 
field of mineral economics which emerged as a separate academic discipline after 
World War II (Gordon and Tilton 2008).  
 
 
2.4 World War II and the take-off of consumerism (1930-1970) 
 
World War II led to huge worldwide destruction and rapid technological 
development. After the war this led to an increased demand for mineral resources for 
rebuilding the lost infrastructure and producing all the newly developed consumer 
goods. In addition, the supply of minerals was hampered by the dwindling resources 
in developed countries, the weakening or severing of colonial ties and the disruption 
of normal trade patterns caused by the start of the Cold War (The President's 
materials policy commission 1952; Geiser 2001). In the US The President's Materials 
Policy Commission (known as the  Paley Commission after its chairman5) was established 
in 1951, during the Korean War. The commission was charged "to make an objective 
inquiry into all major aspects of the problem of assuring an adequate supply of production materials 
for our long-range needs and to make recommendations which will assist me in formulating a 
comprehensive policy on such materials" (Truman 1951). The commission’s report laid down 
the basic principles of the material scarcity debate, including the formulation of 
possible policies and research agendas. It framed the depletion problem as a problem 
of resources that are harder to retrieve: "The threat of the Materials Problem is not that we 
will suddenly wake up to find the last barrel of oil exhausted or the last ton of lead gone, and that 
economic activity has suddenly collapsed. The real problem and deeply serious threat is that we shall 
have to devote constantly increasing efforts to acquire each pound of materials from natural resources 
which are dwindling both in quality and quantity; thus finding ourselves running faster and faster in 
order to stay standing still. In short, the essence of the Material Problem is costs. The real costs of 
materials are not measured primarily in money; they lie in the hours of human work and the amounts 
of capital required to bring a pound of industrial material or unit of energy into useful form".   
 
                                               
5 William S. Paley was best known for his turning CBS into one of the largest broadcasting corporations 
in the US after he bought the company in 1927.    
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In many areas the commission's conclusions can easily be translated to current times. 
For example, it was stated that: 
• technologies should be developed in the areas of exploration of new deposits, 
recycling, bio-based materials and substitution of scarce materials by more 
abundant ones;  
• resources should be used less wastefully and that waste should be treated as a 
source of materials;  
• there should be a shift of focus in the research community (both in academia 
and in private firms) from the generation of basic knowledge to the 
application of this knowledge; 
• there is a trend towards more complex alloys and electronics that will require 
more exotic materials;  
• there is a gap between developed Western nations that have depleted the best 
of their own resources and the developing world that is poor but still 
resource-rich. The commission argued that free trade and the income 
generated by exporting raw materials will help these developing countries to 
increase their standard of living, which in turn will lead to more exports of US 
high-tech products to these countries. It also emphasized the need to invest 
in resource-rich countries to improve their industrial capacity and 
infrastructure;     
• despite many decades of resource depletion and wasteful resource use, 
resources had never before been in more ample supply and that therefore this 
might well be true for coming generations; 
• the resource base of societies shifts over time and it is therefore hard to 
predict which resources should be saved for coming generations;  
• industries are only interested in materials research when confronted with a 
crisis; 
• the problems of resolving the scarcity of materials do not lie in the realm of 
high scientific difficulty but in costs; 
• the problem of material scarcity cannot be solved only by physical science; 
social science, economics and political science are just as important and a 
combined effort by industry, academia and government is needed to resolve 
this issue;  
• oil is a great energy source for now, but sooner or later a return to coal 
(possibly via underground gasification) and/or shale oil will have to be made. 
Energy efficiency is key to a sustainable energy supply and cars should be 
made far more efficient.       
 
The commission took a strong stand against self-sufficiency as a leading principle for 
securing supply. In contrast, it propagated the Least Cost Principle as leading: the 
main aim of any resource policy should be to supply the nation’s industry with the 
cheapest resources. It therefore also focused on international free trade and investing 
in resource-rich countries as something that should be promoted by policy makers. It 
also stated that tariffs and other restrictions on trade would have a detrimental effect 
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on the resource availability. However, at the same time it proposed the expansion of 
national stockpiling of materials and bilateral agreements with resource-exporting 
countries, both of which disrupt free markets and trade. The stockpiling strategy that 
followed until the end of the 1950s was in fact used to keep resource prices high in 
support of domestic mining in an attempt to retain self-sufficiency, and thus against 
the advice of the commission. It was driven by fears that the Cold War might turn 
into a hot war and that domestic supply of materials would be essential for victory. 
This policy resulted first in artificially high world market prices and, after the policy 
was abandoned, in huge stocks with a much depreciated value. In turn, these high 
prices gave foreign producers a chance to build there own mines and refineries, which 
after this period of stockpiling outcompeted US mines, with a disastrous effect on US 
mining (Huddle 1976).  
 
All in all, the report of the Paley commission was a landmark in the debate on 
resource scarcity. Many of the arguments and analyses can readily be translated to the 
current debate. However, after the Korean War commodity prices relaxed and a 
period of relatively little concern about materials scarcity followed until the oil crisis of 
the 1970s (Radetzki 2008).         
 
 
2.5 Environmentalism, the oil crisis and the framing of sustainability  
       (1960-1980) 
 
In 1952, mainly as a result of the Paley report, Resources for the Future Inc. (RfF) was 
established as a non-profit corporation for research and education in the development, conservation 
and use of natural resources.  It was financed by the Ford Foundation and Paley himself 
took the job as Chairman of the board of directors.  In 1963, RfF published a book by 
Barnett and Morse in which an empirical analysis was made of resource scarcity for 
the US in the period 1870-1958 (Barnett and Morse 1963). Their main conclusion was 
that no empirical evidence could be found for increased scarcity, but that in fact the 
availability of all resources had increased during that period, with the sole exception of 
forests.  
 
However, the 1960s also marked the start of awareness of the environmental 
consequences of exponential growth in industrial activities and connected material 
flows. With her book “Silent Spring” Rachel Carson brought the environmental 
problems caused by the widespread use of persistent pesticides to public attention 
(Carson 1962). In 1968 Paul Ehrlich sketched a Malthusian doom scenario for the 
decades ahead (Ehrlich 1968). In his analysis, global food production would be unable 
to keep up with exponential population growth, and starvation would be the fate for 
millions.  
 
In 1968 the Club of Rome was founded as a global think-tank on a variety of issues 
and in 1972 its report "The Limits to Growth" was published (Meadows et al. 1972). 
The report demonstrated the interdependence of the world’s economies and the 
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vulnerability of resource-importing countries to supply disruptions. As with the Paley 
report, the Club of Rome triggered a debate about  materials scarcity and again much 
of the discussion of the 1970s can easily be translated to the debate underway today. 
Security of supply, strategic stockpiling, self-sufficiency, recycling and 
dematerialization were back on top of the political agenda.  
 
The "Limits to Growth" report, which was published as a book, was unique because 
the first computers made it possible to create system dynamic models that could be 
used to calculate the effects of different scenarios on resource depletion and 
emissions. About a year later, in October 1973, the first oil crisis was a fact and the 
resource dependency that had been described by the Club of Rome moved from being 
an academic exercise to an event that disrupted everyday life in many parts of the 
world. If there was ever a time that resource scarcity received wide public attention, it 
was then. The report’s main conclusion was that if the exponential growth of 
population, industrial activities and resource use remained unchecked, the result would 
be resource depletion and collapse of environmental quality by the middle of the 21st 
century. Although the report received a lot of criticism and certain assumptions were 
over-pessimistic, recent updates and analysis have shown that in many respects the 
global economy is still following the path of the scenarios described in “Limits to 
Growth” (Turner 2008).     
 
The scientific community regained interest in the topic, which in February 1976 
culminated in an entire issue of Science (Volume 191, Number 4228) containing 25 
articles devoted to materials but with a focus on scarcity. Again, as with the Paley 
report, many of the articles can easily be translated to the current debate. The range of 
topics addressed in these articles show that the discussions of the problem, including 
possible strategies for solutions, are very similar to those at the time of the Paley 
Commission and the ongoing discussion today.  
 
Cook discusses the limits to the exploitation of non-renewable materials (Cook 1976). 
His first observation is that in the previous two centuries the cost of resources has 
decreased and reserves have increased. However, he also finds that over the same 
period the energy intensity of resource recovery has increased as ore grades have 
declined. He argues that this can be explained by decreasing real costs of energy. He 
does not believe this trend will continue much further in the future, because of 
decreasing efficiency of the production and conversion of energy resources. He argues 
that the efficiency of energy conversion is approaching the thermodynamic limits, 
while the energy required for recovering certain resources is increasing exponentially. 
Similar arguments concerning thermodynamic limits of mining and refining efficiency 
can also be found in more recent work (Ayres 2007)  
 
Blum discusses the possibility of tapping the resources present in municipal waste 
(Blum 1976). He recognizes that recycling is a means and not an end in itself. While 
terming municipal solid waste an "urban ore", he considers that although we have the 
technology to recover most of the components it contains it is not always 
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economically prudent to do so. Urban mining is now a common phrase that is used by 
waste processors and industrial ecologists when they discuss recycling and urban 
materials stocks (Kapur and Graedel 2006; Krook et al. 2011). 
  
Chinoweth describes the importance of electronic equipment with respect to both the 
demand for more exotic materials and its potential to reduce demand for materials 
and energy (Chynoweth 1976). He starts by pointing out the enormous potential of 
miniaturization. As an example he takes the pocket calculator that replaced the 
electromechanical desk-top calculator, which was far bulkier and more materials-
intensive. At the same time, however, he recognizes that electronics are more complex 
in terms of materials composition. In a telephone he counted 42 chemical elements, 
present as 35 metals and alloys, 14 types of plastic, 12 varieties of adhesives and 20 
different semi-conductor devices. A similar study of current mobile phones has also 
found over 40 elements in these devices (Meskers and Hagelüken 2009). Chynoweth 
also discusses the vulnerability of the electronics industry to the export policies of raw 
material-producing countries. He concludes, though, that these risks for the sector are 
probably low, because the value of the materials is relatively low compared with the 
price of the products. The electronics industry would thus be better able than other 
industries to absorb raw materials price increases. When it comes to the potential for 
of raw materials substitution he is fairly negative, because the materials have already 
been chosen in such a way that the overall performance of components is optimized. 
More generally, he argues that "the more a society depends on complex and sophisticated 
equipment, the more vulnerable it is to scarcities of certain key materials, even if these are used in very 
modest amounts". He also includes a Life Cycle thought in his analysis when he 
discusses, in quite similar fashion to Williams and Ayres a quarter of a century later 
(Williams et al. 2002), that although the amounts of materials in semi-conductor 
devices are themselves very small, a far great quantity of materials is required for their 
production: “It could well turn out that the principle material constraint on the availability of 
electronic devices will not be in the electronic material itself, but the availability of the necessary 
processing chemicals. Also, it should be kept in mind that the small quantities of electronic materials 
often represent not insignificant expenditures of energy in obtaining them". He also examines the 
potential of electronics for reducing demand for materials through functional 
innovations. He mentions innovations that are common practice today, e.g. the 
potential for telecommunications to reduce personal travel, including telecommuting 
("communicating to work rather than commuting to work") and the internet ("wired community"). 
He goes on to give other examples that can now be found all around us: sensors that 
increase the efficiency of vehicle fuel combustion or monitor room occupancy  to 
control lighting and heating. 
 
Claassen describes the material needs of advanced energy technologies (Claassen 
1976). Although climate change was not yet on the political agenda, he focuses on the 
materials required to increase the efficiency of existing energy technologies and the 
technologies to decrease dependency on exhaustible fossil fuels. Since many elements 
of energy infrastructure require thermal conversion processes, he argues that there is a 
need for materials that can resist higher temperatures. In general, higher temperatures 
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would allow for more efficient thermal energy conversion. Although in general he is 
not worried about shortages of supply of the materials needed to increase the 
efficiency of the energy system, he points out a number of examples where these 
problems might occur: 1) chromium, used in the alloys required in many parts of the 
system, mainly because it comes from a limited number of countries with unknown 
future political stability; 2) gallium arsenide, needed for thin-film PV cells, for which it 
is easy to calculate that reserves would not allow for substantial scale-up, and 3) 
platinum for fuel cells, for which the same holds true. He expected that solar cells 
would be based on abundant materials like silicon, copper and sulphur and that 
molten carbonate fuel cells with nickel-based electrodes would be a good alternative 
for fuel cells with platinum electrodes. Interestingly, all these issues are still being 
discussed today (Wadia et al. 2009; Råde and Andersson 2001; Kanan and Nocera 
2008). He also sees a problem in the supply of equipment made from abundant bulk 
materials. To illustrate this, he points to shortages of steel pipes, generators and 
turbines, as well as draglines and mine trucks and other items with a long delivery lead 
time. Today, the extractive industry is still haunted by a triple pork cycle between 
material demand, mining investments and supplies of draglines, mining truck tyres and 
other mining equipment.   
 
Carpenter describes the tension between materials and environmental quality 
(Carpenter 1976). He starts by framing the problem as a problem of rapidly increasing 
demand for raw materials, combined with a lack effective management of material 
flows which results in both depletion and pollution. He also discusses the fact that ore 
grades are deteriorating and that this will cause increasing energy requirements and 
environmental impacts of mining and refining. Again, these are issues that are still 
being debated today (Mudd 2010, 2007; Norgate and Haque 2010; Norgate 2010). He 
is not very positive about the bio-based economy and notes that agriculture is in itself 
an important source of diffuse pollutants like fertilizers and pesticides. He believes 
that economic instruments and the internalization of environmental costs in raw 
material prices are the best way to manage the environmental effects due to the 
production of these materials. This discussion is well reflected in today's debate on 
biofuels and bioenergy (Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007).    
 
Fried discusses the international trade in raw materials (Fried 1976). He describes how 
the enormous fluctuations in raw material prices are due mainly to rapid changes in 
demand. He eases fears that resource-exporting countries might use their exports as a 
political weapon, as the OPEC did during the 1973oil crisis, arguing that oil is unique 
in both in its importance and its unequal distribution over the globe and in the fact 
that there is an international organization governing exports (OPEC). He favours the 
free market without trade barriers as the best way to achieve an adequate supply of 
materials and does not believe in resource diplomacy. We have now seen that this 
depends very much on the type of mineral resource cocnerned and on the 
organization of the production chain. Although deposits of rare-earth elements can be 
found in many places on every continent, the fact that 95% of production is now in 
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the hands of a single country makes it a possible to use it as political weapon. Chinese 
export quota have led to official complaints within the framework of the WTO.         
 
In 1980 a famous wager was entered by Julian Simon (with a background in business 
administration and business economics) and Paul Ehrlich (with a background in 
population studies and biology). In the late 1960s and 1970s Ehrlich had written a 
number of books and papers on the disastrous consequences of an exponentially 
growing population, predicting Malthusian collapse. Simon, a true cornucopian, 
believed that population growth should be regarded as growth of human capital, 
which he calls the ultimate resource, and thereby a source of innovation (Simon 1981). 
Simon asked Ehrlich to pick any raw material and any date in the future, further than a 
year away, and he would bet that the material's price on that date would be lower than 
at the time of the wager. Ehrlich and some of his colleagues chose copper, chromium, 
nickel, tin and tungsten and a period of 10 years starting in 1980. The outcome of the 































Figure 1-1: Index of price/ton 1998$, 1950=1 for the metals included in the Simon - Ehrlich wager. Data 
source: USGS. 
 
Figure 1-1 shows that Ehrlich and his colleagues lost the wager and that their timing 
was not very good. If the wager had been accepted two years earlier or five years later, 
Ehrlich would have won. Ehrlich explained the loss of the wager as a combination of 
the drop in oil prices in that period and the economic recession in the 1980s (Ehrlich 
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and Ehrlich 1998). However, in the period of the wager only the price of tin actually 
correlates well with the oil price. Furthermore, metal prices kept on decreasing 
through the 1990s, a period of global economic growth. Looking at the development 
of mining of different bulk metals (see Chapter 5) it seems more reasonable to assume 
that the reason that Ehrlich lost the wager was that metal demand per capita in the 
OECD stabilized in the period from 1975 to 2002.  
 
 
2.6 Dematerialization in the OECD and the metals boom (1980-2011)  
 
Again, this period of high commodity prices was followed by a period of relative 
abundance of cheap commodities. Bulk carriers were still getting larger and combined 
with low fuel prices this led to a period of extremely low transport costs (Lundgren 
1996). The scale-up of mining also provided economic advantages, which pushed 
down metal prices despite annual growth rates in mine production of 3-6%. Metal 
prices remained low until what is referred to as the 'great metals boom' (Humphreys 
2010), which in fact was a big boom of all commodities, as can be seen in Figure 1-2. 
The rapid exponential growth in emerging economies in the 1990s and 2000s 
increased demand in those countries from negligible to substantial around the year 
2000. This boom in demand was mainly a result of the rapid build-up of the so-called 
BRIC countries, most notably China. During that period the prices of non-fuel 
























































Figure 1-3: Price index of commodities, nominal $, Data source: IMF. 
 
 
Although the global financial crisis that started at the end of the summer 2008 caused 
a significant price decrease, prices only very briefly reached pre-2002 levels (Figure 1-
2). Although the crisis lasted until mid-2009, non-fuel commodity prices started rising 
again as early as March 2009 (Figure 1-3). Prices peaked again in February-March 2011 
at a level almost 20% higher than that of the 2008 peak. After that the European 
sovereign debt crisis again caused concern about the global economy, leading to a fall 
in commodity prices. In November 2011 non-fuel commodity prices were back at the 
level of the 2008 peak (Figure 1-3).  
 
In the period between 2002 and 2011 a number of publications by authors well 
familiar with the mining industry showed concerns about the supply of metals 
(Humphreys 2010; Mudd 2007; Norgate 2010). Degrading ore grades, the decreased 
deposit size of newly found deposits, constraints in the supply of water and energy, 
and increased local and global environmental concerns were all cited as causing cracks 
in the supply lines.   
 
As a result of the 2002-2008 metals boom and recent supply constraints on certain 
rare (earth) metals, many governmental organizations, NGOs and research 
organizations have issued reports in which critical materials for the local and global 
economy have been defined6. All the world’s major economies are now assessing the 
                                               
6 (RWI et al. 2006; National Research Council 2007; Morley and Eatherley 2008; National Institute for 
Materials Science 2008; Angerer et al. 2009; Ad-hoc Working Group on defining critical raw materials 
2010; Statistics Netherlands 2010; U.S. Department of Energy 2010; American Physical Society & 
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possible impact of metals scarcity and policy measures, including the mechanisms of 
the WTO, to ensure free commodity trade, national stockpiles for strategic materials 
and bilateral agreements with supplier countries. The establishment of the UN 
Resource Panel is a clear sign that the international community deems resource-related 
issues to be a major concern for the coming decades.  
 
The question is whether the current episode of apparent metals scarcity is any 
different from the scarcity episodes society has faced in the past. In the past, scarcity 
has always been a temporary issue and was followed by periods of abundance, either 
through technological progress increasing mining efficiency and allowing access to 
formerly unsuitable deposits, or through the scope for accessing new materials to 
replace the old ones. Will this happen in the present period of scarcity? There are 
some indications that solutions from the past now no longer work. This question will 
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Chapter 3  
Resource constraints in a hydrogen economy based on 




In order to tackle climate change, a transition to a renewable based energy system is 
crucial. A renewable based hydrogen economy is one of the possible implementations 
of such a system. The world receives ample energy from the sun that can be harvested 
by PV solar cells and, indirectly, by wind turbines. In order to use the most optimal 
locations for collecting and concentrating energy from these diffuse sources a long 
distance transmission network is needed. Mature and semi-mature technologies are 
available for all parts of the system: from collection to transmission to end-use. In an 
early stage the development, when new technologies have to win market share from 
the existing energy system, their development is driven almost exclusively by the 
reduction of costs per J delivered. However, if a technology should be able to deliver 
tens to hundreds of EJ, resource constraints can become show-stoppers. Many of the 
newest, most cost-efficient,  energy technologies make use scarce resources and, 
although they may play an important role in the transition process, they cannot be 
scaled up the level we need for a complete transition. In most cases however other 
technologies are available that use more abundant materials, be it often at a cost of 
efficiency. The issue is not only with scarce resources. The sheer size of the energy 
transition will also challenge the industrial capacity for the mining and production of 
bulk materials like steel and copper.       
 
Reprinted with minor changes from: Kleijn, R. and E. van der Voet. 2010. Resource constraints in 
a hydrogen economy based on renewable energy sources: An exploration. Renewable and sustainable 





The world is preparing for a transition from a fossil fuels based energy system to a 
system of renewable energy. One important option being discussed is the so-called 
hydrogen economy (European Commission 2003; The White House 2004; U.S. 
Department of Energy 2004; Okano 2003): an energy system relying on hydrogen as 
its main energy carrier, instead of fossil fuels. This envisaged transition is partly driven 
by concerns about the environmental impact, especially global warming, connected to 
the current energy system, and partly by arguments related to security of energy 
supply.  
 
Large-scale transitions cause many changes in society.  It is a good idea, therefore, to 
assess beforehand what the consequences might be of such a transition. These 
consequences can be various. A first question is: does it actually solve the problem it is 
supposed to solve? Although a hydrogen economy is generally propagated as a "clean" 
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alternative for the current fossil fuel based economy, it is the question how "clean" 
this hydrogen economy truly may be. Even if renewable energy sources would be used 
to produce hydrogen, a number of environmental issues would remain whilst 
additional new problems might occur. In a hydrogen economy, hydrogen and water 
are emitted. The emission of molecular hydrogen has been the topic of a debate on 
the possible effects of these emissions, specifically on stratospheric ozone and on 
climate change (Tromp et al. 2003; Schultz et al. 2003; Prather 2003).  
 
A second question relates to the feasibility of such a new system. Can it actually be 
built and implemented? When starting to envisage what a hydrogen economy would 
look like, a first step is to conceive a technological description of such a system. The 
production, transport and use of hydrogen as a fuel requires a whole series of new 
processes, materials, products and infrastructure which all will require resources and 
will have an environmental impact of their own. The same is true for the actual 
generation of energy, which in a renewable energy system will be done by other means 
than combusting fossil fuels, for example by using solar cells, wind power, biomass 
etc. There is a high risk of running into resource constraints of one sort or another, 
simply because of the stunningly large scale of such a transition. 
 
In this article, we will address this last issue, as a very important one. The central 
question in this paper is the following: Will a  transition to a hydrogen economy based 
on renewable energy sources run into resource constraints? In order to answer this 
question we try to create a picture of a world with hydrogen and electricity as the main 
energy carriers and renewables as the only energy source. We will, as well as possible, 
quantify the main parts of such a system, and we will assess whether or not resource 
constraints can be expected. Although it is clear to us that a world without fossil fuels 
is an extreme case (Odell 2004). and there will be many hurdles on the way towards 
such a world, the dynamics of the transition process itself will not be addressed in this 
exploratory work. Also, we will not address economic and social consequences or the 
difficulties of actually realizing the transition politically or legally. It will be a technical 
description, targeted at the issue of potential “show stoppers” in a technical sense. 
 
 
3.2 Core assumptions in the case study 
 
For the technical specification of a renewables based hydrogen economy, we have 
defined the following starting points: 
• the case describes a hypothetical energy system, roughly in the year 2050; the 
path towards this situation is not a part of the study; 
• basic data like population, GDP and energy demand in 2050 are taken from 
the UNEP Markets First Scenario, see Table 3-1 (UNEP 2002); 
• although in the Markets First Scenario the bulk of the primary energy still 
comes from fossil fuels, we describe a purely hypothetical situation in which 
all energy comes from renewable sources; 
• we assume that the role of biomass based energy will be limited; 
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• we assume that the renewables mix for primary energy will be 80% PV solar, 
15% wind and 5% other (renewable) sources; 
• electricity and hydrogen are considered the only two energy carriers. 
 
These starting points are elaborated below. 
 
Table 3-1: Key variables of the IPCC SRES Markets First Scenario 
 1990 2050 unit multiplier 
population 5302 9386 million 1.8 
GDP 25293 191767 billion US $ (1995) 7.6 
primary energy use 356 1278 EJ 3.6 
Source: (UNEP 2002). 
 
3.2.1 Base year & scenario 
The choice for the year 2050 is rather arbitrary as a year which is sufficiently far in the 
future to envisage a novel energy system while not too distant to still have reasonable 
estimates of basic data like world population and GDP. Furthermore, if we seriously 
want to address climate change the energy system needs to change dramatically within 
this time frame. The Markets First Scenario was chosen because (1) it is most in line 
with current world economic and demographic developments and (2) it results in a 
relatively high future energy demand which makes it a worst case. The Markets First 
scenario envisages a world in which market-driven developments converge on the 
values and expectations that prevail in industrialized countries (UNEP 2002). World 
integration, globalization, free trade and reliance on market-based approaches are the 
main directions for development. GDP/capita and energy consumption/capita both 
grow rapidly in this scenario between now and 2050.  
 
3.2.2 Renewables only 
In the Markets First Scenario, the total primary energy production in 2050 will be 
about 1300 EJ, more than 2.5 times the primary energy use in 2005 (about 514 EJ) 
(see Table 3-1). In almost all current projections of future energy use fossil fuels will 
still be the dominant source of energy in the coming decades (IEA 2007; Shell 2008). 
However, in our extreme case study we assume that all energy is generated from 
renewable sources. In the Markets First scenario, where globalization and free trade 
rule, the primary energy mix will be dependent on local availability and world market 
prices. If one looks at the potential availability of the different renewable sources 
(Table 3-2) it is clear that the bulk of the primary energy in the Markets First scenario 









Table 3-2: Availability of renewable energy (excluding biomass and extraterrestrial collection) 
 
 
 W J/a multiplier 
for 1990 
energy use  






(1.28 1021 J) 
source  
Solar      
 solar energy reaching Earth 
surface  
2.6 1016 8.2 1023 2303 642 (Sørensen 2000) 
 collectable in Sahara desert 
with current PV efficiency 
(10%) 
2.1 1014 6.5 1021 18 5 Calculated 
Wind      
 total kinetic energy in  Earth 
atmosphere 
3.5 1015 1.1 1023 310 86 (Leijendeckers et al. 
2008) 
 total in bottom 100 meter 1.3 1015 4.0 1022 113 31 (Leijendeckers et al. 
2008) 
 maximum practically 
realizable 
5.7 1012 1.8 1020 0.51 0.14 (Williams 2001) 
 technical potential  1.5 1013 4.8 1020 1.3 0.37 (Hoogwijk 2004) 
Hydro      
 on basis of precipitation on 
land 
1.0 1013 3.0 1020 0.8 0.2 (Sørensen 2000) 
 principally available  1.2 1012 3.8 1019 0.11 0.030 (Sørensen 2000) 
 realistic reserve hydro 6.3 1011 2.0 1019 0.055 0.015 (Sørensen 2000) 
Tidal      
 total tidal energy 3.0 1012 9.5 1019 0.27 0.074 (Sørensen 2000) 
 tidal world potential at best 
sites 
1.2 1011 3.8 1018 0.011 0.0030 (Sørensen 2000) 
Wave      
 total wave energy 1.1 1011 3.6 1018 0.010 0.0028 (Sørensen 2000) 
Geothermal      
 total stored on Earth  4.0 1030   1.1 1010        3.1 109 (Sørensen 2000) 
 total heat outflow 3.0 1013 9.5 1020 2.7 0.7 (Sørensen 2000) 
 
3.2.3 Large scale biomass is not included 
Next to wind and solar sources, biomass is the only source that could in theory 
provide a substantial contribution to the world's energy supply in 2050. The estimates 
of the potential contribution of biomass to the total world energy supply vary from 0 
to over 1000 EJ/a of which over 90% would have to come from high quality 
agricultural land (Hoogwijk et al. 2003). In a detailed and regionalized study Hoogwijk  
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concludes that the contribution of biomass to the fuel production in 2050 could reach 
a level equal to the present oil demand (180 EJ/a) (Hoogwijk 2004). The largest part 
of the biomass would have to come from the former USSR, East Asia, Africa and 
South America, assuming a large increase in agricultural productivity in these areas. 
Others (Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007) dispute this and state that the required 
increase in biomass production of an order of magnitude is impossible in view of land 
and water constraints. By-and-by it is becoming clear that biomass can provide only a 
limited amount of the world’s energy. We consider competition with nature and food 
production for the limited land area that can be used for the production of biomass1 
such a problem that we exclude biomass as a significant source of renewable energy. 
This in contrast to solar energy which can be collected in areas where biodiversity is 
minimal and agriculture is not possible, and to wind turbines which can either be used 
off shore or combined with agriculture. Moreover, biomass production dedicated for 
energy purposes is less efficient from an energy perspective than PV solar cells2. The 
use of waste biomass and residues as a source of energy is less problematic. However, 
the contribution to the total primary energy production will probably be relatively 
small: 30 -108 EJ/a (Hoogwijk 2004).  
 
3.2.4 Wind and solar provide 95% of energy 
Wind may provide about 180 EJ /a (Williams 2001) or about 15% of the 2050 total 
energy demand,  hydropower up to 3% (Sørensen 2000). All other renewable energy 
sources will be used in addition in places where they are readily available but will 
probably not provide more than 1% of the world’s total primary energy use3. In order 
to simplify the analysis at hand we will focus on the 95% that can be provided via 
wind power (15%) and solar radiation (80%) leaving out all other sources. 
 
3.2.5 Hydrogen and electricity as carriers 
We will focus on two main carriers for the future energy system: electricity and 
hydrogen. Current renewable energy sources (except biomass) directly produce 
electricity. Since any energy conversion is associated with a loss of exergy, conversions 
are limited as much as possible in an optimal energy system. Electricity is an excellent 
                                               
1 The production algae and kelp does not require arable land but is related to problems of its own. For 
example in order to have substantial production levels of kelp nutrient rich water would have to be 
pumped towards the kelp fields which would require energy and lower the overall efficiency dramatically 
(Bungay 2004).  
2 The energy need for the production of Rape Methyl Ester is for example 16 GJ ha-1 a-1 while it delivers 
an equivalent of 43 GJ of fossil energy (Kaltschmitt and Reinhardt 1997). With poplar clones a net energy 
collection of 260 GJ ha-1 a-1 has been reported (European Commission 2005). This is equivalent to an 
efficiency of respectively  0.08 % and 0.8 % (biomass out (HHV)/ solar in)  while current PV systems 
have an efficiency between 6-15 % )(Green et al. 2006).  
3 At the moment the way in which society uses energy is quite wasteful. High exergy energy sources like 
fossil fuels are often used in applications that actually only require low-exergy energy. An example is 
heating of buildings. Although some heating is done by using waste heat from industry, low temperature 
geothermal sources and passive solar energy, the contribution of these sources is still very limited, mainly 
because the use of high-exergy energy is relatively cheap and requires little investments because existing 
infrastructure can be used. Based on the current trends and the Markets First scenario, we explore the 
scenario in which low-exergy energy sources will remain of marginal importance. 
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energy carrier for stationary applications but it is difficult to store in large quantities. 
This is problematic in a renewable based energy system because the availability of 
renewable sources is highly variable through weather conditions, seasonal changes and 
day and night rhythms. It also implies that electricity is not very useful in mobile 
applications that require more than a few Watt, like transportation. Only recently 
battery technology has improved in such a way that the first full electric vehicles are 
being brought to consumer market.  It is not clear which technology, hydrogen fuel 
cells or full electric cars will be dominant. Hydrogen is still seen by many as the 
preferable energy carrier for the use in mobile applications. In our scenario for 2050 
we assume hydrogen will be used as the energy carrier in high power mobile 
applications (mainly in transport).  
 
 
3.3 System specification 
 
The key figures from the Markets First scenario are combined with data from 
literature on the availability of renewable energy sources and data on relevant energy 
technologies. We have used this information to generate a rough but more or less 
complete and quantitative overview of what a world based on renewable energy 
sources and hydrogen as an energy carrier could look like in 2050. The entire energy 
"life-cycle" will be taken into account: from the energy collection, via the transmission 
and distribution of this energy, to the utilization of this energy by the end-users. The 
infrastructure of the renewable based hydrogen economy is described and the material 
flows connected to this infrastructure are quantified over the next sections. On the 
basis of this quantified system description, the bottlenecks with regard to resource 
availability will be identified.   
 
A general overview of our hydrogen energy system based on renewable energy sources 
is given in Figures 3-1 and 3-2. Renewable energy is collected and concentrated, 
preferably in locations where conditions are optimal for a given source, transmitted to 
the centres of economic activity and distributed to the end users. Both electricity 
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3.3.1 Collection and concentration 
In order to collect substantial amounts of useful energy from wind and solar radiation, 
large surface areas are needed, preferably in places with optimal conditions for 
collection. These optimal locations are often not the same as the locations where the 
energy is used. For example, the best places to collect solar energy, deserts, are often 
located far from the economic and industrial centers of the world (Knies and 
Bennouna 2002; Czisch 2004). Therefore, an extensive long distance transmission and 
distribution infrastructure is needed to get the energy to the end-users. Next to that, 
solar and wind energy are intermittent by nature which increases the importance of a 
long distance transmission network in order to buffer the system for temporal local 
shortages (Seboldt 2004). 
 
3.3.2 Hydrogen production 
Hydrogen can be produced via two routes:  
1. via electricity in a two step process: solar and wind energy are used to 
produce electricity, which in a next step is used for the electrolysis of water to 
form hydrogen.  
2. directly from water and solar energy via photolysis.  
The second route has two main advantages: an energy transformation step would be 
eliminated, thereby increasing the efficiency of energy system as a whole, and two 
expensive and complex pieces of equipment, PV cells and electrolysis cells, would be 
replaced by one piece of equipment, the photolysis cell. However, the technology still 
suffers from severe practical problems and needs to be developed further4.  
Next to this photochemical photolysis, a biological route exists. Algae or bacteria or 
their enzymes (hydrogenases) are used  in light-driven bioreactors to split water (Melis 
and Happe 2001). However, this route is also still in the phase of early laboratory scale 
experiments. Because both the direct photolytic route and the biological route are still 
in the early stages of development, it is hard to say anything about their practical 
potential or link them to an estimate of resource requirements. We will therefore 
focus on PV coupled to electrolysis for hydrogen production.  
 
Electrolysis of water can be done with different processes: 
• Alkaline electrolysers (commercial large scale units) 
• Polymer Electrolyte Membrane (PEM) electrolysers (prototypes and 
commercial units) 
• Solid Oxide electrolysers (lab-stage and commercial units) 
All three of these options will be analysed although the main focus will be on alkaline 
electrolysers. 
                                               
4 This technique was first demonstrated by (Fujishima and Honda 1972). Problems like the lack of 
efficient light absorption and the corrosion of the semiconductor have been identified by (Khaselev and 
Turner 1998). In order to avoid these problems, tandem cells are now being developed in which a photo-
electrolysis cell is put in series with a solar cell  which allows the use of semiconductors that are more 
stable in water like tungsten oxide. However, the published efficiencies of these tandem cells are at the 
moment as low as 4.5% (Grätzel 2001). 
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3.3.3 Transmission 
Both hydrogen and electricity can be used for long range transmission of energy, and 
both options will explored in this study. The technology to transport electricity over 
long distance via high voltage AC power grid is already operational today. 
Transmission losses depend on the transport distances. In the1990s the UK the 
average losses, excluding transformation and distribution, were 1.5 to 2% (Oxera 
2003). In Table 3-3 an overview is given of the losses in different types of 
transmission: overhead AC, HVDC and hydrogen pipelines. High Voltage DC 
(HVDC) lines are today used to transport about 2% of all electricity in around 90 
projects all over the world (International Energy Agency 2008). Trans-ocean HVDC 
cables  that have been used to transport electricity from Scandinavia to other parts of 
Europe have losses of  under 0.4% per 100 km. However, a 1-2% loss should be 
added for the AC/DC/AC conversion (International Energy Agency 2008; Sørensen 
2007) so, from an energy efficiency perspective, this technique is only preferred for 
distances over 300 km. From a viewpoint of investment costs, DC transmission 
becomes favourable over AC lines over 50 km5. In our case study we therefore 
assume HVDC for long distance transmission. HVDC cables are either bipolar or 
monopolar. A bipolar cable has a better performance (Basslink 2002) and will 
therefore be assumed in our case study. Conductors in HVDC lines are traditionally 
made from copper although aluminium  conductors are nowadays sometimes used in 
light weight, low capacity cables that are applied for shorter distances.     
 
Table 3-3:  A comparison of transmission losses between AC, HVDC and H2 pipelines 
 overhead AC                  HVDC              H2 pipeline 
energy losses / 100 km(%) 1 0.4 0.8 
AC/DC conversion losses 0 1-2% NA 
% losses for 1500 km 15 8 12 
% losses for  3000 km 30 14 24 
Source (Sørensen 2000) 
(International Energy  
Agency 2008) (Weindorf et al. 2003) 
 
 
Hydrogen can be transported as a gas via pipelines or as a liquid in cryogenic dewar 
vessels on ships, trucks or trains. Since hydrogen is widely used in oil refining and 
chemical industry, a commercial system of hydrogen distribution is already in place for 
the use of hydrogen in oil refining and in the chemical industry (e.g.(Zittel and 
Altmann 1996)). When hydrogen is transported via pipelines specifically designed for 
hydrogen transport, losses can be very low. Overall losses from the pipelines in 
Germany are about 0.1% per year (Zittel and Altmann 1996). The pumping of a gas 
                                               
5 Other advantages of DC lines are (Wright et al. 2002): (1) it is possible to link two asynchronous power 
grids (i.e. the frequency at either end can differ); (2) DC lines, unlike AC lines,  do not have the drawback 
of so-called reactive current which can substantially reduce the power throughput. This problem does not 
occur in overhead lines; (3) the direction and the magnitude of the power flow can be controlled; and (4) 
a given cable can carry more power in DC than in AC. 
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through a pipeline requires energy. In natural gas pipelines about 0.2% of the 
transported amount of gas is used for compressors every 100 km at a rate of 10 m/s 
(Bossel et al. 2003). Because hydrogen contains roughly a factor three less energy per 
unit of volume than natural gas, more energy is needed for compression when 
transporting hydrogen through pipelines: about 0.8 % every 100 km (Bossel et al. 
2003; International Energy Agency 2008). In Table 3-3 transmission via electricity is 
compared with hydrogen pipelines. For a transmission distance of 1500 km losses 
from H2 pipelines are 1.5 times as high as those from HVDC cables. If the distances 
increase the relative difference increases as well. However, by optimizing the hydrogen 
pipelines (larger diameter, improved gas turbines for compression etc.) losses could be 
reduced to less than 10% for 3000 km (Weindorf et al. 2003; Ball et al. 2009). 
 
Because hydrogen molecules are very small hydrogen can easily diffuse through most 
materials and seals and it can cause severe degradation of steels. Therefore, pipelines 
used for transporting hydrogen must be made of high quality non-porous materials 
such as stainless steel (Ball et al. 2009). Hydrogen can be added to steel natural gas 
pipelines in mixtures up to 30 vol % (10% in energy terms) (Ball et al. 2009; Blazek et 
al. 1992). A problem for transport through steel pipes is the so-called hydrogen 
embrittlement. This phenomenon is not completely understood, but it refers to cracks 
and blisters in the metal due to hydrogen permeation in the steel, which result in 
leakages. To avoid embrittlement pipes can be coated, small quantities of  CO, SO2 or 
O2 can be added or embrittlement-resistant steels can be used. Transport of hydrogen 
through plastic pipes is also problematic because hydrogen permeates through plastic 
four to six times as fast as natural gas (Ball et al. 2009; Ogden 1999) . 
 
Liquefaction of hydrogen can be applied by cooling hydrogen to extremely low 
temperatures (below -253 °C). The energy content of one litre of liquefied hydrogen is 
much higher than the energy content of a litre of compressed gaseous hydrogen. The 
main disadvantages are that the energy costs are high and that the losses during 
handling and transport are relatively high too. One of the reasons for these losses is 
that boil-off, evaporation of hydrogen due to temperature changes, is inevitable. 
However, the hydrogen that escapes in this way can, in some cases, be captured again 
and used for the propulsion of the vehicle in which the transport takes place. 
Although the transport of liquid hydrogen is technically feasible, the costs, both in 
terms of energy as in terms of money, will be so high that it will probably only be used 
under very specific circumstances and it will not compete with pipeline transport. 
Pipelines are the preferred transport option for large quantities and long distances 
while liquid hydrogen is preferred for smaller volumes over long distances (Ball et al. 
2009). Therefore, in our case we assume pipelines for long distance bulk transport of 
hydrogen.  
 
3.3.4 End Use 
Although electricity and hydrogen are interchangeable as energy carriers in 
distribution, this is not the case in end-use. As transport fuel, hydrogen can either be 
combusted like gasoline and kerosene, or used in fuel cells. Fuel cells convert 
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hydrogen into electricity which is used to power the electric motors that are used to 
make the wheels turn and propel the vehicles. Even fuel cell cars that are filled up 
with hydrogen will thus ultimately be powered by electricity. In cars, the dominant 
hydrogen based technology is fuel cell cars. Prototypes of internal combustion engine 
(ICE) based hydrogen cars exist (e.g. BMW), but this should be seen purely as an 
intermediate technology that will help the transition to a hydrogen fuel cell vehicles 
(Wietschel et al. 2009). In aviation, the dominating propulsion technology is jet 
engines. Since these make direct use of the exhaust gases to propel the plane, 
combustion of hydrogen would be the preferred option here (Faaß 2001). Consumer 
electronics that need a lot of power, like refrigerators, washing machines, TV’s and 
stereos, will remain grid connected and powered by electricity. Smaller electronics like 
laptops and mobile phones will either be battery powered or powered by small fuel 
cells, that in turn produce the electricity that powers these devices.  
 
 
3.4 Identification of possible resource constraints 
 
To identify possible resource constraints of the hydrogen economy, a quantification 
will be attempted with regard to the most important elements of the system described 
above:  
• energy collection via PV cells and wind turbines 
• hydrogen production via electrolysis 
• long range electricity and hydrogen transmission 
• end-use: fuel cells & electric motors  
 
3.4.1 Resource constraints related to energy collection 
PV Solar Cells  
If 80% of the primary energy in 2050 comes from solar, this means that around 1000 
EJ will be produced via solar energy. Part of this could come from built-up area. The 
IEA (IEA 2002) concludes that in selected developed countries between 30 and 120 
% of the electricity use in that year could come rooftops. Here we assume a theoretical 
maximum of about 15% of primary energy in 2050 (around 200 EJ) that could come 
from built-up area6.  Even with this maximized amount of PV from built-up are this 
would mean that 65% of the primary energy would have to come from other surfaces. 
This implies that land will be used that is currently used for agriculture, or that is 
currently not used by humans. In (sub)tropical desert areas on average about 7.2 
GJ/m2 reaches Earth surface every year (Leijendeckers et al. 2008). Assuming a 10% 
efficiency, an area of 1.0 million km2 would be needed to produce 845 EJ/a (65% of 
1300 EJ/a, see earlier). This area is equivalent to about 10% of the Sahara desert area, 
divided over the different continents. At a latitude of 50° (Vancouver , Paris) the 
average annual incoming solar energy on ground level is around 3.6 GJ/m2 
                                               
6 This assumption is based on data on built-up area in different countries (WRI online database land use), 
the assumption that 20% of this area  would be suited for PV collection, an average incoming solar 
radiation of about 110 W/m2 and a PV efficiency of 10%.   
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(Leijendeckers et al. 2008). Based on this irradiation an area of 2.0 million km2 would 
be needed to supply the remaining 65% of the total energy use, equivalent to about 
four times area of France. If, for example, OECD Europe would want to be self-
sufficient in energy terms, it should be able to collect 100 EJ/a in 2050 (IMAGE team 
2001). In order to achieve this, 4% of the total land area (or 10% of the agricultural 
area) would have to be re-allocated to collect solar energy, in addition to a 15% use of 
wind energy and a 15% use of solar cells on built-up land, and the assumed 5% other 
renewable sources.  
 
At the moment, different solar cells are available. There are different types of silicon 
cells: monocrystalline, polycrystalline and amorphous. All three forms of silicon are 
produced from sand of which supply is abundant. The only other materials in the cells 
themselves are dopants, mostly phosphorus and boron. For both materials the 
application in electronics is only a very small fraction of the total production so no 
constraints are in sight (USGS 2009b). Amorphous Si cells are cheap but have low 
efficiency, while crystalline Si cells have high efficiencies but they are also expensive 
and energy intensive to produce (Wadia et al. 2009). Therefore new thin-film PV cells 
have been developed that can be produced at lower costs (Wadia et al. 2009; Fthenakis 
2009). At the moment the main thin-film technologies are cadmium telluride (CdTe) 
and copper indium gallium diselenide (CIGS) (Fthenakis 2009). Typical efficiencies of 
different cells are given in Table 3-4. Since these thin film cells use a combination of 
less common materials, the supply of these materials can be an issue of concern once 
production reaches a substantial level.  
 
Table 3-4: Efficiency of PV cells 
 
record cell efficiency 
          (%) 
record module 
efficiency (%) 
Si (crystalline) 24.7 22.7 
Si (multicrystalline) 20.3 15.3 
Si (thin film) 16.6 8.2 
Si (amorphous) 9.5 N/A 
CIGS (cell) 18.4 13.4 
CdTe 16.5 10.7 
concentrator Si (parabolic disc) 26.8 N/A 
concentrator GaInP/GaAs/Ge  
(2-terminal) 34.7 N/A 
Source: (Green et al. 2006) 
 
During the last decade several studies have addressed the issue of material constraints 
of thin-film PV (Wadia et al. 2009; Fthenakis 2009; Andersson et al. 1998; Andersson 
2001; Andersson and Jacobsson 2000).The material needs of the four main non-
silicon solar cells have been calculated by (Andersson and Jacobsson 2000). On the 
basis of these numbers and our scenario we calculated resources constraints for these 
technologies which are presented in Table 3-5. It is apparent that current reserves 
would not allow a substantial contribution of these cells to the solar energy collection 
we need in our scenario for 2050. All four technologies will be limited to a maximum 
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of less than 1% (10 EJ/a) of the total required energy collection. In more recent and 
more detailed work the limits for current thin film technologies (CdTe and CIGS) are 
estimated at around 10-100 EJ/a. However there are large differences in the material 
constraints for different technologies. Some, more unconventional, thin film PV 
technologies (especially FeS2) look very promising from the perspectives of material 
constraints and can be scaled up to the level of over thousand EJ/a (Wadia et al. 2009; 
Fthenakis 2009) . Considering these material constraints7 it seems that the use of 
current thin film cells based on rare materials will be limited. In a world based largely 
based on solar energy, the bulk of the solar cells would thus have to be based on new 
thin film materials or amorphous silicon. Next to the PV cells themselves the 
production of PV modules requires additional materials, these are not quantified in 
this study.  
 
Table 3-5: Material constraints of different elements for four thin film solar cell technologies 




















CdTe        
 Cd 6.3 600 640 20 21 10000 
 Te 6.5 20 24 0.29 NA 11000 
CIGS        
 Se 4.8 70 93 2.2 2.1 7900 
 Ga 0.53 110 NA 0.054 0.18 880 
 In 2.9 2.6 NA 0.2 0.61 4800 
aSiGe        
 Ge 0.44 2 NA 0.063 0.12 730 
dye-sensitised       
  Ru 0.1 6 NA 0.011 NA 170 
Sources: (Andersson et al. 1998; Andersson 2001; Andersson and Jacobsson 2000). The 1.7 106 km2 is based on 15% 




As stated before wind may provide about 180 EJ or about 15% of the 2050 total 
energy demand. This would mean that about 195 EJ/a will be produced via wind 
                                               
7 Another issue with technologies using rare materials is, that the energy pay-back time as well as 
environmental impacts are relatively high because of the energy-intensive mining and refining processes. 
It was calculated, based on current technologies, that the full life cycle energy payback time is 6.3 years 
for an indium gallium phosphide (InGaP) module and only 3.5 years for a mono-crystalline Si module 
(Meijer et al. 2003). They also estimated that  the environmental impact of the InGaP module was 80% 
higher than the impact of a mono-crystalline Si module. This reinforces the conclusion that these types of 
solar cells cannot contribute more than a small fraction to worldwide energy generation. 
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turbines. In January 2008, 94 GWe of wind power was installed, delivering about 1.4% 
of global electricity demand (International Energy Agency 2008). Thus in order to 
produce 190 EJ in 2050 the installed capacity has to increase by a factor of 2508, 
resulting in a capacity of 24 TWe. Present turbines have a capacity of around 1-2 
MWe on land and up to 3-5 MWe for offshore sites. However, the size of wind 
turbines has been growing rapidly: from 0.5 MW in 1992 to 4.5 MW in 2002 (Kuik 
2001). If we assume an average capacity of 2 MWe, 12 million of these large turbines 
would have to be installed.  
 
An indication of the material use in wind turbines is given in Table 3-6. The amount 
of copper needed for these turbines is between 2 tons/MWe (onshore) and 3 
tons/MWe (offshore) per turbine. This means that for the total 24 TWe, more than 
50 million ton copper is needed. This is equivalent to about 7% of current reserve 
base9 and more than 4 times the worldwide mine production in 2008. The use of iron 
and steel is around 140 ton/MWe and thus more than 3 billion ton for the total 24 
TWe. This is equivalent to around 2% of the base reserve of iron ore and, in terms of 
iron content of the ore, about 3 times the current iron ore production.  
 
















multiplier of world 
annual mine 
production 2008 

















steel 148 135 3551 3244 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.7 
aluminium 0.42 0.26 10 6     
copper 2.75 1.83 66 44 6.6 4.4 4.2 2.8 
lead 3.79 0 91 0     
plastics 2.09 1.92 50 46     
concrete 1050 306 25100 7340   1.3 0.38 
gravel 150 0 3600 0     
neodymium 0.15  3.6    180  
Source: (Frischknecht R. 2007); Neodymium (Polinder et al. 2006; USGS 2009a), reserves & production USGS Reserve 
Base is defined by the USGS as "That part of an identified resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical 
criteria related to current mining and production practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth. The 
reserve base is the in place demonstrated (measured plus indicated) resource from which reserves are estimated." (USGS 
2009a) 
 
Next to the base metals which are used in wind turbines more exotic materials are 
sometimes used as well. Neodymium is a rare earth metal which is used in permanent 
                                               
8 This may seem like a very high number but at an annual growth rate of 14% would be enough to 
achieve this in 2050. The last ten years, 1999 to 2008, the annual growth rate in installed wind capacity 
has been around 25% (International Energy Agency 2008).   
9 As defined by the USGS:  base reserve:  "That part of an identified resource that meets specified 
minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including 
those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth." 
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magnets. Neodymium magnets are preferred above other permanent magnets because 
they can provide the same magnetic strength with smaller and lighter magnets. Using 
permanent Nd magnets in wind turbines can slightly increase their efficiency, reduce 
maintenance costs and reduce the weight of the generator, all because in a they can 
make gearboxes redundant. In state of the art wind turbines with direct-drive 
permanent-magnet generators about 550 kg permanent magnets or 150 kg of 
neodymium is used per MWe (Polinder et al. 2006; Hatch 2008).  This would mean 
that around 3.6 million ton Nd would be needed for the total 24 TWe in our scenario. 
This is about 180 times the current annual mine production. At the moment very few 
wind turbines actually use direct-drive with permanent magnets and most use 
electromagnets in geared generators which are made of copper and iron. Neodymium 
constraints will therefore not be a show stopper for large scale application of wind 
turbines in general but it will limit the market share of certain new types of wind 
turbines.  Even more so because the turbine producers would have to compete with 
car manufacturers (see under 4.4) and with other renewable energy sources in which 
permanent magnets are used (Hatch 2008). 
 
The amount of concrete needed to build a wind turbine is between 300 ton/MWe 
(onshore) and 1000 ton/MWe (offshore) which means that for 24 TWe between 7 
and 25 billion ton of concrete needs to be produced. If the average cement content of 
concrete is set at 15% the amount of cement needed to produce this concrete is 
between 40% and 130% of the annual world cement production in 2008 (USGS 
2009a). For cement, the base reserve is not very relevant: although there can be 
regional shortages of the raw materials, like limestone and sand, are geologically 
abundant and widespread. However, there may be environmental constraints: cement 
production is an important source of CO2 (Kleijn et al. 2008).  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that if wind energy is to contribute 15% to the 
global primary energy use in 2050, this would mean that a substantial amount of the 
base reserve of copper and  iron ore needs to be invested in this sector. The 
worldwide production of copper, iron ore and cement would have to increase 
dramatically. If wind turbines are to be scaled up to the level of TWhs it does not 
seem likely that neodymium containing direct-drive permanent-magnet generators will 
play a significant role because of resource constraints related to Neodymium.  
 
3.4.2 Resource constraints related to hydrogen production 
Electrolysers based on the alkaline process have been in commercial use for decades. 
PEM electrolysis cells and solid oxide based electrolysers have recently been 
commercially introduced. In this analysis we will therefore focus on alkaline 
electrolysis. The electrolyte is an alkaline solution, usually potassium or sodium 
hydroxide, and the electrodes are made of different coated metals. The anode is often 
made of nickel and copper and coated with oxides of metals and the cathode is made 
of platinum coated nickel. A theoretical maximum efficiency of 83% is given by 
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(Sørensen 2000). In practice the efficiency based on LHV10 is between 50 and 75 % 
(Ogden 1999; IEA 2005; Koroneos et al. 2004). Here we assume a future efficiency 
for the production of hydrogen from water of 75%. This means that if hydrogen is 
used as the energy carrier in transmission, the energy collection and the connected 
material flows and land use will have to be 25% higher than calculated above.  
 
In electrolysis, hydrogen is produced from fresh water. This is problematic in many 
places that would be ideal for PV solar power plants. In desert-like areas that are close 
to oceans, like the Western part of the Sahara, one could overcome this problem by 
combining PV plants with desalination installations. Although desalination has 
become much more efficient over recent years it still requires a significant energy 
input which would decrease the overall efficiency of hydrogen production. 
Current electrolysers are made from stainless steel, plastics and the materials needed 
for membranes and electrodes and the electrolyte. There is little quantitative 
information on the material use in the membranes and electrodes in the public 
domain. The electrolyte is normally potassium hydroxide or sodium hydroxide. Both 
of them are bulk chemicals and the use in this application would still be small 
compared the total annual use. The membranes are made of organic polymers, such as 
nafion and polybenzimidazole, and are not related to material constraints either. The 
electrodes are made of metals: the anode is usually a combination of nickel and copper 
coated with a layer of metal oxides. The anode is made of nickel coated with a layer of 
platinum (Koroneos et al. 2004). Although we do not have much specific data on the 
quantity of the metals in electrolysers we assume here that they will be in the same 
range as that of fuel cells. This would imply potential resource constraints with regard 
to Platinum (see further in this text, under “Resource constraints related to hydrogen 
use: Fuel Cells”). Technological innovations have a potential to solve these material 
issues. Recently a study was published on a promising new technique that uses a 
solution of much more abundant cobalt and phosphate as the main active 
components11 (Kanan and Nocera 2008).  
 
It can be concluded that material constraints of hydrogen production via electrolysis 
using alkalines can be expected related to platinum.  PEM electrolysers also use 
platinum as a catalysts and these would run into similar constraints (see 4.4). For solid 
oxide this is presently unclear, as they are not developed fully yet, but resource 




                                               
10 The LHV assumes that the latent heat of vaporization of the water that is produced during the 
electrolysis is not recovered. For hydrogen the Higher Heating Value is about 18% higher than the lower 
heating value.   
11 The authors use a solution with cobalt and phosphate ions in aqueous solution at neutral pH. In the 
experiments a newly formed catalyst is deposited on the electrode consisting of both cobalt and 
phosphate. This catalyst is highly active and will regenerate spontaneously. In the experiment an indium 
tin oxide (ITO) catalyst was used which by including indium has its own resource scarcity issues. 
However, this material was itself did not seem to be taking part the electrolysis mechanism. 
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3.4.3 Resource constraints related to transmission 
In May 2008 the longest HVDC cable became operational and connects the electricity 
grids of Norway and the Netherlands. Specifications of this cable are given in  
Table 3-7 The capacity of the cable about 600 MW and it has a copper conductor of 
760 mm2.Total transmission losses are estimated at 4% with full load (Tennet 2007; 
Statnett 2002). In a scenario where solar energy is collected in remote desert areas 
power cables would be needed that are about a factor 10 longer than the longest 
operational cables today. The main materials used in these cables are copper, steel, 
lead and polyethylene. In Table 3-8 the material needs for transmission of 65% of the 
primary energy in 2050 through HVDV cables is calculated.  The copper use in the 
600 MW NorNed cable is about 7.5 kg/m. With increased conductor size the 
maximum power through this types of cables today can be several 1000 MW (ABB 
2009). If it is assumed that the conductor size would have to double when doubling 
the power throughput. In a 1200 MW cable the copper use would also be doubled to 
14 kg/m, in a bipolar cable this would again be doubled to 28 kg/m. If 65 % of the 
primary energy use in 2050 would be transmitted over an average distance of 1500 km, 
22 thousand 1200 MW (bipolar) cables would be needed. In order to produce these 
cables 900 million ton copper would be needed. This is equivalent to about 90 % of 
current reserve base and twice the cumulative production between 1900 and 2001 
(Porter and Edelstein 2003), 24% of the total copper resource and almost 60 times the 
current annual world production. The long term availability of copper has been 
discussed in literature (Gordon et al. 2006; Tilton and Lagos 2007).  Although copper 
is not a rare element, still resource constraints are in sight if electricity transmission 
has to take place in these amounts over these large distances.  
 
Table 3-7: Details of the HVDC power cable between Norway and the Netherlands   
conductor size 2 x 760 mm2 (bipolar) 
conductor material Copper 
weight 85 kg/m (bipolar)  
outer diameter 120 mm 
rated power 600 MW  
rated voltage 450 kV 
length 580 km 
maximum water depth 410 m 
Source: (Tennet 2007; Statnett 2002) 
 
If 65% of the primary energy use in 2050 would be delivered by hydrogen through 
stainless steel pipelines (current technology) this would require substantial amounts of 
nickel and chromium. The exact specifications of pipelines may vary substantially. An 
estimate is given in Table 3-9. The starting point of the calculations was that 600 
MWH2 stainless steel (API 303/304/316) pipelines would be used. The number of 
pipelines would then be identical to the number of HVDC cables in the case of 
electricity transmission. Based on typical wall thickness and diameter from (Ball et al. 
2009) and typical chromium and nickel content in stainless steel this result a demand 
for Ni of about 45 times the current annual mine production and for Cr of about 5500 
times the current annual mine production. The amount of nickel needed would be 
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about halve the current reserve base. The USGS does not give global reserves for 
chromium but the amount is about a third of the base reserve of countries that are 
included in their data.    
 
Table 3-8: Calculation copper use in transmission if  65% of the world primary energy supply in 2050 (845 EJ) would 
come from PV solar plants in the deserts, assuming transmission with HVDC power cables.. 
Data on HVDC cables    
 unit amount source 
power through existing cable W 6.00 108 (Tennet 2007; Statnett 2002) 
conductor cross section for 600 
MW mm2 760 (Statnett 2002) 
maximum power per cable W 1.20 109 (ABB 2009) 
conductor cross section for 1200 
MW mm2 1520 
assumption: double power, double 
conductor cross section 
volume copper per m cable cm3 3200 calculated 
density conductor (copper) g/cm3 8.9 (CRC 2009) 
mass copper g/m cable 13500 calculated 
    
Calculation cables needed     
total energy use 2050 J/a 1.3 1021 assumption in this study 
total energy use 2050 W 4.1 1013 calculated 
65% from deserts W 2.6 1013 calculated 
number of cables needed - 21951 calculated 
average distance to end-users km 1500 assumption in this study 
km cable needed km 3.3 107 calculated 
    
Calculation total copper use for 
transmission    
total copper use monopolar kg 4.5 1011 calculated 
total copper use if bipolar kg 8.9 1011 calculated 
    
Comparison to copper 
production & base reserve    
base reserve (Cu) Kg 1 1012 (USGS 2009a) 
resources (land and ocean) Kg 3.7 1012 (USGS 2009a) 
mine production  Kg/a 1.6 1010 (USGS 2009a) 
cumulative world production 1900-
2001 Kg 4.2 1011 (Porter and Edelstein 2003) 
multiplier copper use transmission 
vs base reserve - 0.89 calculated 
multiplier copper use transmission 
vs resources - 0.24 calculated 
multiplier copper use transmission 
vs mine production - 57 calculated 
multiplier copper use transmission 
vs cumulative mine production 
(1900-2001) - 2.1 calculated 
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Table 3-9: Calculation nickel,  chromium and iron use in transmission if  65% of the world primary energy supply in 2050 
(845 EJ) would come from PV solar plants in the deserts, assuming transmission with hydrogen pipelines. 
Data on hydrogen pipelines    
 unit amount source 
power through pipeline (600 MW_H2) W 6.0 108 (Ball et al. 2009) 
pipe diameter cm 25 (Ball et al. 2009) 
wall thickness cm 1.0 average API 10 pipe 
volume steel per m pipe cm3 2500 calculated 
density stainless steel g/cm3 8 
(The Physics 
Factbook 2009) 
mass steel kg/m pipe 20 calculated 
fraction Ni in stainless steel - 0.11 average 304,306,316 
fraction Cr in stainless steel - 0.18 average 304,306,316 
fraction Fe in stainless steel - 0.71 remaining fraction 
mass Ni kg/km pipe 2200 calculated 
mass Cr kg/km pipe 3600 calculated 
mass Fe kg/km pipe 14200 calculated 
Calculation pipelines needed     
total energy use 2050 J/a 1.3 1021 
assumption in this 
study 
total energy use 2050 W 4.1 1013 calculated 
65% in centralised scenario from deserts W 2.6 1013 calculated 
number of pipelines needed - 22000 calculated 
average distance to end-users km 1500 
assumption in this 
study 
km pipeline needed km 3.3 107 calculated 
Calculation total Ni and Cr use for 
transmission    
total Ni use kg 7.2 1010 calculated 
total Cr use kg 1.2 1011 calculated 
total Fe use kg 4.7 1011 calculated 
Comparison to production & base reserves    
base reserve (Ni) kg 1.50 1011 (USGS 2009a) 
mine production (Ni) kg/a 1.61 109 (USGS 2009a) 
base reserve (Cr) kg 3.74 1011 
(USGS 2009a) total 
based on main 
producers 
mine production (Cr) kg/a 2.15 107 (USGS 2009a) 
base reserve (Fe) kg 1.6 1014 (USGS 2009a) 
mine production (Fe) kg/a 1.2 1012 (USGS 2009a) 
multiplier Ni use pipelines / base reserve - 0.48 calculated 
multiplier Ni use pipelines / mine production - 45 calculated 
multiplier Cr use pipelines / base reserve - 0.32 calculated 
multiplier Cr use pipelines / mine production - 5500 calculated 
multiplier Fe use pipelines / base reserve - 0.0029 calculated 
multiplier Fe use pipelines / mine production - 0.39 calculated 
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From the analysis above it is clear that, using current technologies, the use of copper  
in HVDC lines would be prohibit the use of HVDC transmission in our extreme 
scenario. The use of the much more abundant aluminium conductors might solve this 
issue but it would also decrease the overall efficiency of the transmission. Also the use 
of current technology stainless steel for the transport of hydrogen cannot be scaled up 
to the level that we would need in our scenario due to material constraints of 
chromium and nickel. Other steels or coated steels might be the best alternative here 
or possibly steel could be avoided completely by the use of new composite materials.  
 
3.4.4 Resource constraints related to end use: fuel cells & electric motors 
Fuel cells in cars 
In 2001 there were 555 million cars in the world (Worldwatch Institute 2002). In the 
Markets First scenario, GDP per capita will grow by a factor of 3.7 from 2001 to 
2050. It is assumed that the number of cars will grow with the same factor. This 
would mean that there will be roughly 2 billion cars on  the road by 2050. We assume 
that all these cars will have a PEM fuel cell on board. Rade & Andersson (Råde and 
Andersson 2001) use in their baseline scenario, based on current technologies, that in 
PEM fuel cells on average 0.39 g of Pt is needed per kW. With 2 billion cars on the 
road in 2050 this would mean that 39,000 ton of Pt would be needed. Since the 
platinum catalyst is an expensive part of the fuel cell, R&D will be aimed at reducing 
the amount of platinum needed in fuel cell vehicles. The UK Department for 
Transport reports an ultimate goal of about 3 g per car which would mean a demand 
for Platinum of about 6,000 ton in 2050 (UK Department for Transport 2003). 
Currently platinum group metals (PGM) are used as catalysts. The USGS estimates the 
reserve base at 80,000 ton and world resources at over 100,000 ton (USGS 2009a). 
World production in 2008 was 200 ton Platinum and 206 ton Palladium (USGS 
2009a). The cumulative production of PGM from 1900 to 2000 is 9120 ton (Kelly and 
Hilliard 2003). In Table 3-10 the amount of platinum in fuel cells is calculated. If the 
goals for the reduction of Pt in fuels cells are met less than 10% of the base reserve is 
needed. However, using current technologies the amount of Pt in cars in 2050 would 
exceed the world resources. In any case the production rates would have to grow 
dramatically to fulfil the demand.  
 
The problem of Pt use might be solved in future by using alternative catalysts which 
do not contain rare metals. The two main alternatives are the use of base metals and 
the use of enzymes. However, for hydrogen fuelled fuel cells there are no known 
(combinations of) base metals that can be practical substitutes for PGM metals yet. 
The enzyme route is more promising although a practical enzyme based biofuel cell is 
(Armstrong et al. 2009) also still in the early stages of fundamental research. Currently 
technologies are being developed to adsorb enzymes like hydrogenase on electrodes 
which brings the biofuel cell a bit closer to practical application (Lamle et al. 2003).  
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Table 3-10: Calculation of Pt and Nd use in fuel cell cars in 2050.   
  unit source 
number of cars on the road in 
2050 2.0 109 - 
Assumption based on GDP 
growth 
    
Pt per car (high) 60 g/car 
(UK Department for Transport 
2003) 
Pt per car (low) 20 g/car (Råde and Andersson 2001) 
Pt per car(minimum) 3 g/car 
(UK Department for Transport 
2003) 
    
Pt for all cars in 2050 (high) 120000 ton calculated 
Pt for all cars in 2050 (low) 47000 ton calculated 
Pt for all cars 2050 (minimum) 6000 ton calculated 
    
world production Pt 2007 220 ton (USGS 2009b) 
    
multiplier (high) 530 - calculated 
multiplier (low) 220 - calculated 
multiplier (minimum) 28 - calculated 
    
Nd per car (low) 1 kg/car (Gorman 2009) uncertain ! 
Nd per car (high) 2 kg/car (Gorman 2009) uncertain !  
    
Nd for all cars in 2050 (low) 2000 kton calculated 
Nd for all cars in 2050 (high) 4000 kton calculated 
    
world production Nd 2008 20 kton (Gorman 2009) 
    
multiplier (high) 100 - calculated 
multiplier (low) 200 - calculated 
 
Stationary fuel cells for power generation 
If hydrogen is used for the transmission of energy a substantial part of this should be 
transformed again to electricity. This can be done by combustion of hydrogen which 
in power plants that are comparable to current natural gas fired power plants. This 
option would thus not be confronted with additional material constraints. However, it 
would be more efficient to use fuel cells instead. This would mean that stationary fuel 
cells would be used to convert hydrogen into electricity. Large stationary fuel cells are 
small compared to current power plants. This means that power generation will be 
distributed in which case the power grid would only be used for local distribution. 
There are different types of stationary fuel cells: Phosphoric-acid fuel cells (PAFC), 
Molten-carbonate fuel cells (MCFC) and solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC). Although we 
did not quantify this it seems likely that both PAFCs and SOFCs would be confronted 
with resource constraints: in PAFCs platinum is used and in SOFCs lanthanum is 
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used. In MCFCs less scarce materials like Ni, Cr and Al can be used as electrode 
materials. The material constraints with in stationary fuel cells will be less severe than 
for the use of fuel cells in cars.  
 
Electric motors in cars 
Fuel cells in cars are used to produce electricity which is used to power the 
electromotors that make the wheels turn. The use of neodymium in electromotors 
make these motors smaller, lighter and more efficient. Reliable sources on the amount 
of Nd in cars have not been found. However, figures of 1 to 2 kg of neodymium for a  
Toyota Prius can be found in the media (e.g. (Gorman 2009)). For the 2 billion cars 
on the road in 2050, 2 to 4 million ton of neodymium would be needed, about 200 
times the current annual production. For full electric cars using permanent magnet 
motors these number would be higher. However, like in wind turbines alternatives are 
possible. The Tesla roadster for example, uses an induction motor without permanent 
magnets.  
 
Resource constraints will prohibit the scale up of the use of fuel cells in cars due to 
constraints in the availability of platinum. An extreme reduction of the amount of 
platinum per fuel cell might solve this issue. The use of other, less scarce,  electrode 
materials might also be a way out. Stationary fuel cells needed to produce electricity in 
a scenario where hydrogen will be used for the transmission will run into similar, 
though less severe because the installed capacity can be much lower because they are 
used almost 24/7. Neodymium magnets are an issue in electric vehicles if permanent 
magnet motors will be used. However, alternatives like the induction motor that do 
not contain permanent motors are available.    
 
 
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
 
The limiting factor for a renewable based hydrogen energy system does not lie in the 
amount of renewable energy that is available. There is plenty of wind and especially 
solar energy to provide for an exponentially growing world economy. However, since 
wind and solar energy are diffusive energy sources the infrastructure needed to harvest 
substantial amounts is huge. In order to limit the amount of infrastructure needed for 
harvesting it is important to choose locations where the circumstances for harvesting 
are optimal. Especially for solar energy these locations are quite often far from the 
locations where this energy is used. Therefore an extensive transmission network is 
needed in addition, to get the energy in the right place.   
 
In this study we have shown that the choice of technology has a strong influence on 
the material resources that are needed in such a system. In three crucial parts of the 
system we describe the use of relatively scarce materials as show stoppers for specific 
technologies: rare elements in current thin film solar cells, neodymium in direct-drive 
permanent magnet wind turbines and electro motors, and platinum in electrolysis and 
fuel cells.  Resource constraints prevent these technologies from upscaling to a level 
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that would be needed for a substantial transition to a renewable based hydrogen 
economy. For a worldwide conversion to renewable energy, therefore, different 
technologies must be chosen and/or developed that do not rely on these scarce 
materials. Many of these technologies are available be it sometimes at the cost of 
efficiency and/or economics. 
 
Furthermore, the amount of steel that would be needed for both wind turbines and 
hydrogen pipelines is very high. For wind turbines, this would be 6 times the current 
annual production of iron for hydrogen pipelines  40%. However, if current 
technology stainless steel is used for the pipelines about 45 times the annual 
production of nickel would be needed and 5500 times the annual production of 
chromium. If electricity is chosen as a carrier, the amount of copper that would be 
needed in the system is equivalent to 70 times the current annual world production. 
For the wind turbines an additional 4 times the current annual world copper 
production would be needed. Although resource constraints for iron ore are not in 
sight, it would imply a major increase in worldwide energy and, in the current system, 
fossil fuel use. The same is true for copper. While scarcity is not an immediate issue, 
the energy required to mine increasingly lower ore grades could become very large, 
thus creating a negative spiral. 
 
This paper is a first step in the analysis of changes in material needs as a result of 
energy transitions. There are some important issues that we have not addressed yet. 
This study focuses on the direct material needs only. The life cycle perspective is not 
applied. If it would be, the material needs would probably be much higher. Moreover, 
the energy system that we use as a starting point is an extreme case that is not 
predicted in any of the major energy scenarios. However, it was not our intention to 
sketch a realistic energy scenario for 2050 but to explore the material needs of a 
complete transition. A partial transition would of course decrease the material needs, 
as would a limitation of primary energy needs. However, we also made some major 
simplifications that underestimate material needs. For example the intermittent nature 
of solar and wind as energy sources will make some sort of buffering an essential part 
of the energy system. In the large scale energy system perspective that we have used 
here, this could be done for example by high capacity east-west power lines that would 
compensate for the day-night rhythm of PV. These cables would have to be much 
longer than the ones we have assumed here. which would decrease the efficiency of 
the system as a whole. If hydrogen would be the energy carrier of choice for 
transmission, intermittency might be buffered by allowing changes in pressures in the 
pipelines.  
 
Further in-depth analysis is needed to assess the material needs of a transition to a 
renewable based energy systems. Including the life cycle perspective could be a means 
to detect mechanisms that have a potential to make the system spiralling out of 
control. The increasing use of energy to produce the materials required to generate 
energy could be such a mechanism. Another large research area is introducing the 
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dynamics of actual transformations. This will lead to more detailed and realistic 
estimations of material needs through time in different scenarios.      
 
Another issue is the environmental aspects of these energy systems. The systems are 
designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A first relevant question would be, if 
this is indeed the case. If material requirements explode, so might the use of fossil 
fuels in build-up phase of the system. But even if a substantial reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions would be reached, still there may be side-effects in other 
areas of environmental impacts, such as land and water use, emissions of toxic 
substances etc.. These side-effects need to be investigated as well, in order to be able 
to have a balanced assessment of alternative energy systems. 
 
Finally, A sustainability approach is not limited to scarcity and environmental impacts, 
but also includes economic and social aspects. These have not been addressed in this 
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Chapter 4  




Today, almost 70% of the electricity is produced from fossil fuels and power 
generation accounts for over 40% of global CO2 emissions. If the targets to reduce 
climate change are to be met, substantial reductions in emissions are necessary. 
Compared to other sectors emission reductions in the power sector are relatively easy 
to achieve because of it consists mainly of point-sources. Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and the use of low-carbon alternative energy sources are the two categories of 
options to reduce CO2 emissions. However, for both options additional infrastructure 
and equipment is needed. This article compares CO2 emissions and metal 
requirements of different low-carbon power generation technologies on the basis of 
Life Cycle Assessment. We analyze the most critical output (CO2) and the most critical 
input (metals) in the same methodological framework. CO2 emissions and metal 
requirements are compared with annual global emissions and annual production for 
different metals. It was found that all technologies are very effective in reducing CO2 
emissions. However, CCS and especially non-fossil technologies are substantially more 
metal intensive than existing power generation. A transition to a low-carbon based 
power generation would require a substantial upscaling of current mining of several 
metals.  
 
Published as: Kleijn, R., E. van der Voet, G. J. Kramer, L. van Oers, and C. van der Giesen. 





The demand for electricity has been rising steadily ever since its introduction in the 
late 19th century (Fouquet 2008). Since 1980 the average annual growth in demand has 
been over 3% and this growth is projected to continue in the future (International 
Energy Agency 2009a). The expected introduction of new technologies such as 
electric vehicles and heat pumps may even accelerate this demand growth in the 
future. In 2007 the installed capacity for power generation was over 4,000 GW and 
the world electricity production in that year was almost 20,000 TWh (International 
Energy Agency 2009a). Almost 70% of this electricity is produced from fossil fuels 
(International Energy Agency 2009b) mainly coal (41%) and natural gas (21%). Power 
generation accounts for over 40% of global CO2 emissions with an annual emission of 
29 Gt in 2007 (International Energy Agency 2009c). Hence, power generation is one 
of the major contributors to climate change.  
 
If the targets to reduce climate change are to be met, the share of electricity in the 
energy sector should increase while the emissions from this sector should be 
substantially reduced. According to the IPCC, emissions need to be reduced by 50 to 
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85% below 2000 levels by 2050, in order to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
at 450-490 ppm (Metz et al. 2007). This is estimated to correspond with a temperature 
increase of 2 ºC to 2.4 ºC. More than half of this decrease can be achieved by 
efficiency improvements, the remainder would have to come from Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) and non-fossil alternatives (International Energy Agency 2009a).  
 
4.1.1 Material requirements of power generation 
In this paper we explore how and to what extent material requirements may constrain 
the scale-up of low-carbon power generation technologies. In an earlier study we 
found that for some specific technologies the use of minor metals may prevent them 
from growing to a significant global scale(Kleijn and van der Voet 2010a). The 
requirements of minor metals will not be discussed here. Next to these minor metals it 
is also clear that in general the material intensity of new energy technologies is higher 
than for existing technologies. For CCS this is a logical consequence of the additional 
infrastructure that is needed for the capture, transport and storage of CO2 in 
combination with the  loss of efficiency in power plants. For non-fossil technologies 
this is related to the relatively high material intensity that is needed for harvesting 
energy from diffuse sources, such as wind and sunlight.  
 
4.1.2 Goal of the study 
In this article we will present an analysis of the effectiveness of CO2 emission 
reduction and the requirements of selected metals in low-carbon electricity 
technologies: iron, aluminum, nickel, copper, zinc, tin, molybdenum, silver and 
uranium. These metals are chosen as a mix of major metals that are important for the 
general infrastructure: iron, aluminum, copper and zinc; metals that are important for  
special alloys: nickel, tin and molybdenum; and metals that are important for specific 
technologies: silver and uranium.  
 
The main research questions addressed here are: 
1. to what extent can CCS and current non-fossil technologies contribute to 
CO2 emission reduction targets of 50-85% ? 
2. what are the metal requirements of these CCS and non-fossil technologies?  
3. how does this metal demand compare to current mine production ?   
 
We will start by comparing CO2 emissions and metal requirements of different 
electricity producing technologies on a life cycle basis. After that CO2 emissions and 
metal requirements of four cases will be compared: 
• the current electricity mix  (International Energy Agency 2009b) 
• the current electricity mix but with the assumption that all fossil fuel based 
electricity would be fitted with CCS 
• an electricity mix consisting of only existing non-fossil technologies 
• the 2050 electricity mix as described in the IEA Blue Map 
Scenario(International Energy Agency 2008).  
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The emissions and metal requirements are then compared with annual global CO2 
emissions and annual mine production for different metals. Possible bottlenecks are 
identified and possible solutions are discussed.  
 
4.1.3 Other constraints for low-carbon power generation  
Material availability is only one of several factors that might constrain the scale up of 
the low-carbon electricity technologies. Although these are not the subject of this 
paper, the most important constraints are briefly discussed in this section: economic 
constraints, constraints of industrial capacity and spatial and infrastructure planning. 
 
Under the existing economic regime, low-carbon electricity technologies are often 
more expensive than the dominant fossil fuel based technologies. Only large scale 
hydropower, nuclear power and wind turbines can compete with fossil fuel based 
electricity under specific circumstances, while the production price solar electricity is 
much higher per kWh produced (Raugei and Frankl 2009; Kammen and Pacca 2004) . 
Furthermore, massive investments are needed for additional infrastructure, either in 
power transmission for non-fossil energy sources or in CO2  pipelines for the CCS 
(Hammond et al. 2011). Subsidies, feed-in-tariffs and other economic instruments are 
used to overcome this price-gap but this requires considerable shifts in tax regimes 
and legislation.   
 
However, even if new technologies are competitive with the existing ones, it takes 
time to build the human and industrial capacity to scale them up to substantial levels 
i.e.. more than 10% of current production (Kramer and Haigh 2009). In 2007 world 
installed power generation capacity was around 4500 GW and this is projected to 
increase to around 7800 GW by 2030  (International Energy Agency 2009a).  Around 
37.5 GW newly installed wind capacity was added in 2009 (Global Wind Eenergy 
Council 2009). With a capacity factor of around 0.25-0.4 (Global Wind Energy 
Council 2010) this is equivalent to about 15 GW installed coal or nuclear capacity 
(assuming capacity factors of between 0.7 and 0.9) (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 2010). PV solar is still far from this level with a newly installed 
capacity of 5,4 GW in 2008 (REN21 2009). With a capacity factor of around 0.14 
(Schiermeier et al. 2008) this is equivalent to 1.5 GW installed coal or nuclear power. 
In order to contribute significantly to the global power generation capacity in 2030 the 
production of both wind and PV solar need to be scaled up dramatically.   
 
Next to the economic issues the and industrial capacity, discussions on spatial and 
infrastructure planning are common when new nuclear power plants, wind turbines 
and CCS projects are planned and this can slow down the implementation of these 





4.2. Analysis of CO2 emissions and metal requirements of different 
technologies 
 
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is used here to analyze the CO2 emissions and metal 
requirements of different technologies for power generation. In a LCA all emissions 
and extractions over the whole life cycle of products and services are considered. In 
this article we limit the scope to CO2 emissions and the metal requirements. 
Furthermore, we limit the study to the production of the electricity. This means that 
the transmission, distribution and use of the electricity is not included. This 
simplification might lead to a relative overestimation of material needs for distributed 
power generation options like rooftop PV and distributed wind power. Both of these 
options would reduce the amount of transmission capacity that is needed. However, 
in practice, large scale centralized wind and PV farms are needed in order to achieve a 
substantial contribution to the global electricity production(Kleijn and van der Voet 
2010a; MacKay 2009). Centralized wind and PV farms will actually increase the 
transmission network that is needed. Next to that, a substantial buffering 
infrastructure would be needed in order to facilitate a substantial share of the 
renewables in the electricity mix.  
 
The production of the infrastructure, equipment and materials, the transport and 
mining of fossil fuels and raw materials that are needed for the electricity production 
are all taken into account. The functional unit of this LCA, which is the basis for 
comparison of the different technologies, is 1 kWh of electricity delivered to the grid.  
 
 
4.3 Implications for mass deployment – three cases   
 
In order to assess the effectiveness with regard to CO2 emission reduction and the 
metal requirements, three cases for world electricity supply will be compared with a 
reference case (Table 4-1). The reference case is based on the 2007 energy mix for 
power generation as given by the IEA (International Energy Agency 2009b). We 
defined two alternative cases based on different technologies to reduce global CO2 
emissions: CCS and non-fossil energy sources. The cases are not meant to represent a 
realistic future electricity mix but they are used here as two extremes of the spectrum 
of low-carbon power generation. Future power generation will most likely consist of a 
mix of CCS and non-fossil electricity. Therefore, next to these extreme cases, a fourth 
case was introduced which was based on the electricity mix from IEA BLUE Map 
scenario as described in (International Energy Agency 2008). This mix was combined 
with the global electricity supply in 2007. For the electricity production part, the IEA 
BLUE Map case is based on a combination of low-carbon technologies and CCS.  
 
The CCS case is identical to the reference case but all incineration based electricity 
(coal, natural gas, oil and biomass) is assumed to be connected to a CCS 
infrastructure. The non-fossil case assumes a power mix with an equal distribution 
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over the different non-fossil technologies: 20% nuclear, 20% hydro, 20% wind, 20% 
PV and 20% biomass. Although this choice seems arbitrary, it is actually a reasonable 
reflection of the potential (and limitations) of each of these technologies. 
Intermittency of wind an solar will mean that buffering is needed and that it is sensible 
to mix them with other sources. Allocating 20% of the electricity mix to both seems 
therefore reasonable. Although recent growth in hydropower has been substantial and 
some large  projects are still in the pipeline a limited increase from the current 15.6% 
to 20% of the mix seems reasonable to assume. The best locations for hydropower 
have been developed already and the environmental and social implications of large 
projects will limit it’s growth potential. Nuclear power is back on the political agenda 
in developed countries and many developing countries are just beginning to explore its 
potential (International Atomic Energy Agency 2009; Guang and Wenjie 2010). 
However, the lack of industrial capacity, risks of proliferation, limited capacity for the 
storage of nuclear waste and difficulties to scale up uranium supply are likely to limit 
the extent of the growth (Lior 2008). An expansion from the current 14% to 20% 
seems just doable. In the IEA BLUE Map case the contribution of fossil fuels is 
limited to 32% which is almost completely combined with CCS. Nuclear is scaled up 
to 24% and hydro scaled down (relatively) to 13%. Solar and wind combined deliver 
25%, and 6% is derived from biomass1.   
 
Table 4-1: Electricity mix in different cases based on the 2007 global power generation of 19855 TWh  (International 
Energy Agency 2009b) 
        current mix              CCS    low carbon IEA BLUE map 
      % TWh      % TWh   % TWh     %         TWh 
coal 41.4% 8220     0%  
coal + CCS   41.8% 8302   14% 2694 
natural gas 20.8% 4130     4% 863 
natural gas + CCS   21.0% 4171   14% 2689 
oil  5.6% 1112     0% 66 
oil + CCS   5.7% 1123   0% 0 
nuclear 13.7% 2720 13.8% 2747 20% 3971 24% 4856 
hydro 15.6% 3097 15.8% 3128 10% 1986 13% 2591 
biomass rape seed oil     15% 2978 3% 604 
biomass waste wood 
chips in CHP 0.96% 191 0.97% 193 15% 2978 3% 604 
wind 0.87% 173 0.88% 174 20% 3971 13% 2549 
PV solar 0.02% 4 0.02% 4 20% 3971 12% 2342 
others 1.1% 218       
total 100% 19865 100% 19843 100% 19855 100% 19855 
 
In the CCS and low carbon scenario the 1.1 % others is proportionally distributed over the other categories. In the 
IEA BLUE map scenario the category 'others' accounted for 5%. This 5% was also proportionally distributed over the 
other categories.   
 
                                           
1 It should be kept in mind that the IEA BLUE Map mix is based on the electricity production in 2030 
which is assumed to be about double that of 2007. 
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4.4 Methods & data sources 
 
LCA is used to calculate CO2 emissions and metal requirements per kWh electricity 
produced with different technologies. The LCA was performed using version 5.0 of 
CMLCA (Heijungs 2010). EcoInvent 2.0 (Frischknecht et al., 2007) was used as the 
LCA database for all electricity technologies and all background data and it was 
supplemented with additional data for Carbon Capture and Storage (van der Giesen 
2008). Abbreviations, descriptions and data sources of the different technologies are 
given in Table 4-2. The basic data that was used for the natural gas and coal fired 
power plants with CCS is given in Table 4-3 . For biomass two technologies have 
been analyzed which more or less represent a worst and best case. The 'best case' is 
Combined Heat and Power with waste woodchips as a source of biomass. The 'worst 
case' is rape seed oil which is fed into an oil fired power plant.  The metal intensities 
and CO2 emissions of the different technologies are then multiplied by the total 
electricity demand and mix as given in Table 4-1. This results in the total annual CO2 
emissions and metal requirements for the current mix, the CCS mix and the non-fossil 
mix.  
 
This bottom-up approach to calculate global CO2 emissions and metal requirements 
on the basis of individual technologies should be seen as rough estimations of actual 
emissions and metal requirements. In reality the mix of energy technologies is much 
more diverse than the one used here. Secondly, when the total energy production is 
used as the basis for calculations the substantial extra installed capacity which is 
needed for peak-demand is not taken into account. Finally, in the non-fossil scenario 
buffering will be needed because 40% of the sources (solar and wind) are intermittent 
by nature. This buffering can either be done by installing back-up capacity of non-
intermittent technologies like nuclear and biomass, or by adding storing options like 
compressed gas, pumped hydro, batteries etc. Both options will add to the metal 
requirements and increase CO2 emissions of the system as a whole. In this very 
simplified analysis we did not take these factors into account.  
In a final step the reduction in CO2 emission is compared with the emission reduction 
of 50% to 85% below 2000 levels which is needed for stabilization of atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations. The metal requirements are compared with the annual global 
production of these metals. Data on annual global production are taken from the US 
Geological Survey (U.S. Geological Survey 2010).  
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Table 4-2: Description of power generation pathways, other data from Eco-invent 2.0  
abbreviation description additional data 
current mix electricity   
coal 
production of electricity via burning of 
coal UCTE (European weighted 
average) - 
natural gas 
production of electricity via burning of 
natural gas UCTE (European weighted 
average) - 
oil 
production of electricty via burning of 
crude oil UCTE (European weighted 
average) - 
nuclear 
production of electricty in nuclear power 
plant UCTE (European weighted 
average) - 
wind 
production of electricty with 2 MW 
offshore wind turbine OCE  - 
solar 
production of electricty with 3 kWp flat 
roof PV installations based on mc-Si - 
biomass rape seed oil in oil fired power plant a combination of two ecoinvent processes: 
rape seed oil production and an oil fired power 
plant 
biomass CHP waste wood chips -  
hydro Alpine region hydropower - 
   
electricity with CCS   
coal + CCS  
as coal but with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) CCS (van der Giesen 2008) 
natural Gas + CCS 
as gas but with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) CCS (van der Giesen 2008) 
oil + CCS 
as coal but with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) CCS (van der Giesen 2008)  
biomass+CCS 
as biomass but with Carbon Capture and 
Storage as in natural gas CCS CCS (van der Giesen 2008) 
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Table 4-3: Basic data natural gas and coal power plants with CCS (based on (van der Giesen 2008) 
 natural gas coal source 
power plant    
 type Combined Cycle pulverized coal (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 size  400MWe 400MWe (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 efficiency 57.7% 35.9% (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 lifetime 180000 hours 150000 hours (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 operation 8000 hours/a 8000 hours/a (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 CO2 emission 350 g/kWh (plant only) 930 g/kWh (plant only) (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 
CO2 concentration flue 
gas 3.9 mol% 12.8 mol% 
(Ramezan and Skone 
2007; Fluor and Statoil 
2005) 
 steel in construction 10600 ton 35000 ton (Frischknecht R. 2007) 
 
efficiency loss due to 
capture and compression 25% 15% 
(Odeh and Cockerill 
2008; Spath and Mann 
2004) 
capture installation    
 type post combustion post combustion  
 solvent 35% MEA 35% MEA (Fluor and Statoil 2005) 
 capture efficiency 90% 90% (Fluor and Statoil 2005) 
 carbon steel 3700 ton 5560 ton (van der Giesen 2008) 
 stainless steel 950 ton 1470 ton (van der Giesen 2008) 
 life time 30 year 30 year (van der Giesen 2008) 
compression    
 
pressure at 
injectionpoint 100 bar 100 bar (van der Giesen 2008) 
 
pressure after 
compression 140 bar 140 bar (van der Giesen 2008) 
 
weight compressor and 
pump 210 ton 550 ton (van der Giesen 2008) 
 electricity needs 86.5 kWh/ton CO2 86.5 kWh/ton CO2 (van der Giesen 2008) 
 life time 15 years 15 years (van der Giesen 2008) 
Pipeline    
 length 200 km 200 km (van der Giesen 2008) 
 size NPS 10 NPS 16 (van der Giesen 2008) 
 wall thickness 6.4 mm 8.9 mm (van der Giesen 2008) 
 weight 42 kg/m 93 kg/m (van der Giesen 2008) 
 total weight 8400 ton 18600 ton (van der Giesen 2008) 
Injection    
 depth of well 1000 m 1000 m (van der Giesen 2008) 
 number of wells 1 2.7 (van der Giesen 2008) 
 stainless steel 210 570 (van der Giesen 2008) 
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4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Analysis of the CO2 emissions and metal requirements of individual 
technologies  
The results of the calculations of CO2 emissions and metal requirements of the 
different electricity producing technologies are given in Figure 4-1 to 4-3. Figure 4-1 
shows the CO2 emissions of different technologies. The application of CCS, will 
reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel based power plants with a factor 10. For 
biomass the emissions related to the use of rape seed oil are about half of those of 
natural gas fired power, without CCS. For the CHP with waste wood the emissions 
are a factor 30 lower. For nuclear, hydro and wind, CO2 emissions are very low but 
not zero. This is caused by the necessary production of equipment, capital goods and 
infrastructure. In a static attributional LCA, as we have used here, this uses the inputs 
of the current fossil fuel dominated energy system. For the same reason and because 
construction and production is relatively more material and energy intensive the 


















































































































































































Figure 4-3: Requirements of selected metals in different power generation technologies 
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With regard to the metal requirements it is clear from Figure 4-2 and 4-3 that CCS will 
increase the demand for iron and nickel substantially. For coal fired power plants, the 
increase is about 30% for iron and 75% for nickel. For gas fired power plants, it is 
about 40% for iron and 150% for nickel. This is caused by additional infrastructure, 
especially the pipelines and the additional capacity needed to compensate for the loss 
in efficiency. Wind requires 20% more iron than coal plus CCS and solar is in the 
same range as natural gas power plants. Biomass energy based on rape seed oil 
requires about five times as much iron per kWh electricity produced than regular fossil 
fuel based energy. The reason for this lies in agricultural production of the biomass, 
which requires substantial inputs like fertilizers and capital goods per unit biomass 
produced. The intensity for other metals is given in Figure 4-3 and is especially high 
for the all new non-fossil technologies like rape seed based biomass, PV-solar and 
wind. For biomass the reason is again the high amounts of fertilizers and capital goods 
required. For wind and solar it is metal intensive turbines and solar panels and their 
production.  
 
In Figure 4-4 the material demand of different technologies is given relative to the 
metal demand of the current electricity mix. It is clear that requirements for most 
metals are higher in the case of CCS, but much more so in the case of non-fossil 
technologies. 
 




4.5.2 Analysis of the CO2 emissions and metal requirements at world scale 
implementation – the three cases. 
In Figure 4-5 the CO2 emissions of the three different cases and the reference case are 
given. The 11.6 Pg of annual CO2 emissions from power generation compares well 
with the 11.9 Pg/a which is given by the IEA (International Energy Agency 2009c). 
However, in contrast to the IEA figures, the emissions we calculated  are "life-cycle" 
emissions which means that the emissions of the production of the fuels and capital 
goods and all other upstream processes are included in the 11.6 Pg/a. Since over 90% 
of the life cycle CO2 emissions from  gas and coal based electricity originate from the 
power plants themselves and less than 10% from the background processes this still 
means the bottom-up figures we calculated are in correct order of magnitude. At an 
assumed 90% capture rate at the power station, CCS reduces the life cycle emissions 
to around 17% of the emissions in the current mix. The non-fossil case reduces the 
emissions just a little extra to about 10% of the current mix. The IEA BLUE Maps 
scenario is about as effective as the other two cases. All three cases are thus more or 
less equally efficient in reducing CO2 emissions. All three fall well within the range of 
emission reductions (50-85%) that are necessary to stabilize atmospheric CO2 



























Figure 4-5: CO2 emissions in the different power mix cases 
 
Figure 4-6 and 4-7 show the metal requirements for the CCS, non-fossil, IEA BLUE 
maps cases in relation to the current mix. The CCS case requires an annual input 
which is 10% (silver) to 40% (nickel) higher than that in the current mix. For uranium 
the annual requirement remains constant as the nuclear fraction in the mix remains 
constant in this case. The non-fossil case requires far more metals than the current 
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mix: between 1.5 times (uranium) and almost 800 times (silver) the amount in the 
current mix.  
 
Whether these increases are important becomes more clear, when the requirements 
for power generation are compared with current annual mine production. Figure4-8 
shows the annual metal requirements in the three cases and reference case, given as a 
fraction of the 2009 world mine production of these metals. From this analysis it is 
clear that the increases of metal requirement of iron, tin, and zinc are relatively 
insignificant when compared to current mine production. However, the increases in 
requirements in the non-fossil case for aluminum (1% to 15%), nickel (50% to 250%), 
molybdenum (30% to 100%) and silver (0% to 44%) but also uranium (130% to 
190%) would have a significant impact on the mining of these metals. In the CCS case 
the material requirements are less but still significant. Nickel demand would go from 
about 60% to over 80% of the annual production and for molybdenum from about 
30% to 40%. In the IEA BLUE maps case the material requirements are in between 





























Figure 4-7: Requirements of selected metals in different power-mix cases 
 
4.6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
About 40% of global CO2 emissions originates from the production of power. In this 
paper, we have analyzed to what extent these emissions can be reduced, by the use of 
low-carbon technologies (CCS, nuclear and renewables) and what the consequences 
would be with regard to the metal requirements. All three electricity mixes presented 
here (CCS, non-fossil and IEA BLUE Maps) result in a reduction of about 80-90% of 
CO2 emissions, if comparable reductions would be achieved in other sectors the 450-
490 ppm stabilization goals could be realizable. However, in all  three cases presented 
here this comes at a cost of higher metal requirement.  
 
The addition of CCS to the current electricity mix, would influence the annual 
demand for nickel and molybdenum substantially. Applying CCS requires 10 to 30% 
percent more metals than the current electricity mix (Figure 4-8).  This is a result of 
the additional infrastructure that is needed to capture, transport and store CO2 
(specialty steels), in combination with a reduced efficiency of the power plants. 
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Figure 4-8: Requirements of selected metals in different power mix cases compared with world annual mine production of 
these metals.  
 
The switch to a non-fossil electricity mix would result in a  much higher demand  for 
nickel, uranium, silver, molybdenum and, to a lesser extend, copper and aluminum. 
For PV-solar, non-waste biomass and wind the increase in metal use ranges from a 
few percent to a factor thousand .This means that mining of these metals would have 
to be scaled up considerably in order to fulfill the demand for these new electricity 
technologies (Figure 4-8). Not all non-fossil technologies are more metal intensive 
than fossil fuel based power. Nuclear power, hydropower and waste biomass have a 
relatively low metal intensity.  PV-solar, non-waste biomass and wind, however, are 
much more metal intensive than the current mix. For PV-solar and wind the increase 
is related to the relatively high metal intensity of PV solar cells and wind turbines. For 
non-waste biomass it is related to the need for relatively material intensive agricultural 
processes including the production of agricultural machines and the production of 
fertilizers. 
 
The last couple of decades a trend of decreasing material intensity per unit of GDP 
produced has been found in many developed countries  (Moll et al. 2005; van der 
Voet et al. 2005). However, when climate change forces these economies to switch to 





The type of material demand in different technologies depends strongly on the 
specific technologies that are chosen. For example, the extremely high demand for 
silver in solar electricity is related to the choice for mono-crystalline silicon PV cells. 
However, other PV solar technologies have material demand issues of their own 
(Kleijn and van der Voet 2010b; Wadia et al. 2009). Current thin film CdTe and CIGS 
will run into scarcity issues long before they will contribute significantly to the global 
power generation(Kleijn and van der Voet 2010a). The 2 MW off-shore wind turbine 
with a geared generator that we used in this study does not require neodymium based 
permanent magnets. However, the new, more efficient and low-maintenance  direct-
drive turbines use about 150 kg Nd per MW (Polinder et al. 2006; Kleijn and van der 
Voet 2010a). Scaling up these technologies to the level of tens of GW would require a 
dramatic increase in the production of this rare earth metal. 
 
Next to PV solar, wind and biomass electricity other renewable technologies like 
ocean renewables and PV thermal are available as well. Some first results show that 
ocean renewables have an even higher metal intensity than the technologies discussed 
here. The amount of iron needed in the equipment itself (excluding the life-cycle) for 
wave and tidal energy is between 8 and 10 g/kWh (Kluts 2009), which is four to five 
times as high as the life-cycle iron intensity for wind turbines.    
 
We did not analyze any changes in the grid related to the different technologies. 
However, it is clear that the CCS options would require little or no changes to existing 
transmission and distribution infrastructure, while the large scale introduction of  PV 
and wind would require substantial changes in the electricity infrastructure. Roof PV 
relocates electricity production to the electricity consumers and it will thereby reduce 
the transmission load in the network. In contrast, centralized PV and wind power, 
especially of-shore, will relocate and probably increase the infrastructure needed for 
transmission. This will increase the metal requirements of these technologies 
considerably, especially for copper and aluminum. 
 
The analysis presented here is a static analysis in which the dynamics of the transition 
to a low-carbon electricity system are not discussed. However, if climate goals are to 
be met a fast transition to a low-carbon power sector is needed. If the power sector 
will be transformed in the next two or three decades, based on current technologies,  
it is clear that this will cause a significant  peak in metal demand. Uncertainties about 
the long term climate policy and technology choices will make it difficult for mining 
companies to anticipate such a peak. Further research is needed to explore the 
dynamics of the metal demand connected to the energy transition. 
In this work we only looked at the electricity sector. However, the energy transition 
will also lead to increased material demand in other sectors. One of the most 
important ones will be the automotive sector. Hybrids and plug-in hybrids, full electric 
vehicles and fuel cell vehicles will all require metals in high tech parts like batteries, 
electro motors (including permanent magnets) and fuel cells (Kleijn and van der Voet 
2010b). At the same time the introduction of these vehicles will considerably increase 
the demand for electricity.  
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Whether or not material requirements induce material scarcity will depend on a host 
of things, but specifically also on the possibilities for substitution(Goeller and 
Weinberg 1976; Ayres 2007). In many of the technologies described here, material 
substitution may potentially reduce the requirement of specific metals. Silver in PV-
solar cells might be replaced by other metals. PV solar cells can be made on a 
completely new basis e.g. FeS cells. Nickel and molybdenum containing steels might 
be replaced by steels containing other alloys or by new strong and inert composite 
materials. Concrete might be used to substitute for the steel towers of wind turbines. 
Aluminum can substitute copper as a conductor. Extensive agriculture which 
produces high cellulosic biomass might substitute for the highly intensive oil 
producing agriculture. However, there is a limit to which this substitution is possible. 
It is not likely that completely new carbon based materials will replace basic materials 
like steel and other metals in the near future. There is a limited number of elements 
available and at the moment almost all of them have useful applications. Shifting from 
one to the other will therefore in many cases simply shift the problems of material 
availability from one sector to another. In addition, substitution that is forced by 
looming scarcity – in contrast to substitution induced by product improvement – 
could very well slow down the energy transition and reduce overall efficiency, as 
material choices are forced by scarcity and the technically “optimal” solutions cannot 
reach their full potential.    
 
Energy and mining are linked to each other in two directions: not only are materials 
needed for building (new) energy infrastructures but, the other way around, huge 
amounts of energy are needed during mining, reduction and refining of metals. 
Increased mining will lead to additional energy use. Dwindling ore grades and the use 
of less accessible resources will  increase energy demand per kg of metal (Norgate 
2010). This will result in considerably higher CO2-emission levels providing a less 
optimistic picture of GHG benefits of low-carbon energy pathways.  
 
Until now technological developments in mining and processing of metals have more 
than compensated for the dwindling ore grades and increasing demand, keeping metal 
prices relatively low (Radetzki et al. 2008; Radetzki 2008; Gordon 2009; Solow 1974). 
The peaks we have seen in metal prices in the past can almost always be explained by 
peaks in demand that outpaced the capability miners and processors to increase 
supply. However, there are indications that the latest mismatch between demand and 
supply, the 2002 -2008 metal boom, was at least partly caused by more fundamental 
problems at the supply side(Mudd 2010; Humphreys 2010).   
 
The transition to a sustainable energy system is a prerequisite for a sustainable future 
but there are hurdles, some of which are not that obvious. In the end, changing the 
worlds energy system to reduce GHG-emissions is a huge operation with huge 
implications for the worlds material system as well. There are all kinds of feedback 
mechanisms and dynamics involved that make it difficult to oversee all implications. 
This paper shows, at least, that using diffuse energy sources instead of concentrated 
sources substantially increases metal requirements for harvesting the energy. It also 
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shows that adding emission reduction technologies to the existing fossil fuel based 
energy systems increases metal requirements, be it to a lesser extent. Whatever the 
future energy system will look like, at least we can be sure that the days of “easy”, i.e. 
material-extensive, are over. It is very important to explore all the implications of such 
a change to support the transition to a new energy system, in order to make it a 
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Chapter 5  
Metal scarcity: imminent threat, eternal problem or red 
herring ?  




The commodity price explosion of 2008 and its current reverberations have brought 
the broader issue of resource scarcity back on the research and policy agendas with an 
intensity not seen since the 1970s. In the last century, periods of increased attention 
for this issue were interspersed by periods in which resources were abundant and 
cheap. In this article the question is addressed if, and if so how, the current perception 
of metal scarcity is different from periods of relative scarcity in the past. We start by 
reviewing some of the past and current trends in the demand and supply of metals. 
Next we critically consider how ongoing technology advance and innovation is likely 
to influence future supply as well as future demand. That is: will the resource pressure 
of raw economic growth and the dwindling of high-quality resources be compensated 
by dematerialization, substitution and recycling? On balance we find the evidence 
suggests that the current episode of metal scarcity is different from those that 
occurred in the recent past. The world is at the eve of BRICs and other non-OECD 
climbing the “material ladder” at a speed and scale not seen before. As the world is 
about to globalize resource demand to levels of consumerist societies, the world of 
supply is already fully globalized: there are no geographic frontiers anymore which can 
be moved to expand.  Climate constraints enforces a switch to a sustainable energy 
system, which, within the next few decades will requires orders of magnitude more of 
some key metals compared to the current energy system. Linkages between resources 
like materials, water, land and environmental quality further limit the possibilities for 
continued exponential growth in mining and refining. In summary, while the nature of 
the questions about scarcity as a major constraint to development are qualitatively 
identical to what they always were, the quantitative scale at which it plays out is 
different - namely global- and the time scale is more compressed - decades rather than 
centuries which decreases the solution space.  
 
Conditionally accepted by the Journal of Industrial Ecology as:  Kleijn R., E. van der Voet, G.J. 
Kramer. Metal scarcity: imminent threat, eternal problem or red herring ? The current 






Concerns about the supply of basic commodities are as old as humanity itself – from 
the overhunting of big game by hunter-gatherers in prehistoric times (Burney and 
Flannery 2005), through the salinization of arable land in ancient Sumer (Tainter 
1988), concerns about the availability of fertile land for an ever-growing population in 
the days of Malthus (Malthus 1798) and the availability of (fuel) wood in 17th and 18th 
century England (Perlin 2005) to the projections of the Club of Rome in the 1970s 
(Meadows et al. 1972), the prediction of “peak oil” (Campbell 2006) and the metals 
boom between 2002 and 2008 (Radetzki et al. 2008). Time after time, however, 
human ingenuity in the form of technological innovation has solved the problem of 
scarcity, by replacing one natural resource by another or by expanding the resource 
base. This is perhaps best exemplified by the two greatest revolutions in human 
history: the agricultural and the industrial revolutions. Some 10,000 years ago, fertile 
land and agriculture with domesticated livestock were substituted for wild game, 
enabling a substantial increase in productivity and thus in population.1 The industrial 
revolution created an ample supply of mechanical labour and fertilizers that facilitated 
the use of marginal lands for crop production and substitution of animal labour, 
freeing up a substantial amount of cropland2. These two substitutions of key resources 
marked major transitions in the development of human society.   
 
The industrial revolution and the two centuries of essentially continuous progress that 
followed have installed resource optimism as the gold standard for the outlook of 
what Erasmus Darwin has called ‘the active and energetic’ who rule the world. The 
undeniable fact that on average the conditions of human life have improved 
spectacularly over this period makes for a societal condition in which the pessimist’s 
voice is somewhat muted in the public debate, having little impact on decision makers. 
Although resource optimists will generally admit that resource use cannot grow 
indefinitely, many will argue that continued technological advance will save us from 
worldwide resource scarcity in the future, as it has reliably done in the past (Radetzki 
2008; Gordon 2009; Solow 1974). When push comes to shove, governments, 
companies and individuals count on technology saving the day … somehow.  
 
Radetzki argues that the economic importance of commodities in general is limited 
and has decreased over time. The share of the primary sector (agriculture, fishery and 
mining) has steadily declined through the ages and now accounts for less than 5% in 
most rich market economies (Radetzki 2008). Economists often explain this as being a 
consequence of the fact that in the modern world added value increasingly comes 
from knowledge, innovation and related services, rather than from ‘stuff’. However, 
                                           
1 This is but one interpretation of the agricultural revolution – essentially the Whig interpretation of 
history. Another reading of how the agricultural revolution succeeded – of how Cain slew Abel – is also 
possible, though. It states that farmers simply outbred hunter-gatherers, despite their miserable lifestyle. 
It was thus not improved quality of life that made the agricultural revolution a success, but the sheer 
force of numbers(Diamond 1987).  
2 Around 1900 one quarter of all arable land in the US was used to feed horses (Ponting 2007). 
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some economists have pointed out that the apparent increase in relative importance of 
the service sector might have a very different cause. Kander argues that this relative 
shift is simply caused by the fact that the prices of manufacturing goods are falling 
relative to those of services, which in turn is caused by a more rapid productivity 
growth in manufacturing (Kander 2005).  Moreover, the undeniable physical reality 
remains that the products of mining and agriculture are the ultimate foundation of our 
welfare. Ecologists have pointed out that classical economics fails to acknowledge this 
by mislabeling resource extraction as ‘production’ and generally failing to acknowledge 
the economic reality of ‘natural capital’, being the sum of natural resources and 
ecosystem services. In short: products as well as services cannot exist without a 
material basis. That material basis is the foundation of the economic pyramid. While 
the primary production of commodities is but a small fraction of GDP, the global 
interconnectivity of the economy and the complexity of material service provision 
mean that disruptions of supply may be more damaging now than at any time in the 
past (MacNeill et al. 1991). 
 
In this article we review the historical and current debate on resource scarcity, thereby 
focusing on metals, for which the empirical evidence of the last century is very much 
in favour of optimistic resource economists. Despite the fact that the production of 
most metals has grown exponentially, the prices of most have been falling for decades. 
With the current metals boom, however, the scarcity debate has once more been 
triggered. The main question addressed in this article is whether the current episode of 
apparent metals scarcity is any different from the scarcity episodes society has faced in 
the past century.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we review the trends in demand for 
metals. In Section 5.3 we consider the meaning of the term ‘reserves’, both 
underground and above ground, while in Section 5.4 we analyze trends in the supply 
of materials. In Section 5.5 we then discuss two options for resolving possible scarcity 
issues: substitution and dematerialization. In Section 5.6, finally, we discuss our results 
and draw some conclusions with regard to metal scarcity.  
 
 
5.2 Trends in demand for metals 
 
The basic equation of environmental impact analysis is IPAT, impact (I) equals 
population (P) times affluence (A) times technology (T). In the spirit of this equation, 
the materials demand ‘impact’ can be tracked over time in three relevant ways: as 
ton/year (I), as ton/capita/year (I/P) and as ton/GDP (I/PA=T).  
 
5.2.1 Trends in mineral demand  
Figures 5-1 to 5-3 show the corresponding global trends in mine production for iron-
ore, aluminium and copper from 1905 to 2010. All trends correspond to exponential 
growth of mine production although periods of rapid growth are interspersed with 
periods of stabilisation. In the 1905 -2010 period four phases can be distinguished: the 
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first half of the 20th Century ending in 1945 at the end of the second World War, 
which in retrospect were the final days of coal-and-steel-based industrial development; 
the post-war ‘long boom’ between 1945 and 1975 when the ‘modern economies’ of 
the OECD were built up; the last quarter of the 20th Century that saw the 
consequences of the oil crisis and recession followed by dematerialised growth of the ‘ 
new economy’ in the OECD;  and finally the first decade of the 21st Century up to the 
present day during which material demand is driven significantly by the build-up of a 
modern economy in China and other non-OECD countries.  
 
Iron has been and still is by far the most important metal that is produced (>90% of 
the total metal production). It was of course the metal that facilitated the industrial 
revolution as it was the metal from which steam-engines, ships, railroads and trains 
were built. But it still is the leading indicator for urbanisation and infrastructure 
development. Both copper and aluminium gained importance after the large scale 
application of electricity that started in the late 19th. Copper because it is used in the 
production, transmission, distribution and use of electricity and aluminium because 
electricity is needed to free it from its ore. After WWII mine production experienced a 
period of rapid growth which can be linked to the build-up of the OECD economies 
and the start of the consumer society and growing middle class. When the 
urbanisation and infrastructure build-up in OECD countries stabilised the oil crisis 
triggered a period of relatively slow growth. Iron mining stabilised but aluminium and 
copper mining still increased significantly. For copper this can be linked to further 
electrification and the production of electric and electronic consumer equipment. 
Aluminium is also linked to electrification but also to the production of cars, planes, 
packaging materials, buildings and infrastructure, thereby partly replacing iron and 
steel. The build-up of infrastructure in emerging economies caused a surge in iron and 
aluminium demand, with China being the major driving force behind the growth since 
about 2000. For copper, the demand surge began from 1994 on and the surge was 
more global in origin, driven by the rise of the computer age and internet in 
combination with the electrification in non-OECD countries, most notably in Asia. 
For all three metals the 2008 financial crisis can be recognized as small blip in the 
exponential increase since 2002. For copper, iron and less so for aluminium, there is a 
trend of relative decoupling between economic growth and mine production after 
1960. Both for iron and aluminium this trend was reversed after 2002.         










































































Figure 5-1: Global trends in mine production of iron-ore, 1905-2010. Population and GDP data from Maddison 



















































































Figure 5-2: Global trends in mine production of aluminium, 1905-2010. Population and GDP data from Maddison 










































































Figure 5-3: Global trends in  mine production of copper, 1905-2010. Population and GDP data from Maddison 
(Maddison 2011) and metal mine production data from USGS (U.S. Geological Survey 2011) 
 
5.2.2 Rapid growth in global material needs for infrastructure  
In developed countries, demand for construction materials levelled off after 
infrastructure had more or less reached completion and metal recycling had become 
common practice. One key factor underlying the surge in metals demand since the 
early 2000's has been the very high economic growth of BRIC countries, driving up 
materials consumptions in particular through urbanisation and the associated booms 
in house and infrastructure building and industry (Radetzki 2008; Humphreys 2010). 
This drove the rapid increase of mine production of iron (Figures 5-1 to 5-3) as well 
as that of its alloying elements like chromium, manganese and molybdenum. In 2009 
the world's urban population exceeded the rural population for the first time in 
human history. If UN projections will turn out to be correct, by 2050 the urban 
population will almost have doubled from 3.4 billion in 2009 to 6.3 billion in 2050 
(UN 2010). This would mean that over the next 40 years we would build the 
equivalent of all the cities in existence today. In contrast to total world population, the 
growth in urban population shows little signs of levelling off in that period. Mining 
companies now expect a period of at least several decades of growth in material 
demand, with China3 in the lead, South-East Asia, India and Brazil quickly following 
and Africa later on (Albanese 2008; Rio Tinto 2011).  
 
                                           
3 A recent study has concluded that the peak in construction for the Beijing area was reached in 2005 and 
that, without additional policy measures, the need for construction materials would plateau at about 2/3 
of the level of 2005 (Hu et al. 2010). Although Beijing, together with Shanghai, indeed seem to have 
reached levels of saturation for building and construction materials, many other Chinese cities are still in 
the early stages of development (Rio Tinto 2011). 
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5.2.3 Trends in the material complexity of products 
Electronics are an excellent example of products that have become increasingly 
complex in terms of material composition and materials that are needed in their 
production. In the 1970s desktop telephones already contained 42 different elements, 
including exotic substances like indium, germanium, krypton, lithium and tantalum 
(Chynoweth 1976).  A  current desktop computer may contain over 30 elements 
(Meskers et al. 2009) and a mobile phone over 43 (Hagelüken and Buchert 2008). The 
number of elements of the periodic table used in the production of a microchip has 
risen from 12 in 1980s to 16 in the 1990s to over 60 in the 2000s (National Research 
Council 2008). Furthermore, the number of different electronic products and their 
widespread use by consumers has grown enormously. With ever greater demands 
being placed on the functionality of these products, the end of this trend cannot be 
expected anytime soon. 
 
This trend of increased material complexity of products is not just limited to 
electronics as such. Although this is due partly to greater use of electronics in products 
like cars, in this case it also derives from the introduction of airbags, electromotors 
(for chairs and mirrors, etc), special windscreens and headlights, brake linings and 
high-alloy engine parts. With the introduction of hybrid cars, plug-in hybrids and full 
electric vehicles this complexity is set to increase still further, thanks both to the 
amount of on-board electronics and to the number of special parts like high-
performance batteries (Co, Li, La, Ni) and large electromotors (Nd and Dy) (Kleijn 
and van der Voet 2010).  
 
Even the most commonly used metallic material of all - steel - is becoming an 
increasingly complex product. Rare earth elements are added to steel to increase its 
stability at high temperature, while chromium, nickel, molybdenum and manganese are 
added to improve its resistance to corrosion. That products in general are becoming 
ever more complex is also illustrated by the fact that humans now dominate the 
mobilization of 54 of the 90 or so elements that occur naturally on Earth, while 
accounting for 15-50% of the mobilization of another 12 (Klee and Graedel 2004).  
 
The aggregate effect of how continuous innovation have led to a fuller and richer use 
of all elements across the whole material economy is shown in Figure 5-4 where we 
plot the 1970s/2000s ratio of the mine production of elements. In this period 
population grew by 60% and GDP by 160%. In the past three decades the mine 
production of some speciality metals has increased at rates even higher than GDP, up 
to Indium that increased by almost a factor 10 . The reason the mine production of 
rhenium and indium has grown so fast is that use of these elements is dominated by a 
single product or technology whose growth exceeds overall GDP growth. Rhenium is 
used in the nickel-based super-alloys used in turbine blades in aircraft and gas turbine 
engines, which account for some 70% of rhenium use (U.S. Geological Survey 2010). 
This allows for an increase in operating temperature, which in turn leads to higher 
efficiencies. Rhenium is extracted from the flue gases produced during production of 
molybdenum, which in turn is a by-product of copper production. Around 80% of 
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indium is used in the production of indium tin oxide (ITO), which is used mainly in 
flat-panel displays (Harrower 2006). For lithium and cobalt the situation is different: 
although these metals are used in the rechargeable Li-ion batteries applied widely in 
mobile electronic devices like laptops, this is still a minor use of both metals. Only 
23% of the lithium produced is used in batteries; the main other applications are 
ceramics and glass and lubricating greases (U.S. Geological Survey 2010). Batteries 
account for 25% of cobalt use; the main other applications are (super-)alloys, 
pigments and catalysts (British Geological Survey 2009)  The world finds itself at a 
point where demand for certain rare elements becomes dominated by its application 
in one or two very specific high-tech applications, where substitution may be difficult 
and where primary production rates may not be independently set. 
  
Because the material complexity of common products increases, an increasing number 
of  important technologies and products will become vulnerable to supply constraints 
of small amounts of minor metals, thereby increasing the potential impacts of scarcity. 
Another problem is that recycling of basic metals becomes more difficult through 
mixing of metals (in alloys and in products) that are not mixed in the ores from which 
they are extracted, thereby complicating the closing of material loops. Another 
complicating factor for closing the material loop is the fact that the use of trace 
amounts of metals in e.g. electronic equipment will hamper the recycling of these 
metals. 
 
To the extent that innovation has always been mankind’s saviour, making scarcity 
elusive by always moving it out into the future, to the next generation, it has been 
observed that ongoing innovation generally leads to increasing complexity in society at 
large4. In the realm of materials we have seen that where in the past a limited number 
of elements were essential, today virtually all the elements of the periodic table fulfil 
one essential role or another. If the last 50 years have seen disproportional growth of 
the use of ‘the rest of the periodic table’ to keep mankind moving onwards and 
upwards, the question is: what material innovations will sustain growth over the next 
century? Will these come from better access to the remaining resources of scarce 
elements, or will we seek (and find?) replacements through innovative materials made 
from abundant elements such as carbon? 
                                           
4 Increasing complexity is central to the thesis of Tainter as to why complex societies collapse (Tainter 
1988).  
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Figure 5-4: Ratio of global mineral mine production (2000-2009 / 1970-1979). GDP and population data from 
Maddison (Maddison 2011) and metal mine production data from USGS (U.S. Geological Survey 2010). Main 
applications are given for elements for which the mine production grew faster than GDP. (GDP=Gross Domestic 
Production; PGM= Platinum Group Metals ; REE= Rare Earth Elements) 
 
5.2.4 The material needs of the energy transition 
If the issue of climate change is to be brought under control, global greenhouse gas 
emissions need to be reduced by 50% to 80% compared to current levels (Metz et al. 
2007). This can only be achieved through a high-speed transition to a low-carbon 
energy system. Most low-carbon energy technologies like CCS, wind turbines and PV 
solar cells require more materials with a more varied elementary composition than 
current fossil fuel-based technologies(Kleijn et al. 2011). The sheer size of the energy 
system implies that the amount of metals needed is also large in absolute terms. In the 
case of nickel, for example, replacing the current power generation system by non-
fossil alternatives would require a fivefold increase in global annual mine production 
(Kleijn et al. 2011). If a world based solely on non-fossil energy were to be realized by 
2050, construction of a worldwide transmission grid by 2050 to make use of the high 
intensity of solar radiation in desert areas would require 70 times the current annual 
mine production of virgin copper, equivalent to 90% of the reserve base(Kleijn and 
van der Voet 2010). In such a scenario increased copper prices would lead to 
increased substitution. It could be necessary to choose for technically suboptimal 
solutions like replacing copper by aluminium as a conductor in .     
 
In that same scenario the use of neodymium in direct-drive wind turbines and hybrid 
and full electric cars would require 400 times current annual output (Kleijn and van 
der Voet 2010). Similar calculations can be made for the lithium, cobalt and 
lanthanum used in batteries for hybrid and full electric vehicles (Andersson and Råde 
2001; Kleijn and van der Voet 2010; Haakman 2008) and the tellurium, indium, 
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germanium and gallium used in thin-film PV cells (Wadia et al. 2009; Kleijn and van 
der Voet 2010).  
 
Furthermore, rare metals like rhenium and rare earth elements (REE) are used to 
increase the efficiency of fossil fuel-based technologies like jet engines and turbines. 
For many of these materials this means that levels of mine production and refining 
will need to be several times what they are today. Since the start-up of large new mines 
and refineries has a lead time of 5 to 10 years, this may slow down a transition to a 
low-carbon energy system.  
 
It is important to note that for many of the advanced energy technologies requiring 
scarce metals there are alternatives available that do not require such materials. For 
example, wind turbines, including those using direct-drive technologies, can be made 
without permanent magnets with little loss of functionality but probably at a cost of 
higher levels of maintenance  (Bergen et al. 2011; Jacobson and Delucchi 2011). PV 
solar cells, including those based on thin-film technology, can be made from abundant 
materials. However, these technologies still only exist in the lab and the efficiencies 
are much lower than those of commercial cells and thus also need a relatively large 
surface area (Wadia et al. 2009); electro motors for electric vehicles can be made 
without the use of REE-containing magnets, by replacing them by non-REE magnets 
or by using electromagnets be it a cost increased size and weight (Hitachi 2010; 
Jacobson and Delucchi 2011); and batteries for these cars can be made without the 
use of rare earth elements and without cobalt although these technologies are not yet 
operational (Haakman 2008). Scarcity-induced substitution of rare elements by 
common elements – if it were to occur – would generally act as a break on market 
development. After all, innovators have come up with the complex material solutions 
because they offered advantages. Having to step back from these because of 
availability issues will in general decrease their competitiveness with incumbent 
technology.  
 
5.2.5 Implications for future metals demand  
In summary, the megatrends that we identified as drivers of materials demand in the 
decades ahead are (i) the ‘globalization of affluence’, resulting in global infrastructure 
and city building, driving up base metal demand. (ii) the ongoing process of 
innovation, making an ever larger number of elements ‘critical’ to an ever-more 
complex and integrated economy, and (iii) the oncoming energy transition which will 
further increase both base and special metals demand significantly, and subject to a 
very tough timeline that is set by the imperative of climate change mitigation, Taken 
together, these trends in demand imply that we are set to enter a period of several 
decades of continued high demand for bulk metals and even more so for specialty and 
high-tech metals. This trend might of course be altered by global-scale events like a 
global economic/financial crisis, war or natural disasters. Otherwise, though, the clear 
implication is that during the coming decades current mining operations will need to 
be scaled up to several times current levels in order to fulfil the material requirements 
of the envisaged transition.    
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The question is then: is this possible? The answer is not straightforward, depending as 
it does on several complex and interwoven issues: 
• are there sufficient resources on the planet to satisfy rising demand? 
• if yes, can we mobilize them in sufficient quantities and at sufficient speed? 
 
An additional question is that, if it appears unfeasible to scale up mining to such an 
extent and with such speed, would it be possible to slow down the demand for virgin 
materials in such a way that supply can indeed keep up? 
 
In Section 3 we shall now assess the available stocks of metals on the planet. Section 4 
deals with trends in supply, focusing on flows rather than stocks. Section 5 is devoted 
to options for reducing demand for virgin materials. 
 
 
5.3 Reserves and resources, underground and above-ground 
 
Above we have argued that demand for metals will in all likelihood continue to grow 
rapidly over the next few decades. The question therefore arises whether supply will 
be able to keep pace with demand. In this section we take the first step in answering 
this question by taking a closer look at available reserves and resources, both 
underground and above-ground. 
 
5.3.1 Reserves and resources, underground 
Of all the planet’s metal resources we can only hope to extract a very small portion: 
those in the upper layer of Earth’s crust and those in the atmosphere and ocean water. 
However, as the economist Nordhaus observed in the wake of the Limits-to-Growth 
report, even Earth’s crust contains millions to billions times the current mine 
production of most of the minerals used by human society (Nordhaus 1974). 
Geologists have long assumed that the distribution of ore grades follow a normal 
distribution. This means that for these ore bodies can be found in many places and, if 
we assume that the richest ores will be exploited first, ore grades will gradually 
decrease over time. Skinner, however, argues based on geological theories on the 
formation of rich deposits, that the geologically scarce elements are distributed in a 
bimodal fashion, with the bulk of these materials locked up as atomic substitutes in 
common rock types and only a few rich deposits existing. These rich deposits are 
formed by the interaction of water and rocks at great depth through which ore 
forming solutions are formed that penetrate the outer layers of the Earth's crust. It is 
from these unevenly distributed rich seams that we currently extract most of our non-
abundant minerals (Skinner 2001; Skinner 1976; Ayres 2007; Craig et al. 2011). 
  
We can only exploit those ores and deposits that are accessible using existing 
technologies (reserve base). Of these only those that can be extracted economically is 
available to humanity (reserves). Therefore, although the amount of any particular 
element in Earth’s crust is fixed, reserves are not. Moreover, only a certain fraction of 
reserves are known to us. Increased exploration and technological progress in 
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exploration will expand known reserves, while technological advances in mining and 
refining will expand the reserve base. After World War I the need for materials rapidly 
expanded and the mineral exploration became a true profession. Techniques like areal 
photography and measurements of magnetism, electric fields and gravity were 
developed to look for deposits beneath a soil cover of tens of meters. The 
development of rapid inexpensive analytical techniques made it possible to analyse 
large numbers of rock and soil samples. (Skinner 2001).  At the same time decreasing 
transport costs of both ores and personnel facilitated the globalisation of mineral 
mining (Skinner 2001; Lundgren 1996). The relation between economic and technical 
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Figure 5-5: The relation between economic and technical reserves and resources. This is a simplification of a more detailed 
qualification system used by the USGS (U.S. Geological Survey 2010) The term Reserves is used for resources that can be 
economically extracted today. The term Reserve Base is used for resources that can be extracted with current or proven 
technologies, now or in the near future. The term Identified Resources is used for resources of which the quantity, grade, 
quality and location are known or estimated. The term Undiscovered resources is used for resources of which the existence is 
only postulated.  
 
Tilton & Skinner explain the fluidity of the size of reserves of non-renewable 
resources by introducing the concept of cumulative supply curves (Tilton 2003; Tilton 
and Skinner 1987). Yaksic and Tilton demonstrate this curve and the concept of 
virtually limitless backstop reserves with the case of lithium. For lithium, ocean water 
is the backstop reserve that can be exploited when the market price reaches a level of 
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150 to 200 dollar per kg, about five to seven times the market price in 2009 (Yaksic 
and Tilton 2009).  
 
It is highly likely that a large part of the undiscovered resources lie beneath a cover of 
younger common rock of 1 to 2 kilometre thickness. These deposits could potentially 
be mined through underground mines that have already reached depths of over 5 
kilometre. However, finding these deposits will require new exploration techniques 
and a huge effort to prepare large scale three dimensional maps (Skinner 2001). 
Furthermore, from large scale open pit mines to smaller underground mines would 
have a substantial negative impact on the overall efficiency and economics of mining.            
 
For many minor metals there is the additional issue that they can only be economically 
extracted as by-products of bulk metals. This means that the supply of these is set by 
the use of the bulk metal, making the supply highly inelastic examples are cadmium 
and indium as by-product of zinc, molybdenum and rhenium by-product of Cu. The 
linkages within the production of metals is often quite complex, and is thoroughly 
discussed by Reuter (e.g. Reuter et al. 2005).     
 
5.3.2 Reserves and resources, above-ground 
After elements are extracted from underground resources they accumulate in society 
according to the lifespan of the products (the in-use stock) and eventually end up in 
waste flows. Some fraction will be dispersed in the environment through use of the 
products, as in the case of phosphorus from fertilizers, zinc from galvanized 
infrastructure and copper from overhead railway power lines. The dispersed fraction is 
difficult or impossible to retrieve. The fraction ending up in stocks in society and in 
waste flows, however, can easily be seen as a resource for which the term urban mining 
has been coined (Hagelüken and Buchert 2008; Klinglmair and Fellner 2010; Kapur 
and Graedel 2006). This concept reflects the notion that mining of metals from their 
ores actually results in a superior reserve: pure metals. Some of this gain is lost when 
metals are mixed in alloys or in products containing a mix of metals. In general 
recycling of metals from the in-use stock or waste flows requires much less energy 
than that required to release the minerals from their ores (Johnson et al. 2008; Ayres 
1997; Yellishetty et al. 2011). Recycling of metals from waste flows is already very 
successful for base and precious metals: for at least 18 metals the recycling rate is now 
over 50% (Graedel et al. 2011). Building and construction wastes and large consumer 
products, most notably cars, have been partly recycled ever since they were produced. 
The stock of metals in products like electronic equipment was already recognized as a 
potential source for materials during the 1970s (Chynoweth 1976). In printed circuit 
boards, the concentration of precious metals like gold and palladium is usually much 
higher (factor 10) than in their ores (Chancerel et al. 2009).  Some substitution of 
metals in infrastructure has developed spontaneously through technological 
innovation, as in the case of plastics replacing metals in plumbing and glass fibre 
replacing copper wire in communication. Active efforts to retrieve metals from 
societal stocks (urban mining) earlier than after their natural life-time are rare. They 
were made during wartime, notably with limited success (Klinglmair and Fellner 
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2010). High prices may change this, however, as evidenced by the increasingly 
common occurrence of thefts of copper from the rail grid and lightning protection 
systems.  
 
A crucial first step in urban mining efforts is to quantify the stocks and flows in 
society. The STAF project at Yale's Center for Industrial Ecology has accumulated the 
most comprehensive database on societal stocks and flows of metals in the world 
(Graedel 2002; Graedel et al. 2004a; Graedel et al. 2005a; Graedel et al. 2005b; 
Graedel et al. 2004b; Reck et al. 2006; Reck et al. 2010; Reck et al. 2008; Johnson and 
Graedel 2008; Johnson et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2006; Kapur and Graedel 2006; 
Lanzano et al. 2006; Mao and Graedel 2009; van Beers et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2007; 
Harper and Graedel 2008; Gerst and Graedel 2008; Du and Graedel 2011). From 
these publications it is clear that the global societal stocks of metals constitute a 
considerable resource for all bulk metals. At a local scale, efforts are currently being 
made to quantify the so-called hibernating stocks, i.e. stocks in discarded pipes and 
cables still underground. It seems such stocks may be considerable and could be 
readily mined. However, the potential contribution of secondary production to total 
demand will be limited in times when the in-use stock is being built up, as in the 
present development phase of the China and the other BRIC economies, and in cases 
where the material is used in products with a substantial life span (Grosse 2010).  
 
Now that we have established that mineral stocks as such are not a limiting factor, we 
turn to the rate of mine production or the mining capacity. 
 
 
5.4 Trends in mineral supply 
 
After many years of exploration and exploitation, mineral reserves and resources are 
still substantial. However, in order to asses whether metal scarcity might become a 
problem in the future it is more important to analyze the flows: can supply keep up 
with demand ? Until now, commodity booms – i.e. a period of supply/demand stress 
leading to price hikes – have almost never been caused by falling supply, but almost 
invariably by surges in demand. During these booms supply struggles to keep with 
demand primarily because the supply side industry can not keep up with the rapid 
increase in demand. This is caused mainly by long development lead times in mining 
and refining operations combined with a lack of investments during times of relatively 
low demand. However, next to the 'normal supply constraints' connected to every 
commodity boom, some additional supply constraints are now being recognized. In 
section 4.1 we describe the additional supply constraints that have recently been 
described by mining experts while in 4.2 we describe how factors that have increased 
the efficiency of mining in the past have lost much of their potency. The question 
arises whether ever rising demand might be checked by the relatively slow pace of 
developments in the supply sector.   
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5.4.1 Developments in the mining sector 
Since the 1970s globalization, up-scaling of mining operations, liberalization of mining 
regimes, decreasing energy costs and the introduction of information technology that 
has decreased labour costs have all led to a decrease in mining costs. This trend has 
now come to an end for "a whole raft of reasons including declining ore grades, more complex 
mineralogy, smaller deposit size, more difficult (e.g. deeper) mining conditions and increasing 
geographic remoteness" (Humphreys, 2010). The sustained high energy prices, due in part 
to the same issues, add to this picture and it will be hard for productivity growth to 
offset the effects of resource depletion in the decades ahead. Policy-related trends are 
aggravating this situation further: renewed resource nationalism and minerals taxation, 
stricter environmental regulations and public resistance to new mining operations are 
all making it harder for mining companies to expand capacity.  
 
A recent study of mining in Australia concludes that "it is hard to envisage new discoveries 
or mining techniques leading to ore grades rising in the future" and that ore grades will thus 
continue to decline. The average copper content of Australian ores is expected to 
decline from 0.95% in 2008 to 0.4% in 2050. The average gold content in ores was 
1.94 g/ton in 2005, while the remaining resource has an average content of 1.0 g/ton. 
According to the author, this decline in ore grades will in turn lead to a higher 
resource and emission intensity of mining. Between 1989/90 and 2005/06 the energy 
intensity of mineral production increased by 3.7% per year (Mudd 2010). Others argue 
that deteriorating ore grades are not caused solely by a lack of high-grade ores but by a 
technology-driven switch to more abundant low-grade ores (West 2011). Although 
this argument is certainly valid, it does not contradict the fact that high-grade ores 
simply do not suffice to fulfil current and future demand. His example of gold, which 
today is produced more and more as a by-product of copper, actually confirms this.    
 
Another major trend in Australian mining has been to move from underground to 
open-pit mines. This trend was facilitated by the availability of cheap diesel fuel, 
progress in engineering which allowed for extremely large mining equipment, and the 
discovery of major deposits close to the surface (Mudd 2010). According to Mudd, the 
slow shift back to underground mines for black coal over the last decade may be the 
start of a trend triggered by the exhaustion of near-surface deposits. He also indicates 
there is a view that for metals such as gold, copper and uranium future deposits will 
be located deeper. He adds that it is unclear whether this will lead to a shift back to 
underground mines or a shift to even larger open-pit mines. The main conclusion that 
Mudd draws from his analysis of Australian mining is that the availability of metals 
will not be limited by a physical lack of resources but by the environmental costs of 
mining. Norgate concludes for the world as a whole that it is almost inevitable that the 
ore resources will deteriorate over time resulting in an increase in the amount of 
energy and water that is needed per unit of metal mined (Norgate and Haque 2010; 





One important factor that has reduced commodity prices in the past was the trend of 
decreasing costs of bulk transport. Prior to 1850 the production and consumption of 
commodities like food, fibres, fossil fuels and minerals was largely a national or 
continental affair. The combination of steam ships and railways made long-distance 
transport of bulk goods considerably cheaper and facilitated globalization that was no 
longer limited to coastal areas. The introduction of bulk carriers and accompanying 
infrastructure following the Suez crisis of 1956 made it possible to transport relatively 
low-price commodities like coal and iron ore over extremely long distances, e.g. from 
Australia to Europe. These two waves of scaling up long-distance transport reduced 
bulk transport costs by 90% (in real terms) between the 1870s and the 1990s 
(Lundgren 1996; Radetzki 2008). The introduction of bulk carriers brought with it a 
substantial positive feedback: bulk carriers made long-distance transport of crude oil 
cheaper, which in turn made oil-consuming transport cheaper. It also supplied cheap 
fuels to the diesel-intensive open-pit mining operations and thereby facilitated the 
shift from underground to open-pit mines which started in the 1950s (Mudd 2010). 
Lundgren does not expect a further rapid increase in ship sizes and there seem to be 
no technological developments in the pipeline that will decrease shipping rates much 
further than the current levels. In fact, it is more likely that rising fuel prices will 
increase future freight costs.    
 
5.4.3 Rate of increase of mining 
The net result of all these developments in concert is hard to predict. Humphreys 
does not believe that the developments will lead to ever-increasing prices but rather to 
a relative rise in commodity prices to a higher plateau (Humphreys 2010).  Trends in 
the global economy and the mining sector do not seem favourable for rapid expansion 
of mining, even though the geological stocks themselves would allow it. As we have 
seen in Section 3, it is also unlikely that recycling, even if pushed to its limits, will 
generate any substantial contribution as long as demand is still growing rapidly. It 
therefore seems worthwhile to explore some of the options for reducing demand. 
This is the subject of the following section. 
 
 
5.5 Possible solutions for metal scarcity 
 
All to often innovation is the presumed panacea for scarcity – especially in non-
specialist economics-based literature. It is therefore instructive to see how innovation 
plays out in the materials domain. As already alluded to earlier, innovation in this 
context is virtually always substitution.   For simplicity’s sake, we here omit the issue 
of material efficiency. As with efficiency in other realms, e.g. energy, this leads to 
endless debates as to whether or not there is a rebound effect (higher efficiency 
stimulates demand) and, if so, how large it is. We have seen that, irrespective of one’s 
position on this issue, demand for all materials continues to grow in absolute terms, 
which is all that matters for the present analysis. Whatever the virtues of efficiency, 
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total material demand in aggregate has been on the rise for centuries and seems firmly 
linked to economic growth (Figures 5-1 to 5-3). 
 
Three types of substitution of mineral resources can be distinguished: substitution of 
one ore for producing a specific element with another, which we shall call resource 
substitution ; substitution of one element by another in a particular product or part, 
which we shall call elemental substitution ; and substitution of the way a certain function 
is fulfilled by a completely different way to fulfil this function, which we shall call 
functional substitution Resource and elemental substitution are discussed in Section 5.1, 
functional substitution, including dematerialization, in Section 5.2.   
 
5.5.1 Elemental and resource substitution 
Elemental substitution is applied for two very different reasons. Innovation will lead 
to substitution when the alternative element provides a functional benefit. Scarcity or 
elevated prices can also lead to substitution but then often at a cost of functionality. 
Elemental substitution has occurred often in the past: bronze replaced copper because 
of its superior properties in many applications the same holds for the replacement of 
bronze by iron, plastic (from fossil fuels) for paper, wood and metals, glass fibre for 
copper in communication, and so on. As a response to the threat of material scarcity, 
most of today's scientific and engineering research is aimed at elemental substitution. 
This sometimes means a shift from one scarce element to another, in which case the 
reprieve will be short-lived. In the future, though, carbon-based materials might 
substitute metals in applications like flat screens and PV solar cells. If we can move in 
the direction of substituting relatively scarce elements by the abundant elements, also 
known as "the elements of hope" (Diederen 2010), this would solve scarcity and 
security-of-supply issues. 
 
Resource substitution can be accomplished by increasing exploration efforts or 
development of new refining technologies that facilitate the use of alternative ores. 
This is therefore a true business-as-usual solution and fits in well with the policies 
generally adopted by national governments and mining companies.  
 
Solow argued in 1974 that the depletion of natural resources is not a problem if it is 
very easy to substitute them by other factors (Solow 1974). Goeller and Weinberg looked 
at this issue from a natural-science point of view in which one natural resource 
replaces another (Goeller and Weinberg 1976). They argue that almost all materials 
can be extracted from virtually inexhaustible resources as long as there is enough 
energy and that the amount of additional energy needed for this purpose is very 
limited: about a factor 2 compared to the levels of that day (1970s). They base this on 
the fact that aggregate demand for materials is dominated by iron and aluminum, for 
which mining from virtually inexhaustible resources is at most a factor two more 
energy-intensive. Resource optimists will argue that if we indeed were to be able to use 
common rock as a source of metals the life expectancy of this so-called resource base 
would be millions to billions of years for most elements. However, it is clear that we 
will never use a substantial part of Earth's crust for metal mining. Apart from 
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environmental and practical considerations the energy and material requirements 
would be enormous.  
 
Fortunately, we are still far from the age where we would need to use common rock as a 
source of metals. Based on the current mining (16 million ton in 2008) the resource as for 
copper as defined by the USGS (3.7 billion tons including deep sea nodules) would last for 
over 200 years. If the 1950-2008 average growth trend of 3.3% would continue, this would be 
reduced to less than 70 years. So over such a period humanity should achieve to run society on 
a stable in-use stock, which requires more or less full recycling and at the same time slow down 
growth in demand. However, even for currently mined ores Norgate finds an exponential 
increase in energy requirements for both the grinding and the refining of metal ores with 
decreasing ore grade for copper and nickel (Norgate 2010).  
 
To illustrate the absurdness of using common rock as a source of metals we will 
elaborate on the energy and material inefficiency of this route which will also illustrate 
the mineralogical barrier as introduced by Skinner (Tilton 2003). Three decades after 
the article by Goeller and Weinberg, Ayres is much less optimistic about the energy 
that would be needed to extract metals from common rock.  He argues that extracting 
copper present as atomic substitute in common rocks (60 ppm Cu) would require 
hundreds to thousands of times more energy than extracting it from the average ore 
with a copper content of 0.9% (Ayres 2007). Steen and Borg support the view of 
Ayres by empirical work in which they come to the conclusion that the energy costs 
for grinding alone would be about 400 MJ per ton rock, yielding between 8 and 27 g 
copper. The energy costs of extracting copper from common rock would then be 15 - 
50 MJ/g copper, which is 300 to 1000 times more than the 45 kJ/g copper on average 
used in current copper production (Steen and Borg 2002). Current production of 15.4 
million ton copper requires 0.7 EJ (0.015% of global energy use). If we were to switch 
to common rock as a resource this would climb to 230-770 EJ (50-160% of present 
global energy use). It is not only energy that is needed to produce copper from 
common rock, but, in a life cycle perspective, copper, too. In Table 5-1 the copper 
return on investment is calculated for the current situation and a possible future based 
entirely on renewable energy. In the worst case, applying current-technology PV and 
using the high estimate of grinding energy given by Steen and Borg, the copper ROI is 
negative: for every four grams of copper invested in this system only one is 
produced5. Although these numbers provide no more than a very rough indication, it 
is clear that the efficiency of copper production will drop dramatically if we become 
compelled to use common rock as the main source and, therefore, that copper mining 
cannot be increased indefinitely.   
                                           
5 This might be an underestimate, because the data for copper use per kWh are based on ECOINVENT 
LCA data (Frischknecht R. 2007), which assume that about 20% of copper production comes from 
recycled copper. The current global average is in fact less than 10% (Graedel et al. 2011). In a future 
where demand for copper plateaus, this fraction could be substantially higher lowering the amount of 
virgin copper needed to produce copper. On the other hand, the figure is an underestimate, because the 
energy needs calculated by Steen and Borg relate solely to grinding and do not include the extra energy 
that will be needed for mining and refining, which will be substantial because the copper content in 
common rock is 150 times lower than in the average ore. If the energy needed for mining an refining 
would be included this will increase the amount of virgin copper needed to produce copper.    
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Table 5-1: Copper return on investment in the current situation, i.e. current fuel mix in electricity and copper from average 
ore (0.9% Cu) compared with a possible future situation where wind or solar PV are the source of energy and copper is 
extracted from common rock.   
 
copper use for electricity 
production 





 g Cu/kWh  kWh/g Cu  g/g 
currents situation   0.0086    0.013  9300 
future I       0.040 Wind   4.2 low estimate          6.0 
future II       0.30 PV 14 high estimate            0.24 
data source (Kleijn et al. 2011) (Steen and Borg 2002)  
 
A similar analysis can be made for many other scarce elements but for some the 
situation is quite different like in the case of lithium where ocean water can be used as 
a virtually limitless source for only five to seven times the current market price.  
 
Goeller and Weinberg acknowledge that it will not be easy to reach their 'Age of 
Substitutability' and they assume there will be a transition phase lasting hundreds of 
years. Our calculations above show that for copper we will have enough resources 
available for less than 70 years in a business as usual scenario.  Although their thesis of 
unlimited substitutability might be theoretically possible for most resources, we do not 
have the luxury of plentiful time. Climate change obliges us to reduce the emissions 
from our energy system drastically within several decades. In our quest for climate 
stability, a shortage, even temporarily, of materials crucial for making the transition to 
a low-carbon energy system might prove to be the show-stopper.   
 
5.5.2 Functional substitution and dematerialization 
Examples of functional substitution are the replacement of photographic film and 
paper by digital photography and the replacement of paper mail and fax by email.  
Wernick has shown that the relative importance of materials for the US economy has 
changed substantially over the last century with some materials becoming more 
important over time and others less (Wernick 1996). In absolute and per capita terms, 
however, the consumption of almost all materials has increased over time. The 
amounts of stone, bronze and iron that we now use per capita are many orders of 
magnitudes higher than in the ages named after these materials. This is analogous to 
the situation in energy. Oil and natural gas have not in absolute terms replaced coal. 
They have just been additional to coal.  
 
The term dematerialization is used to describe a process that leads to a decrease in the 
amount of material required to fulfil a certain function. There are several ways in 
which this can be achieved. Two concepts that might lead to dematerialization are 
miniaturization and the service economy. Miniaturization has been a very prominent 
trend in electronics and computers during the last few decades. Computers and 
mobile phones are the most prominent examples. The fact that miniaturization can 
lead to resource conservation was already recognized in the 1970s (Chynoweth 1976). 
Even then, however, the author already acknowledged that smaller products do not by 
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definition require less materials to produce. The total material use of a product needs 
to be calculated from a life-cycle perspective. Despite this early warning, Ayres notes 
that the advances in microelectronics have been used by economists such as Alan 
Greenspan and Joseph Stiglitz as an example of radical dematerialization of the 
economy (Ayres 1998; Stiglitz 1997). In 2002 a study was published that estimated the 
material requirements of microchip production. The authors came to the conclusion 
that in order to produce a single 2-gram microchip about 1600 g of fossil fuels and 72 
grams of chemicals are needed, in addition to 32,000 g water and 700 g elemental 
gases (Williams et al. 2002). The authors use thermodynamics to explain the reason 
behind this extremely high energy input in a very small product: "Microchips and many 
other high-tech goods are extremely low-entropy, highly organized forms of matter. Given that they are 
fabricated using relatively high entropy starting materials, it is natural to expect that a substantial 
investment of energy and process materials is needed for the transformation into an organized form".  
 
Another factor that reduces the observed dematerialization effect of miniaturization is 
that the production of small electronic devices also provides additional functions that 
lead to an increased volume of electronics per capita. Mobile phones, mp3 players, 
gaming devices and tablet computers are all good examples of devices that have 
created an additional demand for electronics. Through this additional demand, 
miniaturization can also lead to increased dispersion of precious metals simply because 
the devices are so small that a substantial number will end up in household waste. 
Furthermore, for certain products there is no trend towards miniaturization, but rather 
towards bigger products. In principle, flat-screen TVs are more energy-efficient and 
lighter than their CRT-based predecessors. However, the new LCD technology has 
also made it possible to make much bigger screens, which are today approaching the 
power consumption and weight of old CRT TVs (Frauenhofer ISI 2009). The extreme 
demands that software, especially games and video-editing software, generate for 
computer hardware has induced a trend which has increased the average power 
consumption of a desktop computer by a factor 2 between 2001 and 2007 
(Frauenhofer ISI 2009). The battle between increased material efficiency and the 
forces that drive increased consumption will always continue in a free market 
economy (Wernick 1996).  
 
Like miniaturization, the service economy holds out promise for dematerializing the 
economy. Car-sharing schemes may indeed lead to fewer privately owned cars. The 
leasing of all sorts of products, from office carpets to copiers, gives producers an 
incentive to design their products for durability, easy disassembly and recycling. E-
books, mp3 and pay-per-view movies are also examples where e-services substitute for 
physical products. Although the power consumption of mp3 players and e-book 
readers are relatively modest, their production, like that of any other electronic device, 
is relatively material- and energy-intensive (Hagelüken and Meskers 2010). 
Furthermore, huge server parks are running 24/7 to supply these devices with digital 
content. The energy demands of server farms, PCs and network equipment together is 
estimated at 1.3% (84 GW) of global primary energy use in 2008 and is expected to 
more than triple by 2020 (Pickavet et al. 2008). And this is excluding the energy that is 
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needed to produce all this equipment. What this means in terms of demand for 
materials has, to our knowledge, never been reported. One preliminary study on e-
newspapers suggests that in Europe the lifecycle energy demands of e-newspapers, 
including internet use, could be less than 50% than that of printed newspapers  
(Moberg et al. 2010). Another, relatively old study in terms of IT developments, on 
different ways to buy music, concludes that downloading music can significantly 
decrease overall resource consumption compared to CDs bought in shops (Türk et al. 
2003). Streaming media directly from the web could further decrease the resource 
consumption by eliminating the need for a computer and CD player. It should be 
noted however, that the results of these consumer product oriented studies strongly 
depend upon the behaviour of the consumer.   
 
When it comes to the replacement of physical services, then, the internet combined 
with electronic devices has the potential to reduce resource use per unit consumption. 
Again, though, even if this indeed proves to be the case, the question remains whether 
this increase in efficiency will be able to outrun the inevitably rising total consumption 
that will be triggered by these new technologies. 
 
  
5.6 Conclusions, recommendations, discussion & research agenda 
 
Having surveyed the various aspects of future metals demand and supply we can now 
return to the central question of this paper namely whether or not the current episode 
of apparent scarcity of metals any different from what society has faced in the past 
century and see what conclusions - firm or tentative - may be drawn. 
 
Although Earth is finite, the size of current resources has in the modern era not 
constrained the mine production of metals or economic development. Although ore 
grades are deteriorating, reserves of lower-grade ores almost always exceed those of 
rich ores. Therefore, reserves of almost all minerals have increased rather than 
decreased over the last century, despite, or perhaps because of, the exponential growth 
in mining (Tilton 2003; Craig et al. 2011). However, on the basis of the review of the 
evidence in this paper we believe that the present minerals outlook differs from the 
outlook in the decades of the past two centuries for three reasons. 
 
Globalization, driven by cheap energy and cheap bulk transport, has opened up 
virtually every remote corner of the world for exploration and mining. Although 
certainly not every square kilometre has actually been scanned for mineral resources, 
globalization generates no more than a one-off gain. Remaining undiscovered deposits 
exist mainly in regions in which exploitation will be intrinsically difficult, e.g. under a 
cap of one to two kilometre of common rock. Moreover, the cost of energy and bulk 
transport may already have reached its lowest possible plateau. The rate at which 
minerals can be extracted is constraining. Here the analogy with conventional oil is 
relevant. Like with metals the amount of oil in Earth's crust is not the limiting factor 
for oil production. Still the global annual production seems to be heading for a plateau 
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(Kerr 2007). The rate of mining is limited by the amount of equipment required, by 
the availability of skilled workers, by energy requirements and last but not least by 
environmental costs. The two metal episodes of high metal prices that have occurred 
in the recent past (1950s and 1980s) were caused mainly by rapidly increasing demand 
and insecure supply for OECD countries. Rapid increasing demand is also an 
important cause of the current metal boom. However the difference is that the 
insecurity of supply is now a global issue. Furthermore, commodity booms are always 
associated with supply constraints caused by limited investments in preceding times of 
low demand combined with long development lead times of mining projects. 
However, this is now combined with supply side constraints caused by deteriorating 
ore grades, the lack of discoveries of new large deposits and the linkages with 
constraints in other resources like water, energy and environmental amenities.  
 
Secondly it seems that for the first time in human history we are truly experiencing the 
interlinkages between the resources that we use on a global scale. With decreasing ore 
grades more energy is needed to produce metals from ores while at the same time 
more metals are needed to build the low-carbon energy system we need tackle the 
constraints defined by climate change. Water use, land use and the environmental 
impacts are additional constraints that are interlinked with energy and metal mining. 
These mutually enhancing constraints will pose new challenges for future generations. 
We will need to pick our technologies carefully, avoiding obvious material constraints.  
 
Thirdly demand for metals will continue to grow exponentially for decades to come. 
Demand will increase due to the rapid urbanization which will lead to a rapid built-up 
of cities and accompanying infrastructure. Furthermore, economic growth in emerging 
economies will lead to the production of more and more complex products which in 
turn will lead to increasing metal demand. The transition to a low-carbon energy 
system will require vast amounts of materials. For some metals this means mining 
needs to increase by several times the current annual mining. And the most crucial 
issue is that we need these materials in the next few decades, in order to still be 
relevant for tackling climate change.    
 
If the long term projections of global economic development and concomitant 
urbanisation come true the world will build the equivalent of all the cities in existence 
today inhabited by citizens who earn triple the global average income per capita, easily 
doubling iron and base metal demand and a multiple for certain rare elements. If in 
addition the challenge of climate chance is to be addressed by building a low-carbon 
energy system the demand is increased further still.  
 
Mining and exploration efforts see themselves confronted with environmental and 
physical constraints and are already struggling to keep up with demand. An ample 
supply of metals is not only important for producing high-tech electronics; it is also 
vital for the provision of  more sustainable energy and food for the 9 billion people 
that are projected to be around in 2050.  
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There are two main directions that could be used to address the issue of metal 
scarcity: innovation and abandoning the growth paradigm. Although some economists 
are working on de-growth scenarios the mainstream in economics and politics is still 
directed at economic growth measured mainly in terms of GDP. Innovation can help 
through:      
• closing metal cycles, although by definition recycling can only be of limited 
use for reducing virgin input in the growing economy of the next few 
decades. In a more stable economy it is a key ingredient for a sustainable 
metal supply; 
• dematerialization which also has its limitations, but we clearly need to move in 
the direction of a more resource-efficient type of growth; 
• substitution although substitution of one scarce element for another is clearly 
not a long-term solution to metal scarcity, developing new high-tech materials 
based on abundant materials like ceramics and carbon-based nano-materials 
will provide a reprieve for certain specific scarcity issues. 
 
Besides these in essence technically defined directions for solutions there is clear need 
for the assessment of the side-effects of the proposed solutions on different scale 
levels in order to avoid problem-shifting. 
 
All in all, counting on unlimited progress in technology and efficiency to keep 
resource scarcity at bay seems at the least rather naive. Resource optimists are correct 
in their statement that resources are abundant. The problem seems to be in the 
required rate of mining, and here, as we have argued, there is less reason for unbridled 
optimism. This does not mean that metal scarcity will necessarily lead to future 
scarcity. There are a range of technical options for addressing the issue, but alongside 
technological development we will need a change in material policies, product design 
and business models in order to achieve sustainable global metal metabolism. If 
economists are right and we can substitute anything that gets scarce, the consequence 
could be that we run out of everything at the same time. In the run-up to that we 
would see the clock frequency of innovation go up and up and up, until it stops… 
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Chapter 6  
The need for combining IEA and IE tools: The potential 
effects of a global ban on PVC on climate change  
 
Abstract 
Over the last decades the concepts of Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) 
and Industrial Ecology (IE), both claiming to provide analyses and solutions for 
sustainability issues, have been developed separately as they emerged in response to 
questions from different policy-fields. In both fields, specific tools are used to support 
national and international environmental policy. The focus of IEA and IE tools, 
however, is different. IEA tools focus on one or a limited number of specific 
environmental issues. They often model the chain environmental processes with high 
spatial (and temporal) resolution, but have a low resolution for the material structure 
of the economy and only partly take into account indirect effects that occur via 
physical and socio-economic linkages. IE tools take into account all environmental 
issues related to a specific substance or product. They have a high resolution for the 
material structure of the economy and take into account indirect effects that occur via 
physical linkages, however, their environmental modelling is very limited. Both IE and 
IEA tools have proven to be very useful and neither is superior to the other. 
However, a combination of both can provide additional information that can be used 
for more effective policy making.  We use the case of a hypothetical world wide ban 
on PVC to show that a measure that is not directly related to climate change could still 
have significant climate effects. This indirect effect is a result of the linkages of 
material flows in society. We show that IEA tools are not well suited to include these 
types of effects and that IE tools can fill this gap partially. What is really needed is a 
broader systems perspective that takes into account the full range of possible side-
effects of environmental policy measures.1   
 
Published as: Kleijn, R., E. van der Voet, and H. A. Udo de Haes. 2008. The need for combining 
IEA and IE tools: The potential effects of a global ban on PVC on climate change. Ecological 
Economics 65(2): 266-281. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) and Industrial Ecology (IE) are 
important concepts in the realm of sustainability and environmental sciences. Both 
concepts use a systems perspective to analyse similar environmental and sustainability 
issues. Therefore both concepts are quite comprehensive if one looks at the 
definitions that are used by their advocates (for Integrated Environmental Assessment 
see e.g.: Hettelingh et al. 2005, Van der Sluijs 2002; Rotmans and Dowlatabadi, 1997; 
for Industrial Ecology: Lifset and Graedel 2002; Allenby 1999). Although the 
definitions of the concepts are overlapping to a large extent, the tools that 
                                           
1 An update on this issue is given in Chapter 7. 
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practitioners in the fields use are distinct both in their structure as well as in the 
questions they answer. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to illustrate the 
differences between these two concepts when applied to a specific case and to 
highlight the possibilities for combing them in a more comprehensive analysis.    
 
Integrated Environmental Assessment tools are often used for scenario analysis, to 
calculate future trends in emissions and related environmental issues. These 
calculations are made on the basis of socio-economic indicators at the macro-level, 
such as developments in GDP and population. Current IEA tools are built around 
specific, large-scale environmental issues such as climate change and acidification. 
Although existing Integrated Environmental Assessment tools contain complex 
dynamic models of the economy, the resolution in terms of material flows in society is 
rather low (Figure 6-1).  
 
 









Figure 6-1: The main focus of Integrated Environmental Assessment tools 
 
The emissions are calculated on the basis of the dynamic development of a few highly 
aggregated economic sectors. Interconnections between material flows within society 
are not systematically accounted for. However policy measures aimed at reducing 
environmental issues mostly have a number of widely different impacts, often also 
outside the realm of the environmental issue they address (Raadschelders et al., 2003). 
Examples are: economic accumulation, relocation of pollution, substitution of one 
emission by another, dilution of emissions and co-recycling of contaminants 
(Raadschelders et al., 2003).  Studies in the emerging field of Industrial ecology have 
clearly shown that side-effects of environmental policy measures are often caused by 
changes in the closely interconnected material flows in society (e.g. Ayres & Simonis 
1994; Ayres & Ayres, 1996; Baccini & Bader 1996; van der Voet et al., 2000; Bourg & 
Erkman, 2003). Because of this interconnection, problem shifting from one substance 
to another, from one environmental problem to another, or shifts in time and space 
often occurs as a result of policy measures. Co-benefits and co-damages of policy 
measures that occur via the interconnections of material flows in society can easily be 
overlooked by IEA tools. 
 
The aims of Industrial Ecology are, as indicated above, quite similar to those of IEA. 
In contrast, the tools connected with this concept are quite different. Industrial 
Ecology tools are mainly used to analyse and assess the environmental effects of 
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changes in material flows in society. Material Flow Analysis (MFA) and Substance 
Flow Analysis (SFA) are used to analyse the flows of materials or specific substances 
in society and their interconnections.  
 
The resolution of IE tools is high in terms of material flows in society and their 
interconnections, for example linked to product life cycles, and in how these material 
flows result in emissions (Figure 6-2). In the environment, on the other hand, the 
resolution is low: environmental impacts are modelled roughly or not at all like in 
MFA/SFA, or in terms of potential impacts with low spatial resolution like in LCA. 
Furthermore, the link with macro-economic drivers is weak. The result of most LCAs 
is only valid if the differences that are described are marginal from a macro-economic 
point of view. MFAs and SFAs describe also non-marginal changes but they are not 
systematically linked to socio-economic developments.  
 
 









Figure 6-2: The main focus of Industrial Ecology tools 
 
Our hypothesis is that the systems perspective on material flows in society that is 
provided by Industrial Ecology tools can be used in addition to Integrated 
Environmental Assessment tools, (1) to detect and therefore prevent different forms 
of problem shifting, or in other words to identify co-benefits and co-damages of 
environmental policy measures, techniques, transitions etc., and (2) to identify 
potential environmental impacts of policy measures aimed not at specific 
environmental issues, but at materials and products in society.  
 
In this article we will show that tools related to Industrial Ecology analysing material 
flows in society can provide important additional information compared with IEA 
tools. In order to illustrate this we will use the example of a hypothetical world wide 
ban on the production of PVC. This example is chosen for several reasons. First of 
all, it refers to a long-standing and still ongoing environmental debate. For that reason, 
PVC has been subject to policies both on the national (VROM, 1997) and on the 
European level (Commission of The European Communities, 2000 and European 
Parliament, 2001). Secondly, phasing out PVC implies a large-scale change which 
cause far reaching changes in industrial sectors and thus possibly also in the 
environmental flows, both directly and indirectly. In the third place, it aims at changes 
in material flows in society and therefore is suitable as a case to illustrate the value of 
using Industrial Ecology tools in addition to an Integrated Environmental Assessment 
approach. In Section 2, a brief description is provided of the PVC and chlorine 
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debate. Section 3 describes the above mentioned tools of Integrated Environmental 
Assessment and Industrial Ecology. In Section 4, the tools are applied to assess the 
impacts of a hypothetical PVC ban. Section 5 generalises these findings and treats the 
need for a wider perspective. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
 
6.2 The PVC and chlorine debate  
 
Chlorine and chlorinated compounds have been an important part of the chemical 
industry since the early 1940’s. DDT was found to be very useful because its acute 
human toxicity is extremely low, and therefore it was thought of as a very safe 
pesticide. The same holds true for CFCs as aerosol. PVC has become one of the 
major plastics because of its inertness and because its properties can be manipulated 
relatively easily by adding all sorts of additives. Furthermore, chlorinated compounds 
have become very popular intermediates in chemical industry. It is relatively easy to 
replace hydrogen by chlorine in a hydrocarbon compound while this chlorine in turn 
can relatively easily be replaced by other functional groups.  
 
Environmental concerns around chlorinated compounds started with concerns about 
the ecotoxicological impacts of DDT and Drins (a group of pesticides) in the late 
nineteen sixties. Later, the ozone depleting impacts of CFCs were discovered and 
PCBs were added to the list of toxic and persistent chlorine compounds.  With the 
discovery in the nineteen eighties of the fact that in many processes unintended 
production of extremely persistent and toxic dioxins occurred, the use of chlorine in 
the chemical industry became strongly debated. Many of the compounds that are 
nowadays on the list of most hazardous substances are chlorinated compounds. 
Environmental NGOs, supported by a number of scientists and GOs, have been 
calling for a complete ban of chlorine from the chemical industry. PVC has been in 
the centre of this discussion because it is the only bulk polymer (next to neoprene) 
that contains a substantial amount of chlorine (up to 56% on weight basis) and 
because of the fact that dioxins are produced when incomplete combustion of PVC 
occurs. Another argument against PVC was put forward recently, concerning the 
additives. Toxic phthalates are used as a plasticiser in flexible PVC, which for example 
was often used in baby-toys. Still another argument that is used against the use of 
PVC is the adverse effects of PVC on the recycling of mixed plastics. Both the 
chlorine and the additives interfere with the recycling process. Although toxicity issues 
have been the driver of the PVC/chlorine debate in the early days, nowadays it is clear 
that other environmental issues are involved as well. Climate change is introduced as 
an issue in the assessment of plastics in general, for example when comparing fossil 
fuel-based plastics with bio-based alternatives. Acidification is also an issue, 
specifically related to PVC, because of the formation of hydrochloric acid in waste 
incineration. Finally public safety is now an important issue in the chlorine debate, 
mainly connected to the transport of chlorine by train through densely populated 
areas. 
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There are many sides to the issue of PVC, or, more broadly, chlorine. The stalemate in 
the societal debate seems to center around a difference in basic starting points (Tukker 
1999, Kleijn et al., 1997). The NGO's take the point of view that there are alternatives 
to all chlorine applications, consequently they argue that a ban on chlorine is possible 
and should be effected in view of all certain and uncertain adverse impacts. In 
contrast, the industry starts from the wide usefulness of chlorine, and argues that 
substitution is only useful if the alternative is proven to have less impacts. It could be 
useful, therefore, to assess the impacts of a measure such as a complete ban on PVC. 
What would be the environmental benefit? Are the alternatives functionally 
equivalent, and is their impact on the environment indeed less? The PVC case is used 
here to illustrate the differences between the IEA and IE approaches, single out their 
strong points and limitations, and say something about the way they could be 
improved and mutually benefit from each other. 
 
6.3  IEA and IE Tools 
 
6.3.1 Integrated Environmental Assessment tools 
There are many Integrated Environmental Assessment tools. In Figure 6-1 the main 
focus of Integrated Assessment tools is illustrated.   For practical reasons we will use 
the Climate Change tool IMAGE (IMAGE team, 2001) and the acidification tool 
RAINS (Amann et al., 2001; Hettelingh et al., 2005) as examples here. Both tools have 
been very successful in supporting policy on both the national and the international 
level.  
 
RAINS has been developed by IIASA (Alcamo, 1990; Amann et al., 2001; Hettelingh 
et al., 2005) as a tool for the integrated environmental assessment of alternative 
strategies to reduce acid rain deposition. RAINS is an abbreviation of ‘Regional Air 
Pollution INformation and Simulation'. RAINS Europe, which was developed on the 
basis of the original RAINS, expanded its scope from acidification to eutrophication 
and ground-level ozone. Recently the scope of RAINS was further broadened to 
include fine particulate matter (Schöpp et al, 1999). The tool consists of five modules:  
1. developments in energy use, agricultural and other productive activities, 
delivering emissions of acidifying compounds; 
2. and 3. two modules on emissions and control costs; 
4. atmospheric dispersion; 
5. environmental impacts (environmental effects in RAINS terminology). 
Any changes in the flows of materials in society have to be translated in terms of the 
first module. In this module, emissions of three acidifying compounds (sulphur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides and ammonia), VOC and fine particulate matter are 
calculated by using the characteristics of different energy sources and agricultural 
activities. This is done on the basis of a database on energy use and agricultural 
activities for 38 European countries and regions, 21 energy sources and 6 economic 
sectors. Locations of emissions and depositions are specified and the output of the 
tool can be given as a map consisting of grid cells with different colours that 
correspond with the level to which critical loads are exceeded.  
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RAINS Europe was used to provide scientific support for the negotiations under the 
Geneva Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution in Europe (Overseas 
Environmental Cooperation, 2000). The European commission has decided that 
IIASA's RAINS tool will serve as the core Integrated Environmental Assessment tool 
in the framework of the ‘Clean Air For Europe’ (CAFE) programme (IIASA, 2003). 
 
The Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE) tool has been 
developed by RIVM (IMAGE team, 2001) as a tool for the integrated environmental 
assessment of global change. IMAGE 2.2 consists of three modules:  
1. The Energy Industry System (EIS), which calculates regional energy 
consumption, energy efficiency improvements, fuel substitution, supply and 
trade of fossil fuels and renewable energy. On the basis of energy use and 
industrial production emissions are calculated. 
2. The Terrestrial Environment System (TES) which calculates land-use changes 
on the basis of data on developments in agriculture and forestry. Furthermore 
it calculates emissions from land-use changes, natural ecosystems and 
agricultural production systems, and the exchange of CO2 between terrestrial 
ecosystems and the atmosphere.   
3. The Atmospheric Ocean System (AOS), which calculates changes in 
atmospheric composition using the data from the EIS and TES modules, and 
taking oceanic CO2 uptake and atmospheric chemistry into consideration. 
Subsequently, AOS calculates changes in climatic properties by resolving the 
changes in radiative forcing. 
 
IMAGE and other IEA climate change tools have been used as a basis to support the 
discussions in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (de Vries et al., 
2001). The IPCC, in turn, provided policy makers with scientific assessments that 
were used as an input for the development of international conventions like the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto protocol 
that resulted from that. 
 
The starting point for calculating the impacts of a ban on PVC obviously is the EIS 
module, and more specifically TIMER  (the Targets IMage Regional simulation 
model). TIMER is used as a sub-module within the EIS module and simulates the 
global energy system on the basis of data on 17 world regions. The main objectives of 
TIMER are to analyse the long-term dynamics of energy conservation and the 
transition to non-fossil fuels, and to explore long-term trends for energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions (de Vries et al., 2001). TIMER will also be used in future 
versions of RAINS. 
 
The perspective of these IEA tools is limited because:  
1. the thematic character of the tools: they only address a specific environmental 
issue. For example impacts of an energy oriented measure on toxicity are 
outside the scope of climate change tools;  
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2. the resolution of the economic driver modules is low. Small scale measures, 
for example aimed at specific industries, are out of sight because their 
influence on the economic development of the aggregated sector will be 
small;  
3. material flows in society and their linkages are absent. Therefore these tools 
are blind for effects that occur via product and material chains and lifecycles. 
One example of this is the PVC case which is described in this article.  
 
There may be different ways to address the limitations of these  tools. To detect side-
effects to other environmental issues, the different thematic IEA tools could be 
linked. To resolve the low resolution problem, for example, more detail may be 
brought into the economic driver module. Other tools might be used in addition to 
IEA tools to provide a more complete picture. Here we focus on the combination of 
IEA tools with IE tools 
 
6.3.2 Industrial Ecology tools 
Similar to Integrated Environmental Assessment, there are many different analytical 
tools in the field of Industrial Ecology. In Figure 6-2 the main focus of Industrial 
Ecology tools is illustrated. Again for practical reasons we have chosen two tools that 
will be applied on the case of PVC: Substance Flow Analysis (SFA) and Life-Cycle 
Assessment (LCA). Both tools have been used frequently to analyse the societal 
metabolism of certain substances (SFA) and societal material flows connected to 
products and services (LCA).  
 
Environmental Life Cycle Assessment is an IE tool that can be used to compare the 
potential environmental impacts of productsystems. A product system consists of all 
processes in the lifecycle of a product or services: from extraction of raw materials via 
the production, to use, recycling and final waste disposal. (e.g. Guinee et al. 2002; ISO 
14040).  It can be used, therefore, to compare PVC applications with certain PVC free 
alternatives. LCA is by nature a static tool in which 'ceteris paribus' conditions will 
normally be used for the calculations, although more advanced types of LCA are being 
developed (Wrisberg et al., 2002). Like SFA, LCA is a tool that, in principle, can be 
applied to all products and services. The first phase therefore is the definition of the 
specific research question(s) and selection of the products or services that are being 
compared. In the next phase, the inventory analysis, the relevant process data are 
collected and the emissions, extractions and possibly other interventions of the whole 
product system are calculated. In the impact assessment phase these interventions are 
translated into potential contributions to selected environmental issues. In the impact 
analysis so-called characterisation factors are used to indicate the potential 
environmental impacts of the specific emissions and extractions. If possible 
internationally accepted factors like Global Warming Potentials and Ozone Depletion 
Potentials are used as characterisation factor. One way in which IEA and LCA are 
linked is the use of these factors which can be seen as a result of IEA tools. IEA tools 
are also more and more used to generate spatially differentiated characterisation 
factors (e.g. Potting, 1998 et al. and Potting, 2000). In some cases the results are 
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weighted and added to one single environmental score.  Nowadays LCA types of 
analysis are used increasingly for larger systems, e.g. to compare different systems for 
the energy supply in a certain region or country. 
 
Substance Flow Analysis (SFA) has been developed as a quantitative analytical tool to 
keep track of the flows of a certain substance or substance group in society. SFA can 
be used for different purpose: As an accounting system, large flows or accumulations 
can be signalled that may cause environmental issues in the future. If repeated 
regularly, trends in certain flows can be detected. As a static or steady state model, it 
can be used to trace back environmental issues to their origins: the flows of 
substances in society. The steady state model can also be used to study the 
effectiveness of policy measures. SFA as a dynamic model can be used to estimate 
future flows and stocks. In dynamic SFA societal stocks are included and time is thus 
entered as a variable in the model, and dynamic scenario analysis is made possible 
(Kleijn et al., 2000,  Elshkaki et al., 2005). The framework of SFA can be applied to 
any (group of) substance(s) and on any geographical level or region. The starting point 
for an SFA is often a specific environmental problem. The substances contributing to 
this problem are identified and the geographical and temporal system boundaries are 
set. SFA is obviously suitable to describe and analyse societal flows and stocks of 
PVC, and the changes therein as a result of policy measures. The consequence for the 
environment are more difficult to address since the focus is limited to the 
substance(group) which is studied. 
 
Not only the scope, but also the policy implications of  Industrial Ecology tools are 
different compared with the IEA tools. Integrated Environmental Assessment tools 
are used to support policies on specific environmental issues while the IE tools are 
used in product policy and chemicals policies both in the private sector and by 
governmental agencies. In addition Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is sometimes use to 
support environmental labelling and certification (Guinée et al, 2002). SFA has been 
used to analyse the societal material flows which cause certain specific environmental 
issues (Van der Voet et al., 2000, Hansen and Lassen, 2000). Potting (2000) has shown 
that the IEA tools can be used to introduce spatial differentiation in LCA. 
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6.4 Applications of IEA and IE tools on the case of PVC 
 
Before applying any analytical tools, we must have a rough idea on what would 
happen in case of a world-wide ban on PVC.  A simplified schematic overview of the 
production and use of PVC is given in Figure 6-3. PVC is produced via the 
polymerisation of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) which in turn is produced from 
ethylene dichloride (EDC). EDC is produced via a combination of direct chlorination 
(with chlorine) and oxy-chlorination (with HCl) of ethene. The main applications of 
PVC are in profiles for construction (pipes, window frames etc), insulation material  
(electrical cables), flooring and packaging. At first glance, a ban on PVC would result 
in: 
• the dismantling of PVC production facilities (or transformation in order to 
produce other products which in this case is not very likely); 
• a drop in the demand for the raw materials for the production of PVC; 

































Figure 6-3: A simplified schematic overview of the production and use of PVC. 
 
Of course all these effects would result in changes in material and energy flows 
through society. This in turn would affect extractions and emissions and thus 
environmental impacts. Emissions of e.g.  phthalates, dioxins and other chlorine 
compounds, and extractions of fossil fuels would change. However a ban will also 
result in changes in greenhouse gas and acidifying emissions. Half of the mass of the 
PVC polymer is determined by chlorine, therefore if PVC is replaced by pure 
hydrocarbon plastics such as polyethylene (PE), more fossil fuels will be needed to 
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produce the same amount of plastic. On the other hand, if PE-waste is incinerated 
with energy recovery, a part of the energy in the fossil fuels used to produce the PE 
will be recovered. Naturally, the drop in PVC related impacts will coincide with an 
increase of impacts related to the alternatives for PVC. The question is, which of these 
and other direct and indirect impacts will become visible when applying the IEA and 
IE tools. This is treated below. 
 
6.4.1 Application of IMAGE on the case of PVC  
In terms of IMAGE a ban on PVC should be translated in terms that can be used as a 
change in the Energy and Industry System. In this system there are two modules that 
are of interest in this case: the Energy & Industry emissions and the Energy Demand 
& Supply module (TIMER). The Energy & Industry module contains lists of 
industrial sectors together with emission factors for non-energy greenhouse gas 
emissions. Economic data on the development of these sectors is used to calculate the 
greenhouse gas emissions from these sectors over time. The feedstock or chemical 
manufacture sectors are in principle relevant for this case, but the resolution of these 
sectors is to low to distinguish a single polymer like PVC. Therefore there is little 
opportunity to use this module for the calculation of the effects of this ban on PVC. 
The introduction of the ban on PVC in the Energy Demand & Supply module is also 
problematic.  On first sight a ban on PVC does not result in a large change in the 
global energy demand. One example is the substitution of PVC by PE as a plastic. 
Since the substitution of PVC by PE will result in an increased demand for fossil fuels 
as feedstock (PVC consists for about 50% of chlorine while PE comes for 100% from 
fossil fuels) this can be translated in a change of demand for fossil fuels. For this, the 
ban on PVC would have to be translated in a change of certain variables in TIMER 
that would result in changes in greenhouse gas emissions. However, since the 
resolution of TIMER is very low if it comes the use of fossil fuels as feedstock, again 
it is not straightforward how a ban on PVC could be translated in terms of IMAGE.  
 
It is clear that IMAGE can not be used directly to calculate the changes in emissions 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions connected to a ban on PVC due to the fact that 
neither the EIS nor the TIMER module have the appropriate resolution. Of course it 
would be possible to first calculate the changes in greenhouse gas emissions by other 
means, and to use the obtained reduced greenhouse gas emissions as an input for 
IMAGE. However, this solution is not optimal since for every measure a separate 
analysis would be needed. Another solution could be to increase the resolution by, for 
example, distinguishing not 5 but 500 sectors of industry, similar to the resolution in 
current Input-Output Analyses. The PVC producing industry then could be one of 
those sectors. A measure such as phasing out PVC would then be translated in the 
decline of the PVC industry and the concurrent growth of, for example, the PE 
producing industry. It is very likely that the changes in GHG emissions resulting from 
this change as calculated in TIMER would be minor, and that the measure could 
indeed be considered too small to be relevant. Moreover, indirect effects as well as 
side-effects to other environmental issues would still be out of sight. 
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6.4.2 Application of RAINS on the case of PVC 
When attempts are made to translate the phase-out of PVC into terms of changes in 
inputs for RAINS, similar problems do occur. Like in IMAGE, the resolution on the 
material flows in society in RAINS is relatively low although emission reduction 
technologies are quite specified. The economy is divided in 6 economic sectors and 21 
energy sources. A measure like the phase-out of PVC is again too small to be 
implemented in RAINS as such. Like in IMAGE, it would of course be possible to 
first calculate the changes by other means and then to use the results in terms of 
changes in emissions as an input for RAINS. Adding more resolution could be 
another option here as well, with similar implications as described in section 4.1. An 
additional interesting point is that the incineration of PVC generates HCl which 
contributes to acidification. A phase-out of PVC would thus reduce the HCl 
emissions and thereby acidification. HCl emissions are not included in RAINS, 
therefore these changes are invisible. This could be repaired, however, by adding HCl 
as an acidifying substance. All in all it is clear that, because of the low resolution of 
RAINS if it comes to material flows in society, a measure like a phase-out of PVC is a 
measure to small for RAINS to handle.    
 
In the next sections, we apply Industrial Ecology tools to see whether indeed phasing 
out PVC is a small, non-relevant measure. We will focus mainly on the changes in 
emissions of climate change and acidifying compounds via indirect routes, including 
substitution and effects based on the linkages of material flows within the relevant 
sectors. Side-effects on other environmental issues will also be visible, but we consider 
this self-evident and it will not be the main focus. The interesting question is: can 
changes in the emissions that do not come forward in IEA tools, either due to a lower 
resolution or to indirect effects, be detected with IE tools? 
 
6.4.3 Application of LCA on the case of PVC   
When a ban on PVC would be implemented PVC would be replaced by other 
materials. LCA can be used to calculate the potential environmental impacts of the 
substitution of PVC with alternatives like polyethylene (PE) and polypropylene (PP). 
In LCA the whole life cycle is considered so all processes of the lifecycle, from the 
extractions of resources such as salt and crude oil to the final waste treatment of the 
products, are included.  
 
Many of such LCAs have been made for PVC products and their alternatives. 
Although there are some good reasons why LCAs cannot cover all details of the 
discussions on toxicity related to the PVC lifecycle (Tukker, 1998), they can still be 
used to get some indication of the relative impacts of PVC products on many other 
environmental issues like climate change. A simple qualitative meta-analysis was made 
of existing LCAs of PVC products and alternatives. 22 studies were considered of 
which 8 were part of other meta-studies (PVC LCAs: Reusser, 1998; Richter et al, 
1996; Potting and Blok, 1994; Intron, 1995; de Baere et al., 1994; Verspeek et al., 
1992; Beenen and Eygelaar, 1993, Tötsch, W. and H. Polack 1992, FKS, 1995; 
Albrecht and Langowski, 1997; meta studies: Krahling 1999; Finnveden et al., 1996 ). 
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All studies give answers to the question whether or not replacing PVC by alternatives 
in specific applications would be beneficial for specific environmental issues. The 
alternatives depend on the applications but consist of other (HD)PE,  PP in different 
applications, aluminium and wood in window frames, linoleum and wool in carpets, 
glass and paper in packaging etc. (Table 6-1).        
 




































































1 potable water pipeline systems PVC 2  1 3 2    
 (Reusser, 1998) HDPE 3  2 2 3    
  cast iron 1  3 1 1    
2 sewage pipeline systems PVC 2  1 3 3    
 (Reusser 1998) HDPE 3  1 2 2    
  stoneware 1  2 1 1    
3 windowframes PVC 2 3  4  4   
 (Richter et al, 1996) aluminium 4 4  5  3   
  steel 5 5  3  5   
  stainless steel 6 1  7  6   
  
non-ferrous+B84 
metal 7 2  6  7   
  wood/Al 3 6  2  2   
  wood  1 7  1  1   
4 flooring cushion PVC 3 2 2 3 2 3   
 (Potting & Blok, 1994) linoleum 1 1 1 1 1 1   
  woollen carpet 2 4 4 3 4 4   
  polyamide carpet 4 3 3 2 3 2   
5 sewage pipelines PVC (3 layers) 3 3    3 3 3 
 (Intron, 1995) concrete 1 1    1 1 1 
  gres (stoneware) 2 2    2 2 2 
6 bottles for non-sparkling water PVC 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 
 de Baere, et al., 1994) PET 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 
  glass 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 3 
7 blisters for medical tablets PVC-Al 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 
 de Baere, et al., 1994) PP-Al (BUWAL) 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 
  PP-Al (PWMI) 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 2 




































































8 potable water pipelines PVC 2      2 1 
 (Verspeek et al, 1992) asbestos cement 1      1 1 
  cast-iron 4      1 2 
  steel 5      5 1 
  glassfiber/polyester 2      3 1 
  glassfiber/epoxy 3      4 1 
9 ring binders PVC 5 5     4  
 (Beenen & Eygelaar, 1993) PVC glued 3 4     3  
           
  PP 2 1     1  
  PP glued 4 2     2  
  cardboard PP lam. 1 3     5  
10 blisters PVC 1      1  
 (Tötsch and Polack, 1992) PET 2      2  
11 blisters for medical tablets PVC/Al 1      2  
 (Tötsch and Polack, 1992) PP/Al 2      1  
12 wounddrain bottle PVC 1      2  
 (Tötsch and Polack, 1992) PET 2      1  
13 main sewage pipes PVC (recycled) 1 1     2 3 
 (FKS, 1995) Gres (stoneware) 3 2     3 1 
  concrete 2 3     1 2 
14 flooring resilient PVC  4 5 5 4     
 (Albrecht & Langowski, 1997) PVC cushion 2 4 4 3     
  polyolefine 3 2 1 2     
  linoleum 1 1 6 1     
  rubber 5 3 3 5     
  parquet 7  7      
  textile 6  2      
 
The relative ranking of the impacts of consequences for the different environmental 
issues that were included in each study was determined (Table 6-1). PVC scores 
relatively good on climate energy use and climate change. This is due to the fact that 
only half of the weight of PVC comes from fossil fuels, contrary to other plastics. The 
scores are however influenced by assumptions that are made for waste treatment. If a 
waste treatment is assumed with an efficient energy recovery system, the advantage of 
PVC over PE and PP is reduced. PVC is worse than PE if it comes to acidification 
because hydrochloric acid  is produced during the incineration of PVC waste. PVC 
also scores worse on toxicity impacts. This is caused partly by the emissions during 
production and use, and partly by dioxin emissions during waste treatment.  
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In order to draw some strong conclusions on the basis of a meta study differences in 
methodologies, assumptions and quality of the LCA studies should be considered. 
However, on the basis of this very rough survey it seems that replacing products 
containing PVC with alternatives that are free of PVC might reduce toxicity problems 
and acidification, but on the other hand could increase the problem of climate change.  
 
It is clear that these LCA studies can be used to compare the environmental impacts 
of PVC products with its alternatives. The methodological limitations of such studies 
should however be kept in mind. The product system of PVC, or process tree, is built 
up out of processes that are linked to each other in a linear way. Since standard LCAs 
use the assumption of ceteris paribus the effects of replacing 1 kg of PVC by e.g. 1 kg of 
PE can be assessed. However, the effects of replacing the total PVC production and 
consumption chain by a PE chain would need more than a standard LCA. The effects 
of changes in the market for chlorine and other intermediates and the possible 
dismantling of chlorine production plants are not included. To answer that type of 
question LCA is not the right tool. LCA is more suited to answer smaller questions 
like: what material, from an environmental point of view, would be best to use in a specific product? 
Although a standard LCA does not answer the question: what would be the environmental 
impacts of a ban on PVC, it can still be used to answer a part of this question: how does 
PVC compare environmentally to its alternatives in specific applications ? 
 
6.4.4 Application of SFA on the case of PVC 
In case of a world-wide ban on PVC, the SFA region is defined as the world as a 
whole and the material is PVC. An SFA of PVC as a substance would result in an 
overview of PVC flows and stocks in the world. These PVC flows can then be 
connected to environmental problem flows like those of phthalates and heavy metals 
which are used as additives (Tukker et al. 1997, Tukker et al., 1998). Although this is 
interesting when one wants to highlight the most important flows in the total 
metabolism of a material it does not answer the question what would be the environmental 
impacts of a ban on PVC ? The answer to this question on the basis of an SFA of PVC is 
that all the flows, thus also all the problematic flows, would gradually disappear as the 
stocks in society will decrease over time. Any alternatives or shifting of problems via 
other materials or processes is out of sight. 
 
If one would broaden the scope of the SFA by choosing chlorine as the substance for 
the analysis, the interconnections of PVC to the rest of the chlorine chain become 
visible. Several of these studies have been done on different geographical levels 
(Tukker et al., 1995; Ayres, 1997; Ayres and Ayres 1997; Ayres, 1998; Kleijn et al., 
1997; Kleijn and Van der Voet, 1998). These studies show the quantitative 
relationships between PVC and the rest of the chlorine chain. These quantitative 
relationships can be used to assess the changes in chlorine chain as a result of a ban of 
PVC.  Practically the only use of VCM is the production of PVC and its co-polymers. 
A ban on PVC would therefore make the VCM production obsolete. To a lesser 
extent the same is true for EDC: although there are some other applications, the bulk 
of the EDC production is used for the production of PVC. One step further upstream 
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the SFA studies on chlorine show that PVC is by far the most important single end-
use of chlorine. In 1992, 38.6% of the produced chlorine in Western Europe was used 
to produce vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) which is almost totally used for the 
production of PVC (Kleijn and Van der Voet, 1998). In that same year, 32% went to 
the production of PVC in the US (Ayres and Ayres, 1997). Thus in the end a ban on 
































Figure 6-4: A ban on PVC would result in a strong reduction of demand for chlorine.  
 
 
Furthermore the production of PVC is linked to other parts of the chlorine chain via 
the use of hydrochloric acid (HCl) in the production process. A substantial part of the 
chlorine used to produce PVC comes from HCl. Nowadays many of the products of 
the chlorine industry do not contain chlorine. Instead, chlorine is used during the 
production process and (partly) returned either as chloride salts or as HCl. A time 
series SFA would show a gradual shift from chlorine containing end-products to 
chlorine-free products using chlorine as an intermediate in the production process. 
This by-product HCl can be regarded as an inevitable and undesirable by-product and 
it is not so easy to deal with. The most favourable and in fact most wide-spread option 
is to use this HCl again in the production of chlorinated compounds, especially PVC. 
In case of a world-wide ban, this sink for HCl would no longer exist. This in turn 
would stimulate the use of HCl/chlorine recycling loops (see textbox/endnote) which 
in turn would cause a sharp decline in the demand for chlorine and, together with the 
reduction in primary demand for chlorine, could make the chlorine production 
obsolete (Figure 6-5). 
 
 














































Figure 6-5: A ban on PVC would stimulate the use of HCl/chlorine recycling loops which in turn 
would cause a sharp decline in the demand for chlorine and, together with the reduction in primary 
demand for chlorine, could make the chlorine production obsolete. 
Although an SFA of chlorine shows and quantifies the interconnections between PVC 
production and the rest of chlorine chain it too has a limited focus: it focuses on flows 
of chlorine only. A drastic change in the chlorine production would also affect other 
non-chlorine industries that are connected to the chlorine industry. One very 
straightforward example of this is the linked production of chlorine and caustic soda 
(Kleijn et al. 1993). The electrolysis process in which chlorine is produced in fact 
produces 1.1 kg  of caustic soda (NaOH) for every kg of chlorine. If chlorine 
production would stop, another source would have to be found for caustic soda. This 
link, and other links, are invisible in an SFA on chlorine. 
 




HCl as a key substance in the chlorine industry 
HCl is a key substance in the chlorine industry. It is produced as a by-product in the production of 
products of the chlorine industry that contain less chlorine then the starting materials or no chlorine 
at all themselves. It's single most important use is the production of PVC via the oxy-chlorination 
process. In most processes HCl is produced in its pure form, as a corrosive gas, but in some 
processes it is produced in the diluted form of hydrochloric acid. There are three major options to 
get rid of HCl as a that is prod uced by-product: HCl can simply be diluted and/or neutralised and 
discharged as chloride into waste water streams, it can be diluted and sold and on the market as 
hydrochloric acid or it can be used to make other chlorinated compounds, including chlorine. 
Discharging in the form of chloride is an option when the production units are located near an ocean 
but it would be a problem at locations more inland. In the production of TiO2 (a white pigment) 
chlorine is completely converted to a 30% solution of  hydrochloric acid. However, because this acid 
is contaminated with silicates it is often simply neutralised with lime to produce calcium chloride 
which can either be disposed in a nearby ocean or dumped at a solid waste disposal site (e.g. 
http://www.chemlink.com.au/caustic_oz.htm). Selling HCl on the market is not always an economic 
option because of limited demand, transport costs and costs of the demineralised water which is 
needed to dissolve the HCl gas and the costs of removing traces of organics from the HCl gas 
(Motupally et al., 1998). Re-using HCl in the production of  chlorinated chemicals like PVC is often 
the most favourable option.  
 
The main sources of HCl in the Europe are the production of the isocyanates MDI and TDI 
(precursors of polyurethane (PUR) foams) potash fertiliser, allyl chloride, monochloroacetic acid 
(MCA) and of chloromethanes (Kleijn and Van der Voet, 1998). Before 1995 another important 
source was the production of (H)CFCs but this production has been banned almost completely at 
this time. Another source of HCl is the incineration of chemical waste from the chlorine industry 
(light and heavy ends).  
 
In general the processes in which HCl is being produced grow faster than the processes in which 
HCl can be used. Thus HCl supply is larger than the demand and this imbalance will continue to 
grow in the near future. A ban on the main process in which  HCl is used, the production of PVC, 
will have a heavy toll on the production processes that produce HCl as a by-product. Since this 
problem is already occurring even without the ban, the industry is looking for alternative ways to get 
rid of the excess of HCl. One of the options is to convert HCl back into chlorine, the feedstock of 
many of the processes in which HCl is the by-product. Two routes for this process have been 
available for some decades. The first option is the Uhde electrolysis in which HCl is absorbed in 
water and than electrolysed to hydrogen and chlorine. The main disadvantages of this process are 
that a small amount of oxygen is being co-produced which leads to corrosion of the cell components 
and that the produced chlorine contains 1-2% water which has to be removed. The second  option 
that has been available for some time is the Deacon process in which HCl together with oxygen is 
catalytically converted to chlorine and water. The main disadvantage of this process is that it is very 
energy intensive (the process is operated at 400-450 ºC) and the co-production of water demands an 
extensive separation step. Since these two existing processes have important drawbacks which makes 
them economically less favourable new processes are being developed. One of those processes is a 
direct electrolysis of gaseous anhydrous HCl patented by DuPont (Trainham et al., 1995) . With this 
process both the absorption step and the water separation step can be skipped. Furthermore, the 
diffusion coefficients in the gas phase are much higher than those in aqueous solutions which 
increases the overall efficiency of the process. It can be expected that other processes will be 
developed in the near future. This is an interesting development from an industrial ecology 
perspective because this opens the opportunity to close the loop for processes in which chlorine is 
used and HCl is produced as a by-product. For example the production of MDI and TDI can be 
done in a closed system in which chlorine is continuously recycled from HCl to Cl2 that would make 
the input of new chlorine obsolete.  
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6.4.5 Need for a broader perspective 
In the previous paragraphs a description is given of the results of the application of 
different existing IEA and IE tools on the case of a ban on PVC. It is clear that a 
combination of IEA and IE tools can give a more complete analysis of the 
environmental impacts of a ban on PVC than either could give individually. IMAGE 
and RAINS would either need a much more detailed module to calculate emissions 
from industry in order to be useful at all in this case, or must be supplemented by 
other information. IE tools offer some insight in environmental impacts, each in a 
different way. They even could generate some input for the IEA tools. An LCA could 
be used to spot differences in energy use, greenhouse gas emissions or emissions of 
acidifying compounds as a result of the substitution of PVC by other plastics. An SFA 
quantifies the links of PVC to the rest of the chlorine industry and thereby could 
deliver some input to calculate the changes of energy use on that basis. But still each 
of these tools would only put the spotlight on a part of the total effects of such a ban. 
All tools proclaim to use an encompassing systems approach but in fact they are only 
partial and all have blind spots for certain kinds of effects. To get the complete 
picture, a broader approach is needed. 
 
 
6.5 Application of a broader systems perspective 
 
In the end, we come to the question which should have been the start: what would really 
happen in case of a world-wide ban on PVC, apart from any specific tools to analyse it?  
 
In order to get a realistic answer to this question one has to start with a broad systems 
analysis which is not hindered by any constraint that is laid down by individual tools 
i.e.: the limitation to one substance in SFA; the limitation to bulk materials in MFA; 
the limitation to one product(system) and marginal linear changes in LCA; the 
limitation to one environmental problem in RAINS and IMAGE; the limitation to 
very aggregated material flows in society in IEA tools etc.  One has to start with a 
general system description of the actual situation including all types of 
interconnections in society and the environment in qualitative way. This qualitative 
system description can then be extended with quantitative information from the 
different available tools. As an example we will now do this exercise for the PVC 
example. 
 
SFA has shown that a combination of a ban on PVC and the introduction of 
processes that would make the production of chlorine from HCl economic would 
decimate the traditional production of chlorine from salt. In traditional chlorine 
production caustic soda, an important industrial chemical, is a co-product. For every 
mole of chlorine a mole of caustic is produced. Caustic is used in many different 
applications of which the most important are the chemical processing industry, as a 
reactant or pH regulator, the pulp and paper industry for dissolving lignin and 
bleaching, the food industry and in the production of textiles (Kleijn et al., 1993). If 
the traditional production of chlorine would be decimated because of a ban on PVC 
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there are two options for the industries that are now using caustic: dramatically reduce 
the amount of input of caustic by efficiency improvement or substitution or to find 
alternative routes to produce caustic.  
 
Substitution of caustic is possible in some applications. Alkalic substances like 
hydrated lime  (Ca(OH)2) and soda ash (NaCO3) can be used as alternatives in pH 
regulation and in the pulp and paper industry, although they have some disadvantages 
of their own (e..g. lime has a very low solubility in water, less than 1.5 g/l and soda 
ash, when used in an acidic environment will lead to formation of CO2 gas). 
Alternative routes for the production of caustic are rare. One known process is the 
production from soda ash and hydrated lime (CaCO3): 
 
 Ca(OH)2 + Na2CO3 (soda ash)  →  2 NaOH (caustic soda) + CaCO3 (prec.)  
 
Soda ash can be produced from hydrated lime and common salt (NaCl) via the Solvay 
process. The  
aggregated chemical equation of the Solvay process is: 
 
Ca(OH)2 +  2 NaCl + CO2   →   Na2CO3 +CaCl2 +H2O 
 
Combining these processes, caustic soda can be produced from hydrated lime and 
common salt. Hydrated lime is produced by adding water to quicklime (CaO + H2O 
→ Ca(OH)2) and quicklime is produced via the calcination of limestone which is used 
for example in cement kilns (CaCO3 +  heat → CaO + CO2 ). Caustic soda can thus 
be produced from limestone and common salt, two minerals of which large reserves 
exist (Figure 6-6). The mining of these minerals however has important detrimental 
impacts on the landscape. An interesting point from a climate change perspective is 
that CO2 is produced in this process and that the energy need of  the calcination 
process is high (temperatures higher than 500-600 °C are needed). The most 
commonly used fuel for this process is coal (USGS, 2002), resulting in high CO2 
emissions from the energy use. 
 


























































Figure 6-6: If the chlorine production would disappear other production routes for caustic soda would 
be needed. The most obvious known route would be the production from limestone. 
 
Table 6-2 shows the contribution of lime and cement production as a fraction of the 
global CO2 emissions. The production of lime and cement together accounted for a 
CO2 emission of more than 9% compared to the CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. 
About halve of these emissions come from the chemical process while the other halve 
comes from the use of fossil fuels in these processes.  In Table 6-3 an overview is 
given of the chemical  processes that are used in this alternative route for caustic soda 
production. For every mole of caustic soda 0.5 mole of CO2 is released via the 
chemical process (thus excluding CO2 from fuels). However, for the production of 
caustic soda via the electrolysis of common salt energy electricity is needed too, which 
in turn will lead to CO2 emissions. In Table 6-4 a comparison is made of the CO2 
emission of  the traditional NaCl electrolysis route for the production of NaOH  
(System 1) and the route via lime (System 2). In this calculation the emissions of CO2 
per kg of NaOH are calculated by adding up the emissions from the production of the 
different starting materials and the emissions from the chemical process itself (only in 
System 2).  This calculation shows that a transition to the production of caustic soda 
via limestone will increase the CO2 emission of caustic production by more than a 
factor two: for every kg of caustic produced more than a kg of CO2 extra will be 
emitted. In Table 6-5 the additional CO2 emission is given when the total world 
production of caustic would shift from the electrolysis route to the limestone route. It 
is shown that global CO2 emissions would increase by around 0.2 % if this transition 
would take place.  
 
Although one can discuss whether the total chlorine industry would really completely 
disappear when PVC would be banned and it is questionable that the current caustic 
soda production capacity would still be needed in such a situation this analysis clearly 
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shows that a ban on PVC can substantially increase global CO2 emissions, via an 
indirect route.   
 









(109 kg C) 
CO2 from 
cement production 
(109 kg C) 
world CO2 
production from 
fossil fuels (109 kg 
C) 
lime CO2 as % of 
world total from 
fossil fuels 
cement  CO2 as % 
of world total 
from fossil fuels 
1963 68 378 29.7 129 2797 1.1 4.6 
1964 82 416 35.8 142 2952 1.2 4.8 
1965 75 433 32.7 148 3087 1.1 4.8 
1966 78 464 34.0 158 3243 1.0 4.9 
1967 82 480 35.8 164 3347 1.1 4.9 
1968 85 515 37.1 176 3518 1.1 5.0 
1969 90 543 39.3 185 3728 1.1 5.0 
1970 97 572 42.3 195 3997 1.1 4.9 
1971 100 590 43.6 201 4143 1.1 4.9 
1972 102 661 44.5 225 4305 1.0 5.2 
1973 107 702 46.7 239 4538 1.0 5.3 
1974 110 703 48.0 240 4545 1.1 5.3 
1975 105 702 45.8 239 4518 1.0 5.3 
1976 108 735 47.1 251 4776 1.0 5.2 
1977 117 797 51.1 272 4910 1.0 5.5 
1978 120 853 52.4 291 4962 1.1 5.9 
1979 118 872 51.5 297 5249 1.0 5.7 
1980 120 883 52.4 301 5177 1.0 5.8 
1981 117 887 51.1 302 5004 1.0 6.0 
1982 109 887 47.6 303 4959 1.0 6.1 
1983 110 917 48.0 312 4942 1.0 6.3 
1984 117 941 51.1 321 5113 1.0 6.3 
1985 123 959 53.7 327 5274 1.0 6.2 
1986 124 1,008 54.1 344 5436 1.0 6.3 
1987 127 1,053 55.4 359 5558 1.0 6.5 
1988 134 1,118 58.5 381 5774 1.0 6.6 
1989 139 1,042 60.7 355 5879 1.0 6.0 
1990 136 1,043 59.3 356 5939 1.0 6.0 
1991 133 1,185 58.0 404 6025 1.0 6.7 
1992 133 1,123 58.0 383 5922 1.0 6.5 
1993 123 1,291 53.7 440 5914 0.9 7.4 
1994 118 1,370 51.5 467 6050 0.9 7.7 
1995 120 1,445 52.4 493 6182 0.8 8.0 
1996 121 1,493 52.8 509 6327 0.8 8.0 
1997 118 1,547 51.5 527 6419 0.8 8.2 
1998 117 1,547 51.1 527 6401 0.8 8.2 
1999 116 1,603 50.6 546 6366 0.8 8.6 
2000 118 1,643 51.5 560 6480 0.8 8.6 
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Source: lime and cement production from USGS online database (http://minerals.usgs.gov/ 
minerals/pubs/commodity/), world CO2 emission from Worldwatch Insititue (Signposts 2002). CO2 emission 
connected to cement production is calculated as follows: per ton CaO  0.85 ton (non-fuel) CO2  is produced.  
This 0.85 is the average of the range of  0.79-0.91 that is given by www.ghgprotocol.org. Furthermore, 0.75 
ton CO2 per ton cement is produced from the fossil fuels used in this process (BuildingGreen.com). CO2 
emissions from lime production are calculated as 0.785 ton CO2 per ton CaO (chemical) (Winebrake and 
Laden, 1998) and 0.75 ton CO2 per ton CaO from fuels with the assumption that the energy needs are similar 
to those of cement production. 
 
Table 6-3: Chemical route to produce caustic soda from limestone and common salt 
 amount of lime needed to produce caustic 
 Ca(OH)2 +  2 NaCl + CO2 →  Na2CO3 +CaCl2 +H2O 
 Ca(OH)2 + Na2CO3 (soda ash) → 2 NaOH (caustic soda) + CaCO3 (prec.) 
Sum 2Ca(OH)2 + 2 NaCl + CO2  →  2NaOH + CaCl2 + CaCO3 + H2O   
  
 CaCO3  →  CaO + CO2 
 CaO + H2O  →  Ca(OH)2 
Sum CaCO3 + H2O  →  Ca(OH)2 + CO2 
  
  
 2Ca(OH)2 + 2 NaCl + CO2  →  2NaOH + CaCl2 + CaCO3 + H2O   
2x CaCO3 + H2O  →  Ca(OH)2 + CO2 
Sum CaCO3 + 2 NaCl + H2O  →  2NaOH + CaCl2 +CO2 
  
 to produce 2 moles of caustic 1 mole of CO2 is produced 
 to produce 2 moles of caustic 2 moles of lime is needed 
 





lime needed to 
produce  
caustic (109 kg) 
CO2 from caustic via 
lime minus 
electrolysis (109 kg C) 
world total CO2 
emissions from 
fossil fuels  
(109 kg C) 
additional CO2 from 
caustic via limestone as 
% of world total from 
fossil fuels) 
1995 40.7 60 11.8 6182 0.19 
1996 41.1 61 11.9 6327 0.19 
1997 43.6 64 12.6 6419 0.20 
1998 43.4 64 12.6 6401 0.20 
1999 44.4 66 12.9 6366 0.20 
2000 45.6 67 13.2 6480 0.20 
2001 47.3 70 13.7 6553 0.21 
Source: lime  production from USGS online databases, world CO2 emission from Worldwatch Insititue 
(Signposts 2002). Caustic soda production from CMAI, 2001.  Additional CO2 emissions from production of 
caustic via lime 0.29 kg C per kg caustic see calculations in Table 6-4.   
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Table 6-5: Comparison of CO2 emissions from caustic production via two routes: via electrolysis of 
common salt or from limestone and common salt 
 mole (-) M (g/mole) mass (kg) normalized 
per kg NaOH 
CO2 emission from the 
production of starting 
materials (kg/kg) 
kg CO2 / kg 
NaOH 
System 1: NaOH from electrolysis of NaCl 2NaCl + 2H2O → 2NaOH + Cl2 + H2 
 
Inputs       
NaCl 1.00 58.4 0.0584 1.46 0.0940 0.137 
H2O 1.00 18.0 0.0180 0.451   
       
Outputs       
NaOH 1.00 40.0 0.0400 1.00   
Cl2 0.50 70.9 0.0355 0.886   
H2 0.50 2.02 0.0010 0.0252   
       
Emission of CO2 from energy use in this process  0.688 
Total CO2 emissions (kg CO2)     0.825 
Total CO2 emissions (kg C)    0.225 
  
System 2: NaOH from limestone CaCO3 + 2 NaCl + H2O → 2NaOH + CaCl2 +CO2 
       
Inputs       
CaCO3 0.50 100 0.0501 1.25 0.00614 0.00768 
NaCl 1.00 58.4 0.0584 1.46 0.0940 0.137 
H2O 0.50 18.0 0.0090 0.225   
       
Outputs       
NaOH 1.00 40.0 0.0400 1.00   
CaCl2 0.50 111 0.0555 1.39   
CO2 0.50 44.0 0.0220 0.550  0.550 
       
Emission of CO2 from energy use in this process  1.19 
Total CO2 emissions (kg CO2)     1.89 
Total CO2 emissions (kg C)    0.515 
 
Source: Emissions from energy use of the electrolysis process (System 1) are taken 
from ETH LCA database (ETH, 1996), together this is 0.825 kg CO2 per kg NaOH 
of which 0.137 kg CO2 per kg is related to the production of NaCl. Emissions from 
the production of the starting materials of the limestone route (Sytem 2) are also taken 
from the ETH database. The emissions from the chemical process itself are based the 
fact that for every mole of NaOH one mole of CaO is needed (Table 6-3) and the 
CO2 emissions related to this given in the note below Table 6-2.  
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6.6 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our hypothesis was that IE tools can be used in addition to IEA tools to identify 
potential environmental impacts of policy measures aimed not at specific 
environmental issues, but at materials and products in society. In the example the 
virtual ban on PVC we show that this hypothesis holds. We also show that this 
combination of tools can be used to detect and therefore prevent different forms of 
problem shifting (from PVC related issues to climate change) or in other words to 
identify co-benefits  and co-damages (disappearance of the chlorine industry and 
increase in lime kiln activities) of environmental policy measures (a ban on PVC). 
 
IEA tools cannot look outside the scope of the specific environmental issues they are 
made for. Moreover, their resolution in the economic driver modules is too low to 
enable analysing a quite extensive measure like a complete ban on PVC. This could in 
part be repaired by increasing the resolution of the economic driver module by 
distinguishing a higher number of economic sectors. This would indeed constitute to a 
better picture but there is more to it than that. Not only the resolution, but also the 
impossibility of detecting indirect effects is a problem. Due to the significant impacts 
of a ban on PVC on global CO2 emissions, be it in an indirect manner and via a 
number of steps, it can be concluded, that the argument that such a measure is too 
small to be detected is not applicable. IEA tools are not suitable to analyse the effects 
of measures not affecting their object directly. 
 
Because the resolution of IE tools is much higher for material flows in society they do 
a little better in this case. Since they look, in different ways, at society's metabolism it 
is possible to detect changes as a result of a PVC ban. With LCA, a picture emerges of 
the changes in a wider number of environmental issues as a result of a substitution of 
PVC with other materials. With SFA, the implications for the chlorine chain become 
apparent. However, the scope of tools like LCA and SFA is also limited, and their 
assessment of environmental impact is limited. They show part of what might happen. 
Also the picture they show remains fragmented and incomplete. Moreover, their 
analysis of what happens in the environment is limited compared to the outcomes of 
IEA tools. 
 
IEA tools and IE tools are clearly complementary when looking at their main focus. 
In our PVC  example we have shown that IE tools can indeed provide input for the 
IEA tools. LCA can provide data on changes in emissions and waste flows resulting 
from substitution of one product or material to another. SFA can be used to show the 
connections between different industrial processes. Thus, the combined tools deliver a 
more complete picture than any of the single tools. How such a combination could be 
further implemented in practice is a question for further research. For SFA, this may 
be easier than for LCA. SFA is time and location specific and analyses flows in a 
geographically demarcated area, just as IEA tools do. SFA can also easily be tailored to 
the same compounds as the IEA tools. For LCA, a translation step is necessary to 
make the connection but it could be worthwhile to make the attempt. 
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However, even a combination of IEA and IE tools is, as can be seen from Section 5, 
not sufficient to capture all effects. There is a need for a broader systems analysis 
which can be used for the analysis of what actually can be expected to happen, 
preceding the selection of the specific tools. The format of the broader systems 
analysis could range from a material and product flowchart to a true dynamic 
quantified systems analysis. Only when, on the basis of this analysis, there is an idea of 
what really happens has the time come to select and apply specific tools - IEA tools, 
IE tools or a combination of both - to quantify the effects.  
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Chapter 7  
Overarching conclusions, general discussion and research 
agenda 
 
This Chapter presents the conclusions to be drawn from the material presented in the 
preceding chapters, a general discussion of the results of this dissertation and a 
proposal for a future research agenda. 
 
 




Until some 6000 years ago the use of metals was limited to the few that occur in their 
metallic form on Earth (mainly gold and copper). Although metals were rare, they 
were not scarce because their importance was also limited to ornaments with at most 
symbolic value. With the start of the Bronze Age (~4000 BC) and their application in 
tools, weapons and armour, metals acquired a utilization value. At certain times and in 
certain locations, scarcity of the main ingredients of bronze, notably copper and tin, 
will have occurred, while the use of the wood (charcoal) required to free the metals 
from their ores led to deforestation. The use of the much more abundant iron (~1000 
BC) solved the issue of local shortages of copper and tin, but it further increased the 
scale of deforestation. Between the 16th and the 18th century the scarcity of wood 
became a constraint in Europe, not only for metal smelting but also for heating and 
shipbuilding. This link between biotic and abiotic resources was broken by the 
introduction of coke made from abundant coal.  
 
The material basis of societies has shifted many times during the course of human 
history. The main drivers for substitution are scarcity and innovation. While 
innovations often occur independent of scarcity issues, scarcity can lead to 
innovations that both solve the scarcity issue and lead to improved performance. The 
substitution of bronze for copper and wrought iron for bronze illustrate this point. 
The technological breakthrough that allowed the substitution of  firewood (charcoal) 
by coal (coke) alleviated the scarcity of wood in the late 18th century. Steel alloys like 
manganese, nickel, chromium and molybdenum steels can often replace one another 
without loss of performance. Until the mid-18th century humans used fewer than 10 
metals, while at present practically all the metals that exist are used in industry. Metals 
like iron, aluminium, zinc and copper are the foundation of our cities and 
Research questions:  
1. How did the use of metals co-evolve with human progress and what was 
the role of metals scarcity in that process? 
2. What was the nature of scarcity in previous eras and what was its nature 
perceived to be at the time? And how does the current scarcity situation 
and scarcity debate differ from those in the past? 
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infrastructure. Over 60 elements are used in the production of the microchips to be 
found in many everyday products. As Figure 5-4 in Chapter 5 shows, the trend over 
the last few decades is that the mined output of many relatively scarce elements is 
growing faster than GDP. While of less abundant metals can often be substituted by 
more abundant ones (Al, Fe, Ca, Na, Mg, K and Ti), this often leads to loss of 
performance. The opportunities for substituting scarce metals by other scarce metals 
are limited because all these metals are essential for one or more applications. 
(Chapters 2 and 5)          
 
 




Today, after two centuries of rapid exponential growth, the limits to the production of 
fossil fuels are starting to emerge. Not only is production struggling to keep up with 
demand, but the related emissions are now an eminent threat to society. The transition 
to a low-carbon energy system required to tackle climate change implies a steep 
increase of the metals intensity of the energy system, which in turn implies a 
substantial increase in the demand for metals (by a factor 2 to 100). At the same time, 
declining ore grades will result in a substantial increase in the use of energy, water and 
land and in the production of waste per kg of metal produced. Today's metals scarcity 
is therefore not an isolated issue, but one of many interconnected issues in a world 
where planetary boundaries for all of these issues are in sight. 
The introduction of Carbon Capture and Sequestration in fossil-based power 
production would increase the metals intensity of power generation:  by 30% for iron 
and 75% for nickel at coal-fired plants,  and by 40% for iron and 150% for nickel at 
gas-fired plants. There are two main causes:  the efficiency of power production is 
reduced because energy is needed to capture and transport CO2; and additional 
infrastructure is needed in the form of capture installations, pipelines, pumps and 
injection wells. A full transition of the current generation system to a non-fossil 
electricity mix would require a substantial scale-up of the mining and refining of many 
metals including nickel, molybdenum, uranium, silver and, to a lesser extent, 
aluminium and copper. When a business-as-usual economic growth scenario (SRES 
A1) is combined with a complete transition to renewable energy (65% PV solar from 
the deserts, 15% PV solar from rooftops, 15% wind and 5% others) by 2050, the 
metals requirements for this transition would be very high. The equivalent to several 
to hundred times current annual world production would be needed to build the 
Research questions:  
3. What are the metal requirements of the transition to a low-carbon energy 
system and will these requirements constrain the scale-up of individual 
technologies or constrain the pace of the energy transition as a whole? 
4. Will these metal requirements, combined with other types of demand, lead 
to significant scarcity in the short- and medium-term future ? 
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required grid, wind turbines and hydrogen pipelines. For certain technologies it is 
highly likely that materials requirements will hinder their scale up to significant levels 
(hundreds of GW worldwide) in the time frame available to address climate change 
(three to five decades). This is certainly true for thin-film CdTe and CIGS solar cells 
(ten to a hundred times current annual production); new efficient and low-
maintenance direct-drive wind turbines and electro motors that contain permanent 
magnets with Nd and Dy (tenths of times current annual production for 100 GW 
installed capacity and 10% of produced cars); PEM fuel cells that use Pt as a catalyst 
(more than current annual production of Pt for 10% of annual car production); 
cobalt-containing Li-ion batteries for electric cars (all current annual Co production 
for 10% of produced cars). The conclusions above are based on the upscaling of 
current technologies. In many cases alternative technologies are either available or 
being developed that are less likely to run into material constraints when scaled up to 
substantial levels. However, in many cases this might come at the cost of functionality 
or efficiency. Examples are neodymium-containing wind turbines and electro motors, 
In- en Te-containing thin-film PV cells and copper-containing HVDC power lines. 
(Chapters 3 and 4) 
 
Economists tend to point to technological progress and innovation as the process that 
will  provide a virtually limitless supply of metals in the foreseeable future. Innovation 
can indeed be employed to resolve scarcity issues by increasing the efficiency of use of 
metals or, in other words, decreasing the metals intensity of processes and products. 
Although this process of relative decoupling will lead to a reduction in the amount of 
metals used per unit of GDP, in practice this has seldom led to an absolute reduction 
in the amount of metals produced. The Iron Age did not reduce the production of 
copper and tin, nor did the introduction of aluminium and titanium lead to a 
reduction in iron or copper production. Economic and population growth have 
always annihilated the efficiency gains delivered through innovation and technological 
progress. However, these processes did manage to increase the global reserves of 
many metals and thereby kept reserve / production ratios relatively constant. 
However, since the mining output of almost all metals continues to grow 
exponentially, technological progress and innovation need to proceed at an ever 
increasing pace in order to keep up. (Chapters 2 and 5)        
 
Hall and Klitgaard investigate the role of energy and energy return on investment 
(EROI) for economic growth (Hall and Klitgaard 2012). They analyse the essential 
role of an ample supply of high EROI energy sources for economic development. 
Their thesis is that we are entering an age where the EROI for society as a whole will 
significantly decrease due to a lack of easy oil, and later gas which will hamper 
economic growth. This is very much in line with conclusions of this study that it is not 
a lack of metal ores in Earth's crust and oceans that will cause problems for society 
but the increasing costs related to their mining and production both in monetary 
terms and in terms of required energy and water and environmental impacts. In 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation it is concluded that due to current trends in mining and 
refining not only the energy requirements per unit of metal produced will increase but 
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also the metal requirements i.e. the metal return on investment. Three major long 
term trends will compete with the decreasing ore grades and less accessible deposits: 
the technological progress in mining and refining; the slowdown in demand with 
higher per capita income levels (“S-curve”); and the increasing role for recycling. For 
energy, Hall and Klitgaard  conclude that it is highly likely that economic growth, as 
measured in GDP, will stagnate because of the decreasing declining EROI and thus 
declining surplus of energy. Ayres and Warr draw a similar conclusion: economic 
growth cannot be sustained if we fail to find an alternative source of cheap energy 
(Ayres and Warr 2009). However, from a sustainability perspective this might actually 
be a good thing as is discussed by Hall and Klittgaard but also by Jackson and other 
de-growth economists(Jackson 2009).          
 
 
7.3 Conclusions on methodology 
 
 
The case of a virtual ban on PVC shows that even within a limited subset of the 
industrial system, the chlorine industry, the complexities in the system can have a 
substantial impact on the outcome of an analysis of the environmental impacts of 
such a ban. Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) tools lack the resolution in 
their description of material flows through society to capture the changes that occur as 
a result of such a measure. Industrial Ecology (IE) tools have a much higher 
resolution, but they only partially capture the changes  that would occur within the 
chlorine industry. With LCA, a picture emerges of the changes in a wider number of 
environmental issues as a result of substituting PVC by other materials. With SFA, the 
implications for the chlorine chain become apparent. However, the scope of tools like 
LCA and SFA is limited, and their assessment of environmental impact is generic. The 
picture they show remains fragmented and incomplete. (Chapter 6) 
 
Combining different tools will help capture a larger part of the true complexities of 
the material metabolism of society but is still insufficient to capture them all. Any 
sustainability analysis should therefore start with a broad description of the system. 
From this description research questions should be formulated that can be 
quantitatively answered using tools like LCA and SFA that have a high resolution for 
the material flows in society. Broader tools like Environmentally Extended Input 
Output analysis (E-IOA) and IEA tools can than be used to track and quantify 
possible macro-scale consequences. (Chapters 4 and 6) 
 
When it comes to the analysis of the metals requirements of the future energy systems 
presented in this dissertation, the following observations can be made on the 
Research question:  
5. What are the possibilities and limitations of Industrial Ecology and other 
analytical tools when it comes to including the real complexity of material 
flows in societies in sustainability analyses?   
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limitations of LCA. First of all, the ceteris paribus assumption that is used in regular 
LCAs does not hold for the system-wide changes that will occur as a result of a major 
transition in the energy system. Secondly, this transition will take place somewhere in 
the future, which means that the background processes of e.g. steel production and 
transport cannot be assumed to be similar to those that are valid today. Finally, LCA 
databases lack the level of detail with regard to the use of minor metals that is needed 
to quantify them over the life cycle. There is a clear need for tools that can be used to 
asses the sustainability impacts of large-scale changes without losing the life-cycle 
perspective. These tools are currently being developed under the heading Life Cycle 
Sustainability Analysis.(Chapters 4 and 6)   
 
 
7.4 General discussion 
 
Over the ages, the primary sector (agriculture, fishery and mining) has steadily 
declined in importance and now accounts for less than 5% of GDP in most rich 
market economies. Economists often explain this as being a consequence of the fact 
that in the modern world added value increasingly comes from knowledge, innovation 
and related services, rather than from ‘stuff’. However, the undeniable physical reality 
remains that the products of mining and agriculture are the ultimate foundation of our 
prosperity. Ecologists have pointed out that classical economics fails to acknowledge 
this by mislabelling resource extraction as ‘production’ and generally failing to 
acknowledge the economic reality of ‘natural capital’, being the sum of natural 
resources and ecosystem services. In short: products as well as services cannot exist 
without a material basis. That material basis is the foundation of the economic 
pyramid. While the primary production of commodities represents but a small fraction 
of GDP, the global interconnectivity of the economy and the complexity of material 
services provision mean that disruptions of supply may be more damaging now than 
at any time in the past.  
 
Over time, the input of materials in society as a whole has exponentially increased and 
in the future supply will struggle to keep up with demand. The production of the 
materials needed to double the extent of urban infrastructure and triple per capita 
income in the coming decades will require more and more energy, water and land and 
thereby cause substantial environmental impacts. At the same time, global use of 
water, land, energy and environmental services are fast reaching planetary boundaries. 
In earlier ages, humanity could consider the planet as effectively infinite, while now we 
are entering an age in which we are exceeding the safe operating space of our planet in 
many respects (Rockstrom et al. 2009). Paul Crutzen has named our present age the 
Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002).  
 
This dissertation has focused on the link between metals and energy production.  
Climate science tells us that if we fail to act within the next decade irreversible and 
possibly catastrophic climate change will set in. In order to avoid collapse we will need 
to shift our current production and consumption pattern to a much less energy and 
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material intensive direction. In general, the outlines of a sustainable society are clear 
and can be phrased in terms of three major transitions: 
1. a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources; 
2. a transition from linear material flows, from raw materials to waste, to a 
closed-loop materials economy; 
3. a transition from the exploitation of nature and biodiversity to its protection. 
 
Only a combination of these three major transitions will direct humanity in the 
direction of a truly sustainable society. It is important to recognize that both the 
physical and the symbolic aspects of society are interconnected through complex 
linkages. In order to study and implement these transitions these linkages should be 
taken into account in our assessments of future technologies and policy measures. In 
this thesis, I have used tools from the research field of Industrial Ecology to do that.  
 
Industrial Ecology is a young field of science in which societal metabolism (the 
physical part of society) is the object of study. Several tools and methods have been 
developed that can be used to analyse societal metabolism from a natural-science, 
engineering-science and social-science perspective. The core element uniting these 
tools is that they all start out from a systems perspective in which the linkages 
between physical and symbolic aspects of society are (partially) taken into account. 
The sustainability of processes, production plants and products are always analysed as 
part of the broader socio-economic system. This systems perspective is essential when 
designing solutions for sustainability issues, because it prevents problem-shifting from 
one product to another, from one environmental problem to another, from one 
location to another, from one resource to another, etc. However, Industrial Ecology 
tools are based on models of the real world and are therefore by definition a 
simplification of reality. In an attempt to overcome these simplifications and retain the 
overall systems perspective, different routes are being explored. One of these routes is 
the connection of traditional Industrial Ecology tools like Life Cycle Assessment 
(LCA) and Substance Flow Analysis (SFA) with Agent Based Models (Bollinger et al. 
2011; Davis et al. 2009). Another route is the development of Life Cycle Sustainability 
Analysis (LCSA), a life cycle-based framework that is applicable for triple P 
sustainability analysis of large-scale transitions (Guinée and Heijungs 2011). These 
methodological developments are essential if future IE tools are to capture the true 
complexity of societal metabolism.  
 
In this dissertation the issue of material scarcity has been addressed with a specific 
focus on the metals used in energy technologies. Metals have clearly been a key 
ingredient in the development of complex societies. It is unlikely that the views of 
resource optimists about ever-increasing resources and ever-decreasing prices will 
retain their validity over the coming decades. In the next few decades developments in 
emerging economies will lead to a tripling of the global average income per capita. 
The acquired affluence will be spent on products familiar from the Western lifestyle: 
cars, meat, electronics and so on. Billions of people will move to cities, thereby 
doubling the global urban population. This means that the equivalent of all the cities 
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in existence today will be built over the next few decades. The newly produced 
products and urban infrastructure will drive up demand not only for materials but also 
for energy, water, agricultural produce, etc. At the same time we will need to stay 
within the safe operating space of the planet, which effectively means that we need to 
decarbonise our energy system. In this dissertation it has been shown that this would 
require even more metals than would be the case for conventional energy. Mining and 
exploration efforts already find themselves confronted with environmental and 
physical constraints and are struggling to keep up with demand. An ample supply of 
metals is not only important for producing our favourite gadgets. It also plays a vital 
role in providing sustainable energy, food and shelter for the 9 billion of us that will 
be around in 2050. It is hard to imagine how this can be achieved without either a 
reduction in growth or the decoupling of growth from material and energy 
requirements.  
 
Whether or not the material requirements of the energy transition, if implemented, 
will induce materials scarcity will depend on a number of factors, but specifically also 
on the possibilities for substitution. The periodic table comprises a limited number of 
elements and at the moment almost all of them have useful applications. Shifting from 
one to the other will therefore in many cases simply shift the problems of material 
availability from one sector to another. The substitution by abundant elements forced 
by looming scarcity – in contrast to substitution induced by product improvement – 
could very well slow down the energy transition and reduce overall efficiency, as 
material choices are forced by scarcity and the technically “optimal” solutions cannot 
achieve their full potential.  
 
While metals scarcity in itself may be a problem that can be resolved, the relationship 
with other constraints such as climate change, energy supply, biodiversity/nature 
conservation and time makes it one of the key issues for the coming decades. There 
are two main directions that might be used to address this issue: innovation and 
abandoning the growth paradigm. Although some economists are working on de-
growth scenarios, mainstream economics and politics are still directed towards 
economic growth measured mainly in terms of GDP (Martínez-Alier et al. 2010; 
Jackson 2009). Innovation, for its part, can help by:     
• closing metal cycles: although recycling can, by definition, be of only  limited use 
for reducing virgin input in the growing economy of the next few decades,in a 
more stable economy it is a key ingredient for a sustainable metal supply; 
• dematerializing the economy, which also has its limitations, but we need to shift in 
the direction of a more resource-efficient type of growth; 
• substitution: although substitution of one scarce element for another is clearly 
not a long-term solution for metals scarcity, developing new high-tech 
materials based on abundant materials like ceramics and carbon-based nano-
materials will provide a reprieve for certain specific scarcity issues. 
 
If policies are put in place that would significantly stimulate a combination of the 
innovations mentioned above this may ensure a sufficient material supply in next four 
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decades for the energy transition that is needed to tackle climate change. However, 
there is clear need to assess the side-effects of the proposed solutions on different 
scale levels in order to avoid problem-shifting.  
 
All in all, counting on unlimited progress in technology and efficiency to keep 
resource scarcity at bay seems at the least rather naive. Resource optimists are correct 
in their statement that resources are abundant. The problem seems to be in the 
required rate of extraction, and here, as we have argued, there is less reason for 
unbridled optimism. This does not mean that physical metals scarcity will necessarily 
lead to future economic scarcity. There are a range of technical options for addressing 
the issue, but alongside technological development we will need a change in materials 




7.5 Research Agenda 
 
To obtain a better understanding of the implications of the issues raised in this 
dissertation, additional research is needed. Below the most important directions for 
future research are described. 
 
Dynamic analysis of metals metabolism 
Further in-depth and dynamic analysis is needed to assess the material needs of a 
transition to renewables-based energy systems. Some of the dynamic mechanisms 
have the potential to make the system spiral out of control. The increasing use of 
energy to produce the materials required to generate energy could be one such 
mechanism. Initial, rough estimates suggest that up to 40% of the global total primary 
energy supply might be needed for metal mining in 2050 (Graedel and van der Voet 
2010). At the same time it has been suggested that the prime driver for economic 
growth is the availability of cheap energy (Ayres and Warr 2009). It is commonly 
assumed that the energy transition requires only a few percent of global national 
income (Stern 2007). While this analysis is superficially correct, if it is implausible that 
we will be able to mine enough metals to actually build it, we will be unable to 
complete the transition. In our free-market world this is most likely to mean that if the 
target is adhered to, the cost will be far higher (as a result of higher commodity prices 
stimulating mining). Further research is also needed to explore the precise dynamics of 
the metals demand associated with the energy transition. This will lead to more 
detailed and realistic estimates of materials requirements as a function of time in 
different scenarios. If the power sector is to be transformed over the next three to 
four decades, based on current technologies,  this will clearly cause a significant peak 
in metals demand and associated emissions. Uncertainties about long-term climate 
policy and technology choices will make it difficult for mining companies to anticipate 
such a peak in demand. The associated emissions could have a significantly adverse 
effect on the success of climate policies. 
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More detailed and additional explorations of the energy transition 
It would be useful to analyse the materials requirements of promising energy 
technologies that are still in the early stages of development and to add detail to the 
analysis of the technologies that have been discussed in this dissertation. The issues 
that need exploring include the following:  
• The intermittent nature of solar and wind as energy sources will make some 
sort of buffering an essential part of the system. This may consist of high-
capacity power lines, hydrogen pipelines, macro-scale capacitors and water 
reservoirs. All these buffering technologies would both decrease the total 
efficiency of the energy systems and increase their material requirements. This 
should be included in a more complete analysis of the materials requirements 
of the energy transition.  
• Side-effects in the form of environmental impacts, such as land and water 
use, emissions of toxic substances, etc. For a more balanced assessment of 
alternative energy systems all these issues need to be investigated. 
• Many of today's industrial processes depend on the input of fossil fuels. Thus 
steel production depends on coke as a reducing agent for iron ore (iron 
oxide), while production of plastics, artificial fibres and other organic 
compounds are based mainly on oil and natural gas. Furthermore, many 
processes are now based on fossil fuel as a source of energy. It is not clear 
how these processes would change in the event of an energy transition 
leading to a world in which electricity is the main energy carrier.  
 
More detailed explorations of the supply of metals  
Mining engineers have identified several important signs that mining will struggle to 
keep up with ever-increasing demand. Some of these, such as deteriorating ore grades, 
have been studied on a continental scale. Others, like decreasing sizes of newly 
discovered deposits, have been less well quantified. An overall picture of the different 
constraints for scaling up mining is not yet available. More complete analyses are 
needed to clarify the extent of the supply problems. Such analysis could focus on: 
• global historic trends of discovery of resources, including their geographic 
distribution; this could be combined with Hubbert’s peak-type analysis for 
minerals, as presented by (May et al. 2011); 
• the energy requirements of different mining and refining technologies; 
• the possibilities of upscaling deep-sea mining including the (life-cycle) 
environmental impacts and materials and energy requirements; 
• developing a more complete picture of the interdependencies among the 
production of different metals. Minor metals that are important for high-tech 
products are often but not necessarily produced as by-products of more bulk 
metals. A start could be made through a data-mining exercise of large online 
databases such as developed by the USGS; 





More detailed analysis of demand for metals  
In the emerging economies, demand for primary metals is rapidly rising as 
infrastructure is built and consumption increases. In OECD countries, demand for 
bulk metals has stabilized and is decreasing per unit of GDP for many metals. Owing 
to the increased complexity of products, however, demand for high-tech metals is still 
booming. To obtain a better picture of future demand for metals, further research is 
needed to explore the relation between GDP per capita and metals use in more detail. 
This could also be done for minor metals on the basis of information about the way 
different technologies enter lifestyles at different levels of GDP. Such an analysis 
should include the distribution of wealth over the population.  
 
Recycling and substitution  
Recycling is an essential ingredient of a sustainable societal metabolism. However, in a 
scenario where demand for metals is rapidly increasing, recycling does not significantly 
reduce demand for virgin materials, nor does it significantly postpone the moment of 
true scarcity. Furthermore, it makes sense to reduce the amount of metals we use per 
unit of product, but recycling is both technically and economically more difficult when 
elements are dispersed in products in minute quantities. An analysis of the potential of 
recycling for increasing the sustainability of metal cycles is needed. Substitution is also 
potentially a solution for scarcity, but substituting one scarce element by another will 
simply shift the problem, since all the elements are used in important applications. 
The interesting question remains, to what extent we can substitute scarce metals by 
"the elements of hope". Is it possible to draw certain general conclusions about 
substitutability on the basis of the fundamental properties of different elements ?         
 
Designing a sustainable society   
The growth paradigm is central to the world economy. Many of today's business 
models and consequently a large part of global economic growth are based on rapid 
replacement of material products. It is hard to envision a viable business model for a 
producer of razor blades with blades that will last a lifetime, even though this is 
technically possible. New smartphones are introduced ever few months and many 
consumers, including the author, have a hard time not buying the latest gadget. Many 
of the cheap products we buy, including clothing, furniture, toys and electronics, seem 
to be designed to break down or fail as soon as possible. In the business-to-business 
sector, important improvements have been achieved through the introduction of 
service-oriented rather than product-oriented business models for furniture, flooring 
and office equipment (Mont and Tukker 2006). The scope for introducing such 
business models for consumer products is an interesting topic for further research, 
especially since it is hard to imagine a sustainable metals metabolism grounded in the 
currently dominant replacement economy and linear metal flows. Decoupling of 
economic growth from material inputs and material inputs from environmental 
impacts has often been suggested as one of the routes to a more sustainable society. 
The question is, however, to what extent such decoupling is realistic. Society, even the 
virtual part, is undeniably based on a continuous inflow of materials. Shifting from 
products (CDs, DVDs, books) to services (MP3, video on demand and e-readers) 
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does not necessarily reduce the input of materials per unit of service and, even if it 
does, it will lead to extra consumption, which will increase material demand (the 
rebound effect). Degrowth scenarios are being explored in the academic world, but 
the consequences for the material basis of society still needs to be a investigated.     
 
Methodological development 
Sustainability analyses should be taken into account the true complexity of societal 
metabolism. The present early attempts to define Life Cycle Sustainability analysis are 
an important step in this direction and this should be explored further. This is 
especially useful when assessing the future technologies needed for large-scale 
transitions such as the shift required in the energy system. The constraints of 
resources and climate and other environmental impacts are so interwoven that a 
framework for a broad systems analysis is needed to perform useful sustainability 
analyses. Resource scarcity considerations should be an integral part of such a 
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In this dissertation frameworks and tools from the field of Industrial Ecology have 
been used together with a broader systems analysis to analyse problems related to 
metal scarcity, the energy transition and climate change.  
 
Chapter 1 General introduction 
Chapter one forms the introduction. It provides an overview of the broad debate on 
societal metabolism, with a focus on resource scarcity issues, and introduces the main 
research questions. These are: 
 
1. What has been the significance of metals in human history ? 
2. How has the debate on metals scarcity evolved over the course of human 
history ? 
3. What are the metal requirements of the transition to a low-carbon energy 
system ?  
4. Will these metal requirements, combined with other types of demand, lead to 
significant scarcity in the short and medium term future ? 
5. What are the possibilities and limitations of Industrial Ecology and other 
analytical tools for including the true complexity of material flows in societies 
in sustainability analyses?   
 
Chapter 2 A short history of the importance of metals for humanity and the 
debate on their scarcity   
Metals that occur naturally in their metallic state (gold, silver, copper and iron-nickel 
alloys) are very rare and have been used as curiosities and ornaments since pre-historic 
times. On our planet pure metals are oddities of nature and very different from biotic 
materials and stone-like materials that formed the ubiquitous constituents of the 
environment of early man. Ever since the processes were developed to free metals 
from their ores, some 6000 years ago, metals have been important in the development 
of complex societies. Hunting, warfare, agriculture, industry and urban environments 
have all profited from the ample availability of metals. The development of the 
technology to produce bronze created a clear advantage in the production of effective 
tools, equipment and other gear of both soldiers and craftsmen. The fact that bronze 
was made from two or more different metals (mainly copper and tin) that differed in 
their geographical distribution increased the need for trade over longer distances and 
the dependence on foreign supply of materials. It also increased the incentive to 
conquer lands that were rich in resources.  
 
Both copper and tin are relatively scarce elements compared with iron, which by mass 
accounts for about 90% of all current metal mining. The importance of metals for 
society therefore rose significantly when the technology to produce useful iron from 
iron ore was developed some 3000 years ago. During this period, however, the 
material basis of societies was still dominated by renewable resources and silicon-
based building materials, with wood serving as the main source of energy. Both during 
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the final stages of the Roman empire (200 CE) and from the 16th to 18th century CE in 
the United Kingdom and other European countries the availability of fuel wood 
became a constraint for metals production (mainly iron, copper and tin). With the 
introduction of coal as a cheap and abundant source of energy during the industrial 
revolution and the rapid development of new technologies that followed, all this 
changed.  
 
The invention of the coke production, which facilitated iron production using coal as 
a fuel and reduction agent rather than wood-derived charcoal is an example of a 
technological breakthrough that resolved an early scarcity issue. This technology was 
one of the main breakthroughs that led to the industrial revolution, which in turn 
spawned a period of rapid economic expansion and globalization. This expansion 
coincided with a huge increase in the consumption of base metals like iron, copper, 
zinc, tin and lead. These metals were needed to build the new infrastructure, railways, 
bridges and modern cities but also for steam engines, trains, ships and, later on, cars. 
At the same time these new inventions and infrastructure provided the heavy 
equipment and industry that was needed for large-scale mining and refining. Steam-
powered ships and trains provided cheap bulk transport that made it economical to 
transport food, textiles and other medium-value commodities over large distances, 
both on land and overseas. In the late 19th century the large-scale introduction of 
electricity facilitated the liberation from its ore of the only metal that is more abundant 
in Earth's crust than iron: aluminum.  
 
About a century after the start of the industrial revolution the issue of fast depleting 
(national/continental) resources, biotic, mineral and environmental, came to be 
recognized by governments and scientists. This resulted in a strong movement of 
conservationists, led amongst others by Theodore Roosevelt, which in the United 
States resulted in legislation on the use of natural resources and the creation of 
national parks. During the same period economists like Gray (1914) and Hotelling 
(1931) developed the first theoretical economic frameworks of so-called exhaustion 
theory.  
 
In the OECD, World War II was followed by a another period of rapid economic 
development associated with urbanization, infrastructure expansion and the rise of 
mass consumption. The availability of low-cost energy sources combined with rapid 
technological advances led to ample availability of cheap consumer goods. This in turn 
led to increased demand for the mineral resources required to produce these newly 
developed goods.  
 
However, the supply of mineral resources was hampered by the dwindling quantities 
available in developed countries, the weakening or severing of colonial ties and the 
disruption of normal trade patterns caused by the start of the Cold War. During this 
period of rapidly expanding demand for mineral resources and unstable world politics 
the US government commissioned the Paley Committee (1951) to assess the problem 
of material scarcity and make recommendations for a comprehensive policy on 
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materials. In their seminal report the Paley Committee laid down the basic principles 
of the material scarcity debate, including the formulation of possible policies and 
research agendas. It framed the depletion problem as a problem of resources that are 
harder to retrieve rather than a problem of absolute depletion. The committee 
recognized that materials scarcity would start to be problematic long before the last 
gram of ore was mined, simply because the economic, environmental and social costs 
would become prohibitively high. The committee took a strong stand against self-
sufficiency as a leading principle for securing supply. In contrast, it propagated the 
Least Cost Principle as leading: the main aim of any resource policy should be to 
supply the US industry with the cheapest resources available. It therefore also focused 
on international free trade and investing in resource-rich countries as something that 
should be promoted by policy makers. Although the Paley report was a landmark in 
the debate on resource depletion, after the Korean War commodity prices relaxed and 
a period of relatively little concern about materials scarcity followed until the oil crisis 
of the 1970s. One of the reasons for the fall in commodity prices was the Suez crisis 
of 1956-1957, which triggered the development of bulk carriers. Bulk carriers made 
long-distance transport of commodities even cheaper, thereby facilitating the 
globalization of flows of cheap bulk products like iron ore and coal.   
 
In 1968 the Club of Rome was founded and in 1972 their report "The Limits to 
Growth" was published. About a year later, in October 1973, the first oil crisis was a 
fact and the resource dependency that had been described by the Club of Rome 
moved from a merely academic exercise to an event that disrupted daily life in many 
parts of the world. It demonstrated the interdependence of world economies and the 
vulnerability of resource-importing countries to supply disruptions. As with the Paley 
report, the Club of Rome triggered a debate about  materials scarcity and much of the 
debate of the 1970s can be readily translated to the debate we see today. In February 
1976 an entire issue of Science was dedicated to materials, with a focus on resource 
scarcity. Many of the topics discussed in that issue can be more or less directly 
translated to ongoing debates today. Supply security, strategic stockpiling, self-
sufficiency, recycling and dematerialization were back on top of the political agenda. 
Again, however, this period of high commodity prices was followed by a period of 
relative abundance of cheap resources. Bulk carriers were still growing ever larger and 
combined with low fuel prices this led to a period extremely low transport costs. The 
scaling up of mining also provided economic advantages that pushed metal prices 
down despite annual growth rates in mine production of around 3%. Metal prices 
remained low until what is referred to as the 'great metals boom' that started in 2002. 
This boom was caused by a sharp increase in demand that resulted mainly from the 
rapid expansion of emerging economies, most notably China. During that period the 
prices of non-fuel commodities almost doubled in real terms. Although the global 
financial crisis that started at the end of summer 2008 caused a significant price 
decrease, prices never reached pre-2002 levels. Prices peaked again in February-March 
2011 at a level almost 20% higher than that of the 2008 peak. After that the European 
sovereign debt crisis again caused concern about the global economy, which led to a 
fall in commodity prices.  In November 2011 non-fuel commodity prices were back at 
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the level of the 2008 peak. In the period between 2002 and 2011 a number of 
publications by authors well familiar with the mining industry expressed concerns 
about the supply of metals, with degrading ore grades, decreased deposit size of newly 
found deposits, constraints in the supply of water and energy and increased local and 
global environmental concerns all being cited as causing cracks in supply lines.   
 
As a result of the 2002-2008 metals boom and recent constraints on the supply of 
certain rare (earth) metals, many governmental organizations, NGOs and research 
organizations have issued reports defining critical materials for the local and global 
economy. All the world’s major economies are now assessing the possible impact of 
metals scarcity and policy measures including the mechanisms of the WTO to ensure 
free commodity trade, national stockpiles for strategic materials and bilateral 
agreements with supplying countries. The establishment of the UN Resource Panel is 
a clear sign that the international community regards resource-related issues as a major 
concern for the coming decades.   
 
Chapter 3 Resource constraints in a renewables-based hydrogen economy  
There are many linkages between the various resources used in modern society. The 
energy system is closely linked to the use of materials in two ways. First of all energy is 
needed to mine and process mineral resources in such a way that they become useful 
materials and secondly materials are needed for the mining of energy carriers, their 
transformation (e.g. oil refineries, power plants, transformers) and their transport 
(bulk carriers, pipelines and power lines) and for harvesting energy from diffuse 
sources (e.g. wind turbines, solar cells and hydropower reservoirs).  
 
In Chapter 3 a quantitative systems analysis is made of the resources that would be 
needed for a worldwide transition to renewable energy in the year 2050 with hydrogen 
and electricity as the two major energy carriers and based on current technologies. The 
amount of renewable energy that is available is not the limiting factor for a 
renewables-based energy system. Even in an extreme growth scenario the total 
primary energy demand of about 1300 EJ/a in 2050 could be supplied through 
current-technology wind power (15%) and photovoltaic solar (80%), leaving 5% for 
other renewables. In order to limit the amount of infrastructure needed for harvesting 
the available energy it is important to choose locations where the circumstances for 
harvesting are optimal. For solar energy, especially, these locations are often far from 
the locations where the energy is to be used. Extensive transmission networks are 
therefore needed to carry the energy to the right place.  
 
The choice of technology has a strong influence on the resource requirements of 
energy technologies. In three crucial parts of the system relatively scarce materials are 
show-stoppers for specific technologies: tellurium and indium in thin-film solar cells, 
neodymium in direct-drive permanent magnet wind turbines and electro motors, and 
platinum in electrolysis and fuel cells. Resource constraints prevent these technologies 
from being upscaled to substantial levels (hundreds of exajoules). In all cases 
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alternative technologies are available, be it sometimes at the cost of efficiency and/or 
economics.  
 
The amount of steel required in this scenario for both wind turbines and hydrogen 
pipelines is very high: for wind turbines around six times the world’s current annual 
output of iron and for hydrogen pipelines 40% of this amount. If current-technology 
stainless steel is used for the pipelines, about 45 times the current annual output of 
nickel would be needed and 5500 times the annual output of chromium. If electricity 
is adopted as a carrier, the amount of copper that would be needed in the system is 
equivalent to 70 times current annual world production. Wind turbines would require 
an additional 4 times the current annual world copper output. 
 
Chapter 4 Material requirements of low-carbon power generation  
About 40% of global CO2 emissions derive from the production of electrical power. 
In Chapter 4 an analysis is made of the metal requirements of low-carbon power 
generation. Based on a Life Cycle Assessment approach, the CO2 emission reductions 
and metal requirements of low-carbon power sources like wind, PV solar, biomass 
and fossil generation with Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) were calculated. 
All three electricity mixes presented (CCS, non-fossil and IEA BLUE Maps) result in a 
reduction of CO2 emissions by about 80-90%. If comparable reductions were 
achieved in other sectors the 450-490 ppm stabilization goal for atmospheric CO2 
concentrations would be achievable.  
 
However, in all three cases this comes at the cost of higher metals requirements. The 
addition of CCS to the current electricity mix would have a substantial impact on 
annual demand for nickel and molybdenum, requiring 10-30% percent more metals 
than the current configuration. This is down to the additional infrastructure required 
to capture, transport and store the CO2 (specialty steels), in combination with reduced 
efficiency of the power plants themselves. A switch to a non-fossil electricity mix 
would result in much higher demand  for nickel, uranium, silver, molybdenum and, to 
a lesser extent, copper and aluminum. For PV solar, non-waste biomass and wind the 
increase in metal use ranges from a few percent up to a factor thousand. This means 
that mining of these metals would have to be scaled up considerably in order to fulfil 
demand for these new electricity technologies. Not all non-fossil technologies are 
more metals-intensive than fossil-fuel based power, though. Nuclear power, 
hydropower and waste biomass have a relatively low metals intensity with the 
exception of uranium for nuclear. In the case of PV solar and wind the increase is 
related to the relatively high metals intensity of PV solar cells and wind turbines. For 
non-waste biomass it is related to the need for relatively materials-intensive 
agricultural processes, including the production of agricultural machinery and 
fertilizers.  
 
Over the last several decades a trend of decreasing materials intensity per unit GDP 
has been recorded in many developed countries. However, when climate change 
forces these economies to switch to alternative energy sources, in the energy sector 
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this trend will be broken. The type of materials demand occurring in various 
technologies depends very much on the specific technologies adopted. For example, 
the extremely high demand for silver in solar electricity is related to the choice for 
mono-crystalline silicon PV cells. However, other PV solar technologies have material 
demand issues of their own. Current thin-film CdTe and CIGS will run into scarcity 
issues long before they contribute significantly to global power generation. The 2 MW 
offshore wind turbine with a geared generator that is used in the calculations in 
Chapter 4 does not require neodymium-based permanent magnets. However, many of 
the new, low-maintenance direct-drive turbines use about 150 kg neodymium per 
MW. Scaling up these technologies to the level of tens of GW would require a 
dramatic increase in the annual production of this rare earth metal, which currently 
stands at about 18000 tonnes. The Chinese government has recently announced that 
the installed capacity of wind power is to be increased to 1000 GW by 2050. If these 
turbines were all based on direct-drive, permanent-magnet generators this would 
require over 30 times the world’s total current annual output of neodymium, leaving 
little for other countries and applications.   
  
Chapter 5 Metals scarcity: imminent threat, eternal problem or red herring? 
In Chapter 5 the various aspects of future metals supply and demand  are surveyed 
and in combination with the results of the earlier chapters we can now turn to the 
question of whether the metals requirements of the energy transition, in tandem  with 
other types of demand, will lead to significant scarcity in the short and medium term. 
 
Although Earth is finite, until the present the magnitude of current resources has not 
constrained the production of metals. Although ore grades are deteriorating, reserves 
of lower-grade ores have until now almost always exceeded those of rich ores. 
Ultimately, backstop reserves exist in the form of ocean water and common rock. 
Therefore, reserves of almost all minerals have increased rather than decreased over 
the last century, despite, or perhaps because of, the exponential growth in extraction. 
However, this does not automatically mean that metals production can keep up with 
exponentially growing demand over the coming decades.  
 
The pure scale of materials extraction is now far larger than it ever was in the past. 
Globalization, driven partly by cheap bulk transport, has opened up virtually every 
remote corner of the world for exploration and mining. However, globalization 
generates no more than a one-off gain. Remaining undiscovered deposits exist mainly 
in regions where exploitation will be difficult and under a cap of a kilometre or more 
of common rock. Moreover, the cost of bulk transport may already have reached its 
lowest possible plateau owing to limitations on the upscaling of bulk carriers and 
rising fuel costs.   
 
The rate at which minerals can be extracted is a limited, similar to the case of 
conventional oil. The rate of extraction is limited by the amount of equipment 
required, by the availability of skilled workers, by energy requirements and last but not 
least by environmental costs. The two episodes of high metal prices that have 
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occurred in the recent past (1950s and 1980s) were caused mainly by rapidly increasing 
demand and insecure supply for OECD countries. While in the current globalized 
world rapidly increasing demand is still a major factor, it is now insecurity of supply 
that has become a global issue. Today this is combined with cracks in the supply lines. 
Mining companies have great difficulty keeping up with demand for a whole raft of 
reasons, including deteriorating ore grades, smaller and deeper deposits and 
environmental constraints.  
 
Furthermore, for the first time in human history we are truly experiencing the linkages 
between resources on a global scale. With decreasing ore grades more energy is 
needed to produce metals from ores, while at the same time more metals are needed 
to build the low-carbon energy system we need to tackle climate change. Water use, 
land use and environmental impacts are additional constraints that are interlinked with 
energy and metals production. These mutually enhancing constraints will pose new 
challenges for future generations. We will need to pick our technologies carefully, 
avoiding obvious material constraints.  
 
Demand for metals will continue to grow exponentially for decades to come. This 
demand will increase as a result of the rapid urbanization projected for the years 
ahead, leading to a massive expansion of cities and their accompanying infrastructure. 
Furthermore, economic growth in emerging economies will lead to the production of 
more and more complex products, which will in turn lead to ever-increasing metals 
demand. The transition to a low-carbon energy system will require vast amounts of 
materials. For certain metals this means that current production will need to increase 
several times over. The most crucial issue of all, though, is that we need these 
materials in the next few decades, if they are to still be relevant for tackling climate 
change.    
 
It is unlikely that resource optimists’ views about ever-increasing resources and ever-
decreasing prices will retain their validity over the coming decades. If the long-term 
projections of urban development prove true and if climate change is properly 
addressed, over the next four decades we will build the equivalent of all the cities in 
existence today, triple the global average income per capita and build a global low-
carbon energy system from scratch. Mining and exploration efforts find themselves 
confronted with environmental as well as physical constraints and are already 
struggling to keep up with demand. An ample supply of metals is not only important 
for producing our favourite gadgets. It also plays a pivotal role in providing 
sustainable energy, food and shelter for the 9 billion of us that will be around in 2050.  
 
Chapter 6 Combining IE and IEA tools: the case of PVC  
In Chapter 6 a case study of a virtual ban on PVC is used to show that even within a 
limited subset of the industrial system, the chlorine industry, the complexities in the 
system can have a substantial impact on the outcome of the analysis. Neither 
Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) tools nor Industrial Ecology (IE) tools 




With LCA, a picture emerges of the changes in a wider number of environmental 
issues as a result of a substituting PVC by other materials. With SFA, the implications 
for the chlorine chain become apparent. However, the scope of tools like LCA and 
SFA is limited, and their assessment of environmental impact is generic. The picture 
they show remains fragmented and incomplete.  
 
All the tools and models we use are a mere reflection of the real world and are by 
definition less detailed than the real thing and therefore do not include all the 
complexities. This means that not all the linkages that exist in reality can also be taken 
into account in the analysis for which these tools and models are used. Even a 
combination of tools is insufficient to capture all effects. There is a need for a broader 
systems analysis that can be used for analysing what can be expected to actually 
happen, prior to selection of specific tools. The format of the broader systems analysis 
could range from a material and product flowchart to a truly dynamic, quantified 
systems analysis. Only when such an analysis has yielded a picture of what in reality is 
likely to occur has the time come to select and apply specific tools - IEA tools, IE 
tools or a combination of both - to quantify the impacts of polices and activities. This 
is different from simply choosing the right model or tool and correct model 
parameters, and it cannot be done in any general manner. It needs to be done on a 
case-by-case basis, as a tailor-made holistic analysis. Current developments under the 
heading of Life Cycle Sustainability Analysis can be regarded as a step in this direction.     
 
Chapter 7 Overarching conclusions, general discussion and research agenda 
In this chapter the results are presented in the form of a set of conclusions. The most 
important reflect back to the central questions of Chapter 1 and deal with the 
importance of metals throughout human history, the development of the debate on 
resource scarcity with a focus on metals, the material requirements of the energy 
transition and the usefulness of Industrial Ecology tools for analysing the 
environmental impacts of large-scale transitions. This dissertation then concluded with 






In dit proefschrift zijn methoden en technieken uit het veld van Industriële Ecologie 
samengebracht met een bredere systeemanalyse om de problemen te analyseren die 
gerelateerd zijn aan schaarste van materialen, de energietransitie en 
klimaatverandering. 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 Inleiding 
Hoofdstuk 1 is de inleiding. Het geeft een overzicht van het brede debat over het 
metabolisme van de maatschappij, met een focus op de schaarste van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen. Ook worden in dit hoofdstuk de onderstaande  onderzoeksvragen 
gedefinieerd.  
 
1. Hoe belangrijk zijn metalen geweest voor de ontwikkeling van de mensheid ? 
2. Hoe heeft het debat rondom de schaarste van metalen zich door de eeuwen 
heen ontwikkeld ? 
3. Wat is de metaalbehoefte van een transitie naar een koolstofarm 
energiesysteem ? 
4. Leidt deze metaalbehoefte, samen met de vraag naar metalen voor andere 
toepassingen, tot een significante schaarste op korte en middellange termijn ? 
5. Welke mogelijkheden en beperkingen bieden de methoden en technieken uit 
de Industriële Ecologie en aangrenzende vakgebieden om de werkelijke 
complexiteit van materiaalstromen mee te nemen in duurzaamheidsanalyses?     
 
Hoofdstuk 2 Een korte geschiedenis van het belang van metalen voor de 
mensheid en het debat over de schaarste van deze metalen 
Metalen die in hun metallische vorm voorkomen op aarde (goud, zilver, koper en 
ijzer-nikkel legeringen) zijn zeer zeldzaam en worden al sinds de prehistorie gebruikt 
als curiosa en sieraden. Op onze planeet zijn metalen een vreemde eend in de bijt en 
zeer verschillend van het biotische en steenachtig materiaal dat de belangrijkste 
ingrediënten vormden van het milieu van de vroege mens. Sinds er processen werden 
ontwikkeld om metalen uit hun ertsen te ontrekken, circa 600 jaar geleden,  zijn 
metalen belangrijk geweest voor de ontwikkeling van complexe samenlevingen. De 
ruime beschikbaarheid van metalen heeft belangrijke voordelen opgeleverd voor de 
jacht, oorlogsvoering, landbouw, industrie en stedenbouw. Samenlevingen die de 
technologie beheersten om brons te maken hadden daarmee een belangrijke 
voorsprong in het maken van beter gereedschap en een betere uitrusting van zowel 
soldaten als ambachtslieden. Het feit dat brons gemaakt wordt uit twee verschillende 
metalen (voornamelijk koper en tin) met een verschillende geografische spreiding, 
vergrootte het belang van zowel de handel over grotere afstanden als de 
afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse toevoer van grondstoffen. Het versterkte daarmee 
ook de drang naar het veroveren van grondstofrijke gebieden.           
 
Zowel koper als tin zijn relatief schaarse elementen vergeleken met ijzer, dat op dit 




metalen werd daarom aanzienlijk groter toen zo’n 3000 jaar geleden de technologie 
werd ontwikkeld om bruikbaar ijzer te produceren uit ijzererts. In deze periode werd 
de materiële basis van de samenleving echter nog steeds sterk gedomineerd door op 
silicium gebaseerde materialen, met hout als belangrijkste bron van energie. Aan het 
einde van het Romeinse rijk (200) en in het Verenigd Koninkrijk en andere Europese 
landen in de periode van de 16e tot en met de 18e eeuw werd de beschikbaarheid van 
hout een beperkende factor voor de metaalproductie (voornamelijk ijzer, koper en 
tin). Dit veranderde gedurende de industriële revolutie en de periode van snelle 
technologische ontwikkeling die volgde met de introductie van kolen als een goedkope 
en overvloedige energiebron.  
 
De uitvinding van de techniek om cokes te produceren, zorgde ervoor dat kolen als 
brandstof en reductiemiddel kon worden gebruikt in plaats van houtskool dat was 
afgeleid van hout, is een voorbeeld van een technologische doorbraak die een eerder 
schaarste probleem oploste. Deze technologie was een van de vele doorbraken tijdens 
de industriële revolutie, welke gezamenlijk gezorgd hebben voor een periode van 
snelle economische groei en globalisering. Deze groei ging gepaard met een enorme 
groei in de consumptie van metalen zoals als ijzer, koper, zink, tin, en lood. Deze 
metalen waren nodig voor de nieuwe infrastructuur zoals spoorwegen, bruggen en 
moderne steden maar ook om stoommachines, treinen, schepen en later ook auto’s te 
produceren. Tegelijkertijd leverden deze nieuwe uitvindingen en infrastructuur de 
apparatuur, machinerie en industrie die nodig waren voor grootschalige mijnbouw en 
opwerking. Stoomschepen en treinen zorgden voor goedkoop bulktransport zowel 
over zee als over land van voedsel, textiel en andere goederen. In de late 19e eeuw 
maakte de grootschalige introductie van elektriciteit het mogelijk om het enige metaal 
dat nog rijkelijker in de aardkorst aanwezig is dan ijzer, aluminium, vrij te maken uit 
het erts. 
 
Ongeveer een eeuw na het begin van de industriële revolutie werd uitputting van 
biotische en abiotische grondstoffen door overheden en wetenschappers als probleem 
erkend. Dit resulteerde in een sterke beweging van natuurbeschermers, onder andere 
geleid door Theodore Roosevelt, en welke in de VS leidde tot wetgeving op het gebied 
van het gebruik van natuurlijk hulpbronnen en het oprichten van nationale parken. In 
diezelfde periode ontwikkelde economen zoals Gray (1914) en Hotelling (1931) het 
eerste theoretische raamwerk van de zogenaamde “exhaustion theory”  
 
In de OECD volgde na de Tweede Wereldoorlog een nieuwe periode van snelle 
economische ontwikkeling en de daaraan gekoppelde urbanisatie, uitbreiding van 
infrastructuur en de opkomst van massaconsumptie. De beschikbaarheid van 
goedkope energie gecombineerd met snelle technologische vooruitgang leidde tot een 
overvloedige beschikbaarheid van goedkope consumentenproducten. Dit alles zorgde 
voor een snel groeiende vraag naar minerale grondstoffen die nodig waren om deze 




De aanvoer van deze grondstoffen werd echter gehinderd door de beperkte 
beschikbaarheid van grondstoffen in de ontwikkelde landen, de verzwakte koloniale 
banden en de verstoring van de normale handelspatronen als gevolg van het begin van 
de koude oorlog. Gedurende deze periode van snel groeiende vraag naar grondstoffen 
en instabiele wereldpolitiek werd door de Amerikaanse regering in 1951 de Paley 
Committee opgericht om het probleem van schaarse grondstoffen te duiden en om 
aanbevelingen te doen voor een alomvattend grondstoffenbeleid. In hun 
baanbrekende rapport heeft deze commissie de hoofdlijnen van het schaarste debat 
beschreven, met inbegrip van mogelijke beleidsopties en onderzoekslijnen. Ze 
beschreef het schaarste debat in termen van grondstoffen die steeds lastiger te winnen 
zijn in plaats van een probleem van absolute uitputting. De commissie onderkende dat 
materiaal schaarste een probleem zou worden lang voordat de laatste gram erts 
gewonnen zou zijn, simpelweg omdat de economische, ecologische en sociale kosten 
te hoog zouden worden. De commissie was verdere sterk gekant tegen 
zelfvoorzienendheid als leidend principe om een stabiele aanvoer van grondstoffen te 
garanderen. De commissie koos daarentegen voor het “Least Cost Principle”: het 
belangrijkste doel van het grondstoffenbeleid zou moeten zijn om de industrie in de 
VS van zo goedkoop mogelijke grondstoffen te voorzien. Ze legde de nadruk daarom 
ook op internationale vrijhandel en het investeren in grondstofrijke landen als zaken 
die door beleidsmakers zouden moeten worden nagestreefd. Hoewel het Paley rapport 
een mijlpaal was in de discussie rondom uitputting van grondstoffen volgde tussen de 
Koreaanse oorlog en de oliecrisis in de jaren 70 een periode waarin de 
grondstofprijzen daalden en waarin er relatief weinig aandacht was voor schaarste. De 
dalende grondstofprijzen werden deels veroorzaakt door de ontwikkeling van 
mammoetschepen die werd getriggerd door de Suez crisis van 1956-1957. Deze 
enorme vrachtschepen zorgden ervoor dat de prijzen van transport van goederen nog 
verder daalde hetgeen de globalisering van de handel in goedkope bulkproducten zoals 
ijzererts en kolen vereenvoudigde. 
 
In 1968 werd de Club van Rome opgericht en in 1972 verscheen hun rapport 
“Grenzen aan de Groei”. Ongeveer een jaar later, in oktober 1973, was de eerste 
oliecrisis een feit en de afhankelijkheid van grondstoffen zoals deze werd beschreven 
in het rapport verschoof daarmee van een wetenschappelijke exercitie naar een 
gebeurtenis die in veel delen van de wereld het dagelijks leven ingrijpend veranderde. 
De oliecrisis toonde de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van economieën en de 
kwetsbaarheid van grondstof importerende landen bij problemen in de aanvoer aan.  
Net als het Paley report, initieerde het rapport van de Club van Rome een debat over 
schaarste en veel aspecten van dit debat kunnen direct vertaald worden naar het 
huidige debat. In februari 1976 was een heel nummer van het wetenschappelijke 
tijdschrift Science gewijd aan materialen, met een focus op schaarste. Veel van de 
onderwerpen die hierin werden besproken kunnen ook weer min of meer direct 
worden vertaald naar de huidige discussie. Leveringszekerheid, de aanleg van 
strategische voorraden, zelfvoorzienendheid, recycling en dematerialisatie waren 
hiermee terug op de politieke agenda. Deze periode van aandacht voor schaarste werd 




grondstoffen. Mammoetschepen werden steeds groter hetgeen gecombineerd met 
historisch lage brandstofprijzen leidde tot extreem lage transportkosten.De opschaling 
van de mijnbouw zorgde voor dalende prijzen van grondstoffen ondanks een jaarlijkse 
groei in productie van rond de 3%. De prijzen van metalen bleven laag tot wat wordt 
aangeduid als de “great metals boom” die begon in 2002. Deze periode van sterk 
stijgende prijzen was het resultaat van een de sterke groei in opkomende landen, met 
name China. In deze periode stegen de inflatie gecorrigeerde prijzen van ‘non-fuel’ 
goederen bijna met een factor twee. Hoewel de financiële crisis van 2008 een 
significante daling in prijzen veroorzaakte zijn ze nooit meer teruggekomen op het 
niveau van voor 2002. In februari-maart 2011 piekte de prijzen nogmaals op een 
niveau dat 20% hoger lag dan de piek in 2008. Vervolgens veroorzaakte de Europese 
monetaire crisis nieuwe zorgen over de wereldeconomie waarna de grondstofprijzen 
weer daalden. In november 2011 waren de prijzen van ‘non-fuel’ goederen weer terug 
op het niveau van de piek in 2008. In de periode tussen 2002 en 2011 uitten een aantal 
auteurs die zeer bekend zijn met de mijnbouw bezorgdheid over de aanvoer van 
metalen.  Afnemende ertskwaliteit, kleinere nieuwe vondsten, beperkingen als gevolg 
van water- en energiegebruik en zorgen over lokale en mondiale milieueffecten van de 
mijnbouw werden allemaal genoemd als oorzaken van problemen in de aanvoerlijnen.  
 
Als een reactie op deze periode van hoge metaalprijzen en de recente 
toevoerproblemen van bepaalde zeldzame (aard)metalen, hebben veel overheden, 
NGO’s en onderzoeksinstellingen rapporten uitgebracht waarin materialen worden 
aangewezen als kritiek voor de lokale en mondiale economie. Alle belangrijke 
wereldeconomieën zijn op dit moment bezig met onderzoek naar de mogelijke 
gevolgen van metaal schaarste. Ook worden de verschillende beleidsmaatregelen tegen 
het licht gehouden waaronder de WTO mechanismen om vrije internationale handel 
te garanderen, het aanleggen van strategische voorraden en het maken van bilaterale 
afspraken met exporterende landen. De oprichting van het ‘Resource Panel’ door de 
Verenigde Naties is een duidelijk signaal dat de internationale gemeenschap zaken 
gerelateerd aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen een belangrijk onderwerp vinden voor de 
komende decennia. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3: Materiaalgebruik als beperkende factor voor een op 
hernieuwbare energie gebaseerde waterstofeconomie.  
In een moderne maatschappij zijn er vele complexe verbanden tussen het gebruik van 
verschillende natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Het gebruik van energie en materialen is in 
twee richtingen met elkaar verbonden. Ten eerste is er energie nodig voor mijnbouw 
en opwerking van ertsen om deze om te zetten in bruikbare materialen. Ten tweede 
zijn materialen nodig om fossiele brandstoffen te winnen en op te werken (bijv. olie 
raffinaderijen, elektriciteitscentrales en transformatoren), ze te transporteren 
(mammoetschepen, pijpleidingen en bovenleidingen) en om energie te winnen uit 
diffuse bronnen (bijv. windturbines, zonnecellen en waterkrachtcentrales).  
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een kwantitatieve analyse gemaakt van de grondstoffen die 
nodig zijn om in 2050, uitgaande van huidige technologieën, een mondiaal 
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energiesysteem te hebben dat volledig is gebaseerd op hernieuwbare energie, met 
elektriciteit en waterstof als de twee belangrijkste energiedragers. De hoeveelheid 
beschikbare energie is geen beperkende factor voor een energiesysteem gebaseerd op 
hernieuwbare energiebronnen. Zelfs in een extreem groeiscenario van het 
energiegebruik tot circa 1300 EJ/jaar in 2050 zouden huidige technologie wind- (15%) 
en zonne-energie (80%) toereikend zijn, hetgeen 5% over zou laten voor andere 
hernieuwbare energie.  
 
Om het aantal benodigde zonnecellen en windturbines te minimaliseren is het 
belangrijk om locaties te kiezen waar de omstandigheden optimaal zijn. Met name 
voor zonne-energie zijn deze locaties vaak ver verwijderd van de locaties waar de 
energie gebruikt zal worden. Daarom zijn uitgebreide transmissie netwerken nodig om 
de energie naar de juiste plaats te transporteren.   
 
De keuze voor een (energie)technologie is zeer bepalend voor de hoeveelheid en het 
type grondstof dat nodig is. In drie cruciale delen van het systeem zijn relatief schaarse 
elementen cruciaal voor specifieke technologieën: tellurium en indium in dunne-film 
zonnecellen, neodymium in direct-drive windturbines en elektromotoren met 
permanente magneten, en platina in elektrolyse en brandstofcellen. De hoeveelheid 
benodigde grondstoffen zorgt ervoor dat deze technologieën nooit een substantiële 
bijdrage kunnen leveren aan de energievoorziening (honderden exajoules). In al deze 
gevallen zijn alternatieve technologieën denkbaar maar deze zijn vaak kostbaarder 
en/of minder efficiënt. 
  
In dit scenario zijn ook grote hoeveelheden staal nodig voor zowel windturbines als 
waterstofpijpleidingen: voor windturbines ongeveer zes keer de huidige jaarlijkse  
wereldproductie en voor pijpleidingen ongeveer 40% van de huidige jaarlijkse 
productie. Als voor de pijpleidingen roestvrij staal zou worden gebruikt zou daarvoor 
45 maal de huidige jaarlijkse nikkelproductie en 5500 maal die van chroom nodig zijn. 
Wanneer elektriciteit wordt gebruikt als belangrijkste energiedrager zou ongeveer 70 
maal de huidige jaarlijkse productie nodig zijn terwijl voor de benodigde  windturbines 
nog eens 4 maal de huidige jaarlijkse productie nodig zou zijn. 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 4: Metaalgebruik in koolstofarme elektriciteitsproductie  
Ongeveer 40% van de wereldwijde emissie van CO2 komt vrij bij de productie van 
elektriciteit. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt een analyse gemaakt van het metaalgebruik van 
koolstofarme elektriciteitsproductie. De CO2 emissies en het metaalgebruik van 
elektriciteit uit wind, PV, biomassa en fossiele brandstoffen met CO2 afvang en opslag 
zijn bepaald met behulp van een LCA benadering. Alle drie gepresenteerde 
elektriciteitsmixen resulteren in een vermindering van de CO2 emissie van ongeveer 
80-90%. Als in alle andere sectoren een vergelijkbare emissiereductie zou worden 
gerealiseerd zou de doelstelling om het CO2 niveau in de atmosfeer te stabiliseren op 





In alle drie de gevallen zal dit echter gepaard gaan met een hoger metaalgebruik. Het 
toevoegen van CCS aan de huidige elektriciteitsmix zou de jaarlijkse vraag naar nikkel 
en molybdeen met zo’n 10-30% vergroten. Dit is een logisch gevolg van de 
additionele infrastructuur die nodig is voor het afvangen, het transport en de opslag 
van de CO2 (speciale staalsoorten), in combinatie met lager rendement van de 
centrales zelf. Het overschakelen naar een elektriciteitsmix gebaseerd op niet-fossiele 
energiebronnen zal een veel grotere vraag naar nikkel, uranium, zilver, molybdeen, en 
in mindere mate, koper en aluminium tot gevolg hebben. Voor PV, biomassa (op afval 
na) en wind zit deze vergroting in de range van een paar procent tot een factor 1000. 
Dit betekent dat de winning van deze metalen sterk zal moeten worden uitgebreid om 
aan de vraag te kunnen voldoen. Niet alle niet-fossiele technologieën zijn 
metaalintensiever dan fossiele brandstof gebaseerde elektriciteit. Voor kernenergie, 
waterkracht en biomassa afval zijn relatief weinig metalen nodig, met uitzondering van 
uranium voor kernenergie. In het geval van PV en wind zijn de metalen met name 
nodig voor de productie van de PV zonnecellen en windturbines zelf. Voor 
gecultiveerde biomassa komt de vraag naar metalen vooral voort uit de materiaal 
intensieve landbouwprocessen, waaronder de productie van landbouwmachines en 
kunstmest.        
 
De afgelopen decennia was in veel ontwikkelde landen een trend zichtbaar van een 
afnemende materiaalintensiteit per eenheid BNP. Wanneer klimaatverandering deze 
landen dwingt om over te schakelen op alternatieve energiebronnen, zal deze trend in 
de energiesector worden doorbroken. Het soort materiaal dat nodig is hangt sterk af 
van de keuze voor specifieke technologieën. Zo wordt de hoge zilverbehoefte in PV 
met name veroorzaakt door de keuze voor mono-kristallijne silicium cellen. Andere 
PV technologieën kennen echter weer hun eigen materiaal gerelateerde problemen. De 
huidige dunne film CdTe en CIGS gebaseerde cellen zullen geconfronteerd worden 
met de schaarste van de benodigde grondstoffen lang voordat ze een significante 
bijdrage leveren aan de elektriciteitsproductie. De 2 MW offshore windturbines met 
een versnellingsbak die gebruikt wordt in de berekeningen in Hoofdstuk 4 bevatten 
geen neodymium gebaseerde permanente magneten. Echter, veel van de nieuwe 
direct-drive turbines die weinig onderhoud vergen, bevatten zo’n 150 kg neodymium 
per MW. Het opschalen van deze technologie tot een niveau van tientallen GW zou 
een geweldige opschaling vergen van de huidige jaarlijkse productie van dit zeldzame 
aardmetaal die op dit moment 18000 ton per jaar bedraagt. De Chinese overheid heeft 
recent aangekondigd dat de te installeren capaciteit van windenergie in 2050, 1000 
GW zou moeten bedragen. Wanneer al deze turbines op de direct-drive technologie 
gebaseerd zouden zijn, zou hiervoor 30 maal de huidige jaarlijkse wereldproductie van 






Hoofdstuk 5: Metaalschaarste: acute dreiging, eeuwigdurend probleem of 
dwaalspoor 
In Hoofdstuk 5 worden de diverse aspecten van vraag en aanbod van metalen 
geanalyseerd. In combinatie met de andere hoofdstukken wordt de kwestie besproken 
of de metaalbehoefte van de energietransitie, gecombineerd met gebruik in andere 
sectoren zal leiden tot een significante schaarste op korte en middellange termijn. 
 
Ondanks het feit dat de planeet Aarde eindig is, is de omvang van de voorraden nog 
geen beperkende factor geweest voor de productie van metalen. Hoewel de 
ertskwaliteit achteruit gaat zijn de voorraden metaal in laagwaardige ertsen tot nog toe 
steeds groter gebleken dan die in de hoogwaardige ertsen. Uiteindelijk zijn er altijd nog 
ultieme reserves in de vorm van oceaanwater en veelvoorkomende gesteenten. Tot op 
heden zijn de beschikbare voorraden van vrijwel alle metalen in omvang gegroeid in 
plaats van gekrompen, ondanks, of misschien wel juist vanwege, een exponentiële 
groei in winning. Dit is echter geen garantie dat de productie de komende decennia de 
exponentiële groei in vraag kan blijven bijhouden. 
 
De schaal waarop materialen aan het milieu worden onttrokken is groter dan ooit. 
Globalisering, deels gedreven door goedkoop massatransport, heeft vrijwel elke 
uithoek van de wereld toegankelijk gemaakt voor exploratie en mijnbouw. 
Globalisering is echter eindig. De overgebleven onontdekte voorraden liggen vrijwel 
allemaal in gebieden waar de mijnbouw moeilijk zal zijn of onder een laag van één of 
meer kilometer gesteente. Bovendien lijken de kosten van massatransport hun laagste 
punt te hebben bereikt als gevolg van beperkingen in de opschaling van 
mammoetschepen en stijgende brandstofkosten.     
 
De snelheid waarmee metalen kunnen worden gewonnen is beperkt, analoog aan  
conventionele olie. De snelheid van winning wordt beperkt door de beschikbaarheid 
van geschoolde arbeiders, de benodigde energie en, niet onbelangrijk, de 
milieugevolgen van de winning. In de twee periodes in het recente verleden waarin de 
prijzen van metalen hoog waren (jaren 50 en 80) werden deze hoge prijzen 
veroorzaakt door een snel groeiende vraag gecombineerd met onzekerheid over de 
toevoer naar de OECD. Hoewel in de huidige geglobaliseerde wereld de snel 
groeiende vraag nog steeds een belangrijke factor is, is de geopolitieke onzekerheid 
over de toevoer nu een mondiaal probleem geworden. Daarnaast zijn er op dit 
moment ook problemen zichtbaar bij winning. Mijnbouwbedrijven hebben grote 
moeite om de vraag bij te houden om allerlei redenen, waaronder teruglopende 
ertskwaliteit, nieuwe ertslagen die kleiner zijn en dieper liggen en milieueisen. 
 
Daarnaast leven we in een tijd waarin we voor het eerst echt op wereldschaal worden 
geconfronteerd met de verbondenheid van de verschillende natuurlijke hulpbronnen. 
Als de ertskwaliteit achteruit gaat, is er meer energie nodig om metalen te winnen uit 
de ertsen terwijl we tegelijkertijd meer metalen nodig hebben voor de energietransitie 
die nodig is om het klimaatprobleem het hoofd te bieden. Watergebruik, ruimtelijke 




metalen. Deze elkaar versterkende grenzen aan de groei zullen een uitdaging vormen 
voor toekomstige generaties. Als we voor de hand liggende beperkingen als gevolg van 
materiaalschaarste willen voorkomen, zullen we onze technologieën zorgvuldig 
moeten kiezen.     
  
De vraag naar metalen zal de komende decennia exponentieel blijven stijgen. Een van 
de belangrijkste oorzaken is de snelle verstedelijking welke zal leiden tot een massale 
groei van steden en bijbehorende infrastructuur. Bovendien zal de economische groei 
in de opkomende economieën leiden tot de productie van steeds meer complexe 
producten, en daarmee groeiende vraag naar metalen. De transitie naar een duurzame 
koolstofarme energievoorziening vraagt ook een omvangrijke stroom materialen. 
Voor sommige metalen zal dit betekenen dat de huidige productie enkele malen zal 
moeten worden opgeschaald. Het meest cruciale aspect is echter dat we al deze 
metalen in de komende decennia nodig hebben om klimaatverandering het hoofd te 
kunnen bieden.    
 
Het is zeer onwaarschijnlijk dat de optimisten doctrine van steeds maar groeiende 
voorraden en dalende prijzen de komende decennia waar zal blijven. Wanneer de 
voorspellingen voor verstedelijking bewaarheid worden en wanneer 
klimaatverandering substantieel wordt aangepakt, zullen we de komende decennia het 
equivalent bouwen van alle steden die er nu zijn, zal het gemiddelde inkomen per 
capita met een factor drie toenemen en bouwen we vanuit niets een geheel nieuw 
duurzaam energiesysteem. Mijnbouw en exploratie worden op dit moment al 
geconfronteerd met beperkingen als gevolg van milieueffecten en water-, land- en 
energiegebruik en hebben daarom nu al moeite om de vraag bij te houden. Een ruime 
beschikbaarheid van metalen is niet alleen nodig voor de productie van onze favoriete 
gadgets, het is ook onmisbaar om in 2050 negen miljard mensen van voedsel, 
onderdak en duurzame energie te voorzien.  
 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 Het combineren van IE en IEA methoden: de PVC case 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een case studie van een fictief verbod op PVC gebruikt om aan 
te tonen dat zelfs de complexiteit in een beperkt onderdeel van het industrieel 
complex, de chloorindustrie, een substantiële invloed kan hebben op de uitkomst van 
de analyse. Noch de methoden van de Integrated Environmental Assessment, noch 
die van de Industrial Ecology zijn in staat de connecties die binnen de chloorindustrie 
bestaan volledig in beschouwing te nemen.  
 
Met LCA ontstaat een beeld van veranderingen in een grotere groep milieuaspecten 
wanneer PVC wordt vervangen door andere materialen. Met SFA wordt het belang 
van de chloorketen duidelijk. De reikwijdte van methoden zoals LCA en SFA is echter 
beperkt omdat de analyse van de milieueffecten in deze methoden generiek is. Het 




Alle methoden en modellen die we gebruiken zijn slechts een beperkte afspiegeling 
van de werkelijkheid en dus per definitie minder gedetailleerd. Dit betekent dat niet 
alle verbanden kunnen worden meegenomen in de methoden en modellen die worden 
gebruikt. 
 
Zelfs een combinatie van deze methoden is ontoereikend om alle effecten in 
beschouwing te nemen. Er is duidelijk behoefte aan een bredere systeemanalyse die 
kan worden gebruikt om de daadwerkelijke gevolgen van een verbod op PVC te 
analyseren, nog voordat specifieke methoden voor nadere analyse worden gekozen. 
De vorm van deze bredere systeemanalyse kan variëren van een materiaal- en 
productstroomdiagram tot een dynamische en gekwantificeerde analyse. Pas nadat een 
dergelijke analyse duidelijk heeft gemaakt wat er waarschijnlijk in de praktijk zal 
gebeuren is de tijd gekomen om specifieke IEA, IE methoden of een combinatie 
daarvan te selecteren om de gevolgen van beleid en/of activiteiten te kwantificeren. 
Dit is niet hetzelfde als het simpelweg kiezen van de juiste methode of het juiste 
model en of de juiste parameters. Een brede systeemanalyse kan niet worden 
gestandaardiseerd, deze verschilt van geval tot geval en is een op maat gemaakte 
holistische analyse. Recente ontwikkelingen op het gebied van Life Cycle Sustainability 
Analysis kunnen gezien worden als een stap in deze richting.     
 
Hoofdstuk 7 Overall conclusies, algemene discussie en onderzoeksagenda  
In dit hoofdstuk worden de resultaten gepresenteerd in de vorm van een reeks 
conclusies. De belangrijkste reflecteren op de centrale onderzoeksvragen uit 
Hoofdstuk 1 en hebben betrekking op het belang van metalen in de menselijke 
geschiedenis, de ontwikkeling van het debat over grondstofschaarste met een focus op 
metalen, de metaalbehoefte van de energietransitie en de bruikbaarheid van Industrial 
Ecology methoden om de milieugevolgen van grootschalige transities te analyseren. 
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